posted on Sep, 10 2012 @ 08:35 AM
reply to post by freemarketsocialist
What, exactly, are you driving at? That unemployment will usher in hyperinflation? That a basket reserve currency will usher in hyperinflation?
That hyperinflation will usher in hyperinflation?
I could accept an argument as plausible that loss of reserve status would mean the U.S. would no longer be in a position to export its own
inflationary policy. Accepting that as a possibility is not, however, a shoo-in that hyperinflation will follow.
But maybe? Yeah, maybe; however, there's one question that needs to be addressed with that possibility. How will the U.S. government service its
long-term obligations under a regime of long-term hyperinflation? Do you anticipate the U.S. government will function under a regime of long-term
hyperinflation for the next, what, 70 plus years? The U.S. government certainly can't produce the present value of its present, long-term obligations
(in terms of savings) and invest such monies to pay for its own programs. Evidently, then, the U.S. government will have to operate under a regime of
long-term (and I mean "long-term") hyperinflation to service its long-term obligations (i.e., unfunded liabilities).
Your emphasis on hyperinflation skips over a key aspect that long-term obligations are a matter of law. More than that the progressive laws (i.e.,
long-term obligations) are a matter of not-so-minor sentiment among members of the U.S. population. So what is more likely: 1) the U.S. government
will default in specific areas of its long-term debt, or 2) the U.S. government will adopt a policy of long-term hyperinflation to service its
long-term, unfunded liabilities?
Notwithstanding the option you think the commissars in the District of Columbia would opt for, which would you choose?
I'm going to assume neither option, but am nonetheless curious what the free_market_socialist's answer will be.
edit on 10-9-2012 by
Kovenov because: changed "service its debt" to "service its long-term, unfunded liabilities?"