posted on Oct, 6 2004 @ 05:55 PM
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page Five: Chemical
(source: www.CIA.gov)
Key Findings
Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions
were judged favorable:
Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy's superior numerical strength, a
weapon that had saved the nation at least once already?during the Iran-Iraq war?and contributed to deterring
the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.
While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq
unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications
that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad's desire
to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.
The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of
the entire stockpile; however, ISG inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or
deployment of chemical weapons.
Iraq's CW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under
sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military
and civilian organizations, followed by an infl ux of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to
reinvigorate its industrial base.
Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) fi nancially
unsound and in a state of almost complete disarray.
Saddam implemented a number of changes to the Regime's organizational and programmatic structures after
the departure of Husayn Kamil.
Iraq's acceptance of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of Iraq's economic recovery and
sparked a fl ow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to projects for Iraq's chemical industry.
The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base
needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from
the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction
and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production
of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CWrelated
efforts.
The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization
experts from the former CW program.
Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of
these projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq's infrastructure, which would have
enhanced Iraq's ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented.
Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due to sanctions.
ISG found no evidence that this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however
documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this system.
Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure,
although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not
regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF).
ISG did not discover chemical process or production units confi gured to produce key precursors or CW
agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfi guring and
'making-do' with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items.
ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefi ngs, that Iraq at OIF probably
had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.
A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in signifi cant
quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no
credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its
existing procurement networks for sanctioned items.
In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the location and use of all existing dualuse
process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed activities,
if required by the Regime.
One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system for important dual-use process
plants.
Iraq's historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the
capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences
for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have signifi cantly jeopardized its chances of having sanctions lifted or
no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization
activities.
ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental
CW rounds. The available evidence is insuffi cient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe
of activities.
Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions, throughout the 1990s, many of which
had previously been adapted for fi lling with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of
weaponization activities.
Saddam's Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi offi cers and included
the concept of a "red-line" or last line of defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever
included a trigger for CW use.
Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq, information
acquired after OIF does not confi rm the inclusion of CW in Iraq's tactical planning for OIF. We believe
these were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions.
Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been highly compartmentalized
within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence that any fi eld elements knew about plans for CW use
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Uday?head of the Fedayeen Saddam?attempted to obtain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according
to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons.
ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003
a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for
intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform
from which to continue CW agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was
planned. (See Annex A.)
ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents
in these laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents
including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research
or production, however many of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews
with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded very little information about the IIS' activities
in this area.
The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.
The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.
ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemical
weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents,
interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities
noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related.
ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot?the storage site that was
judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no
CW activity, unlike previously assessed.