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The contractors in Iraq
The roles of the contractors
Gross violations and abuses that the contractors did
US Government Documents (UNCLASSIFIED)
The Tourism Board of the Iraq Ministry of State Tourism and Antiquities Affairs claims to be very eager to repossess the hotel at REO Hillah and be compensated for rent and associated damages.
For fiscal year 2009, the Department has 10 ongoing or planned capital improve -ment projects at REO Hillah valued at $3.8 million
However, Iraq’s complex and difficult security situation, with its overlapping sectarian, political, and ethnic conflicts, makes operating and supporting a forward-deployed USG civilian presence a challenging and expensive proposition. Embassy Baghdad calculates that it costs the Department more than $75 million annually, and that nearly 700 contractors are employed to secure, operate, and maintain REO Hil-lah in Babil Province. Before its February 2009 closure, annual operation expenses for REO Kirkuk in Kirkuk Province were $40 million.
The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), is responsible for protecting personnel, facilities, and information—both domestic and abroad.
In mid-2004, the Department negotiated sole-source letter contracts with Blackwater Security Consulting and with Triple Canopy for personal security services in Iraq, which were already providing personal protective services in Iraq to the CPA under Department of Defense contracts. In June 2005, the Department awarded its second Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract to three companies—Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and DynCorp International, LLC.
total estimated costs for the Department’s contracts and task orders with Blackwater for Iraq were over $1 billion as of May 29, 2008.
The letter contract with Blackwater became effective on June 11, 2004,5 and was de initized on February 9, 2005. The contract was for a fixed price of $106,209,242 and a 1-year performance period from June 11, 2004, through June 10, 2005
The contract performance period was ultimately extended to September 10, 2006, and total contract costs increased to $332,472,205.
Private security contractors are the second largest military or paramilitary presence inIraq, after the United States. These contractors are more than double in number of the UnitedKingdom soldiers stationed in Iraq, who as the second largest contingent of coalition combattroops, number approximately 8500.6
The United States Department of Defense (DOD), and other government agencies responsible for reconstruction efforts, greatly underestimated the threat from insurgents or terrorists during Iraqi post conflict operations. The security situation was becoming worse during the summer of 2003, and by August of that year, it was clear with the bombing of the United Nations complex that the emerging insurgency was now targeting nonmilitary targets
For all of 2003, and most of the first half of 2004, senior U.S. officials and officersdid not act on a plan or respond effectively to the growing insurgency. They keptreferring to the attackers as “terrorists,”
This misread on the growing insurgency resulted in a gap between what security the coalition forces, limited by the number of troops on the ground, could provide, and the need for security to enable reconstruction. This gap was really the birth of the private security
While there is no mechanism in place to track the number of private security providers doing business in Iraq or the number of people working as private security employees, DOD estimates that there are at least 60 private security providers working in Iraq with perhaps as many as 25,000 employees
The complex battle space in Iraq gets more complex each and every day with the addition of more private security companies. Private contractors involved in the reconstruction efforts in Iraq are generally on their own to provide security and have done so by using a myriad of private security contractors
The growing presence of private security contractors operating in Iraq has also caused another problem – the shooting and intimidation of innocent Iraqi civilians.
Private security companies drive their distinctive sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) with heavily armed personnel in them up and down the highways and city streets in Iraq. The individual private security contractors wave their arms and point their rifles to clear traffic in their path in order to protect convoys they are escorting
These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the place
The shootings became so frequent in Baghdad this summer that Horst [ADC (M) for 3ID)] started keeping his own count in a white spiral notebook he uses to record daily events
Mr.Bicanic stated further in his interview that Iraqi laws do not apply to private security companies and as a result, the private security contractor is not liable. As a result, when something happens, like a shooting, the person responsible is usually just removed from the country. 26 So in reality, the deputy interior minister has no authority to oversee the private security companies operating in his country. No wonder the Iraqi citizens are irate when a shooting occurs
The solution is clear; in order for the new Iraqi government to be recognized as a sovereign country, it must be responsible for every aspect of security in Iraq
Sample Contract Pages Deemed Appropriate
While there are tactical risks in phasing out private security contractors, the risks in doing nothing are much greater. Currently, there are no controls on how many private security companies or contractors operate in Iraq – today, tomorrow, or two years down the road