From all my reading, Kim Jong Il cannot sustain the 6 month warplan logistics that he attempts to justify his nations staggering social and civil poverty by.

I don't see him gaining anything from the use of NoDong/TapaeDong capabilties because, even with Russian R-27 storeable liquid propellant technology, he cannot build a sufficiently large stockpile to be able to hostage (counterforce) sufficient key targets (Oki, Guam, Misawa, Hawaii, Eilsen/Elmendorf to name just a few) -outside- the Peninsular Theater Surrounds as to prevent a U.S. overwhelming response. Probably by USN SLBM's with reconfigured, 'penetrator/leadership kill' heavy warhead busses.

But. What if his objective is more limited? Say /2 Weeks/ worth of intensive fighting to get into Seoul and 2-3 other urban centers and to isolate if not flatten _local_ APOD/SPOD disembarkation points further South on the Korean Peninsula?

Can he use 'back of APC' 50-100K nuclear weapons as battlefield breakout tools to force the ROK troops to go to distributed formations and then get into Korean FIBUA conditions sufficiently quickly shift to 'atomic suitcase' (ala the missing Russian 20 odd weapons) countervalue tactics?

What would be the ROK leadership response in terms of requesting U.S. atomic intervention on it's own soil. What would be the U.S. response if the ROK leadership were killed? What would be the Chinese response to direct (B61-11 or better) multistrike on the DPRK within 200nm of Bejing?
What would the overall political outlook be for the U.S., worldwide, as a nation that had 'won the war but eggfaced it's ally'? Would there be any deliberate purpose in KJI also issuing nuclear 'demolition' kit to various terror forces to distract U.S. military and political response in other areas? Or would it be wiser to attempt to infiltrate CONUS and similarly hold 5-10 block areas at equivalent risk to 'send in the troops if you dare!' tactics by which the mouse could actually roar louder than the Eagle as a function of attempting to enforce an 'occupational handover and withdrawal' of U.S. forces from the Peninsula? Does The North have the means to implement MORE weapons of smaller yield (i.e. scaleable plutonium inserts and easier maintenance of the weapons stockpile) or is their current Yongbon 'steamfired WMD' processor simply too limited to issue large numbers of microyield weapons in the .3-5K range?

Scenario Playouts and Other Opinions Welcome. KP