Originally posted by GenRadek
reply to post by homervb
Wow! I havent seen such ignorant commentary in a long time from a truther. Oh wait, yes I have.
Your personal incredulity notwithstanding, why are you regurgitating the FALSE facts and ASSUMPTIONS based solely on incredulity from all of those
damned fool conspiracy sites? Do some actual research regarding the education background of most of the hijackers. Then I want you to explain how
our "air defense" system works, since I can tell the only place you learned about it is from the movies and other ignorant sources. Also I wish for
you to explain to me the SOP that was enacted with regards to airliner hijackings, prior to 9/11/01. Once you can correctly give me all of this
information, then we'll see if you can provide anything useful to the thread.
Three months before Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration changed the protocol for responding to commercial hijackings.
Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense under President George W. Bush, issued directive J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on June 1, 2001.
Prior to Rumsfeld’s protocol change, some experts believe that the authority to shoot down a hijacked airplane was delegated by the president to the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 9/11 Commission concluded that approval was needed from the president to shoot down the hijacked
Rumsfeld’s position has been that the 2001 directive merely updated a 1997 directive by clarifying language relating to the protocol for responding
to hijacked aircrafts.
Directive J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A—which Rumsfeld issued to the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff on June 1, 2001—states: “When notified that
military escort aircraft are needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified
command or USELEMNORAD to determine if suitable aircraft are available and forward the request to the secretary of defense for approval in accordance
with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7.”
The language “aircraft piracy” or “hijackings” is not included in the 1997 directive, which J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A replaced.
Compare section 4.5 of the directive 3025.15 issued Feb. 18, 1997: “With the exception of immediate responses under imminently serious conditions,
as provided in subparagraph 4.7.1 below, any support that requires the deployment of forces or equipment assigned to a combatant command by secretary
of defense memorandum, must be coordinated with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Saff. The chairman shall evaluate each request to use combatant
command forces or equipment to determine if there is a significant issue requiring secretary of defense approval. Orders providing assistance to civil
authorities that are approved by the secretary of defense involving the use of combatant command forces or equipment shall be issued through the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon secretary of defense approval, the secretary of the army, when designated ‘the DoD Executive Agent,’
shall implement and oversee DoD support in accordance with such approval orders.”
Section 4.6 continues: “This Directive does not address non-Federalized National Guard assets in support of local and/or state civil agencies
approved by the governor.”
Section 4.7.1: “Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any form of immediate action taken by a DoD component or military commander to save lives,
prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions) may be made to any component or command.”
On Sept. 11, 2001, General Richard Myers was acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Henry Shelton, chairman, was out of the country. General
Myers was promoted to chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff three days after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
According to Myers’ testimony before the 9/11 Commission on June 17, 2004, “The Chairman serves as the principal military advisor to the
president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense; and makes recommendations to Congress. The chairman’s responsibilities
include strategic planning, contingency planning and readiness of the armed forces.
“Unified command roles are directed by Title 10 and the Unified Command Plan. Each of the combatant commander’s chain of command runs through the
secretary of defense to the President. Several other documents outlined the armed forces’ roles and responsibilities in combating terrorism: The
National Security Strategy for a Global Age (2000), Presidential Decision Directives 39 (1995) and 62 (1998), and the National Military Strategy