reply to post by SteveR
A glance at a map of Central and Eastern Europe at about the time of the First World War is revealing. The so-called Pale of Jewish Settlement covered
much of Russia east of the Urals, the Ukraine, Poland, Prussia and the Baltic states. Despite a multitude of pogroms and other abuses and atrocities
under the Soviets and others, there were still millions of Jews resident in these countries when they were overrun by the Nazis – as well as in
Hungary, Austria, Romania and other countries that came under German influence or direct rule during the Nazi period.
The Jewish population of Germany itself was just a drop in the bucket – and it was a far more prosperous and integrated Jewish population, featuring
unusually high rates of intermarriage with Gentiles, than those of the countries I have just named. Many German Jews escaped the Holocaust, but for
all that the figure of six million dead is pretty well documented.
Incidentally, the Nazis were nowhere near as efficient and effective as the modern myth has it. Industrial production in Nazi Germany consistently
lagged behind Allied countries even before the great Allied bombing campaigns commenced around 1942. Hermann Göring, who was minister in charge of
industry, made a hopeless mess of things until Hitler replaced him with Albert Speer, also in 1942. A telling example of the kind of blundering
confusion that was Nazi industrial and armaments policy is the development history of the Ju88 fighter-bomber, one of Göring's pet projects.
Also, and crucially, women were never made an integral part of the war effort in Germany as they were in Britain, the USA and other Allied nations –
Rosie the Riveter never had a German counterpart. Nor were many other manpower resources (including, astonishingly, that of Jewish slave labour and
more generally the use of forced labour under the Organization Todt) used to best effect.
And militarily, the Nazis were hopeless; it was visionary tank commanders like Rommel and Guderian who shaped the Blitzkreig
and won the
psychologically important first victories of the war, but as early as the end of the Battle of Britain the disconnect between Hitler's fantasies of
military glory and the real situation on the ground had become unsustainable. And as the war wore on and losses began to mount, the professional
generals and admirals who might have turned the situation around found themselves supplanted by Hitler and his cronies when it came to making military
decisions. German defeat was then inevitable.
Take these facts, add to them the implausible, unsustainable financial trickery by which German rearmament was financed during the 1930s and the
ridiculous Nazi-prosecuted war against itself that German society was already engaged in long before international hostilities commenced, and it
becomes patent that the myth of Nazi potency was just that – a myth. Even the famously efficient extermination camps took time to hit their stride;
at first they were simply overwhelmed by the number of Jews and others arriving for 'processing'.
By the way, why have you made me your 'respected foe'? Have you got something against Lord Acton?
edit on 7/3/12 by Astyanax because: of strategic errors and tactical blunders.