North Korea and the IAEA: Thier History Together, page 1
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Topic started on 20-9-2004 @ 08:49 AM by FredT
The history of North Koreas nuclear program is a long one. This fact sheet was taken from the IAEA's website (link at the bottom). Its interesting that the NK program has its origins the the 60's using Soviet assistance and by 1979 they had developed thier own. It was not untill the 90's that the IAEA began to suspect that thee was undeclared uranium. Thats alot of time. The question is how much plutonium does Kim really have? Anyway its an interesting read from a historical perspective, and given all the NK nuke post, I thought it made for a good backgrounder.


FACT SHEET ON DPRK NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS (8 January 2003)
1980s: Origins of Nuclear Safeguards. On 12 December 1985 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On 10 April 1992 the NPT Safeguards Agreement entered into force (INFCIRC/403). Before that, in 1977, the country had concluded an INFCIRC/66 type Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/252) for two nuclear research facilities (the IRT research reactor and a critical assembly).

Two-Phased Programme. Two phases are to be distinguished in the DPRK's nuclear programme. The first started at the end of the fifties and was set up with Soviet assistance. In that period a nuclear complex was constructed at Nyongbyong, where in the 1960s a number of facilities were built. The second - indigenous - phase started in 1979 with the construction of a 5 MW(e) natural uranium, graphite moderated reactor in Nyongbyong. In the same period an ore processing plant and a fuel rod fabrication plant were built. By the time the 5 MW(e) reactor became operational in 1986, construction of the first of two larger gas-graphite reactors began and around 1987, also in Nyongbyong, the construction of a Radiochemical Laboratory with a sizeable reprocessing capacity started.

1990s: IAEA Safeguards Inspections. After the DPRK had submitted its initial report to the IAEA under its Safeguards Agreement in May 1992, inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the DPRK's initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centring on a mismatch between declared plutonium product and nuclear waste solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that there existed in the DPRK undeclared plutonium. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste. The DPRK, however, refused access to the sites.

Special Inspection. Thereupon, the Director General invoked in February 1993 the special inspection procedure provided for in the Safeguards Agreement. The request for a special inspection was refused by the DPRK and the Board of Governors on 1 April 1993 concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and, in line with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, referred this non-compliance to the UN Security Council. On 11 May 1993, the Council called upon the DPRK to comply with the Agreement. In parallel with these developments, on 12 March 1993, the DPRK announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT, but in June 1993 "suspended the effectuation" of that withdrawal.

Prelude to Security Council Action. During 1993 and 1994 the IAEA was permitted by the DPRK to conduct safeguards activities with a limited scope only (containment, surveillance and maintenance) with the sole purpose of ensuring, as the DPRK phrased it, the "continuity of safeguards" versus "full implementation" demanded by the Agency. The Director General reported as early as December 1993 to the Board that the kind of limited safeguards permitted by the DPRK could no longer be said to provide any meaningful assurance of the peaceful use of the DPRK's declared nuclear installations. Based on the Director General's report, the UN Security Council, on 31 March 1994, again called upon the DPRK to enable the inspectors to complete their required activities.

June 1994 IAEA Board Resolution. In the context of the special inspection request it was vital for the Agency to ascertain whether the core of the DPRK's 5 MW(e) Experimental Nuclear Power reactor was the first core as claimed by the DPRK. However, in May 1994, the DPRK hastily discharged the fuel from the 5 MW(e) reactor in such a way that the IAEA was not able to conduct the verification activities that could have clarified the history of the core. On 30 May 1994, in his statement, the President of the Security Council called for immediate consultations between the DPRK and the Agency in connection with the further discharge of the core, and, on 10 June 1994, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which concluded that "the DPRK is continuing to widen its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement by taking actions which prevent the Agency from verifying the history of the reactor core and from ascertaining whether nuclear material from the reactor had been diverted in past years". The Board also decided to suspend all non-medical technical assistance to the DPRK.

www.iaea.or.at...


[edit on 20-9-2004 by FredT]
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