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Blix's statements about the Iraq WMD program came to contradict the claims of the George W. Bush administration, [5] and attracted a great deal of criticism from supporters of the invasion of Iraq. In an interview on BBC TV on 8 February 2004, Dr. Blix accused the US and British governments of dramatising the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, in order to strengthen the case for the 2003 war against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Ultimately, no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction were found. [6]
en.wikipedia.org...-2003.29
UN nuclear watchdog IAEA has been closely cooperating with the world’s spy agencies, including on Iran, for years, former head of the agency, Hans Blix, told RT. The cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with the world’s intelligences started following the Iraqi crisis of the1990s.
“Of course, intelligence can always try to fool everybody,” he said. “Half of the information may be true, half of it may be disinformation, and therefore they have to examine it critically.” Hans Blix, who was the chief of the agency in 1981-1997, stressed that the IAEA has been very “cautious about the information they have received about Iran.”
“The combination of the tools of national states and the inspectors who are there legally on a site is very useful,” he said.
"If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament -- under resolution 687 -- could have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided."
On May 25, 1994, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee released a report in which it was stated that "pathogenic (meaning 'disease producing'), toxigenic (meaning 'poisonous'), and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. Department of Commerce." It added: "These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction."[30]
The report then detailed 70 shipments (including Bacillus anthracis) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years, concluding "It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the UN inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program."[31]
en.wikipedia.org...
Mikheil SaakashviliState of the Union Address 2012 Watch live here! www.facebook.com
Here we go again: What did the president know? And when did he know it?
Those are the serious questions raised by a White House announcement that the president made a bogus case about the need to go to war against Iraq in this year’s State of the Union address.
Don’t give the White House high marks for candor, however. Presidential aides didn’t volunteer word of the president’s mistake. They were forced to admit his untruth only after a blockbuster revelation by former U.S. Acting Ambassador to Iraq Joseph Wilson.
Writing in the New York Times, the 23-year career diplomat Wilson revealed he was sent to Niger by the CIA in early 2002 to investigate rumors, based on letters intercepted by European intelligence agencies, that Saddam Hussein was attempting to buy uranium from the former French colony.
Eight days later, he reported back to the CIA there was no truth to the rumors. That information was shared by the CIA with the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House.
Imagine Wilson’s surprise, then, when he heard President Bush declare in his Jan. 28 address to the nation: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”
Based on his own research for the Bush administration, Wilson knew that charge was untrue. He also knew the White House was aware of his findings, because the vice president’s office had specifically requested a copy of his report.
Colin Powell, the US secretary of state at the time of the Iraq invasion, has called on the CIA and Pentagon to explain why they failed to alert him to the unreliability of a key source behind claims of Saddam Hussein's bio-weapons capability.
Responding to the Guardian's revelation that the source, Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi or "Curveball" as his US and German handlers called him, admitted fabricating evidence of Iraq's secret biological weapons programme, Powell said that questions should be put to the US agencies involved in compiling the case for war.
www.guardian.co.uk...
Originally posted by Corruption Exposed
reply to post by skonaz
I don't know the guy, but he seems a lot more level headed than most other people who have shared similar positions on the world stage.
Would it be a bother if I asked you why you hate the guy?edit on 28-2-2012 by Corruption Exposed because: (no reason given)
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a
genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam’s regime was tough and based on
extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried
and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming.
His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale
was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now
seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justifi ed by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience
with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little
discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4
August.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were
three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The fi rst and second
could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be diffi cult. The situation
might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in
the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing
the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right,
people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether
we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the fi rst, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing
to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse
and urban warfi ghting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added
the Defence Secretary.
Originally posted by IsraeliGuy
Personally I think there is nothing here to argue for or against because he is neither in the IAEA any longer, nor is he inside CIA to actually know what he is talking about. Other than that, as you said, this is entirely his opinion and it can never be stated as fact as long as he has not even one single evidence to point by his accusations.
But this is not why I decided to reply. From your own link I've found something interesting which that guy said.
"If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament -- under resolution 687 -- could have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided."
Can't help myself thinking about Iran aswell. If they are or aren't building nukes is one thing, but interrupting IAEA's work and not co-operating with them may result in further sanctions that may result in war.
All of this just because they aren't ready to 'submit' to an IAEA investigation?
And please, don't bring up the "IAEA FOUND NOTHING" point because for every source you give I can provide two that state the IAEA saying Iran doesn't even comply, so obviously nothing can be found.