USAF: Indian Exercises Showed Need For F/A-22, Changes In Training

I've only been to Jane's once and bugged out because of the need for a password... I presented hardcore data; up to you whether you want to look it up or not...




In all honesty, our Eagle fleet isn’t nearly as capable as it should be.

It's not as capable(F-15C/non-AESA) as it could be, but who has a fleet of air superiority aircraft that comes close in capability, or numbers??

Honestly, I would like to see an overhaul project of the F-15C aircraft. A program to supplement the slow supply of the Raptor, and ease costs. It could incorporate many of the usable upgrades(at least) that are standard on E-model aircraft into a single-seat platform, to include, but not limited to, the E-model mux bus system(AIUs, MPDS, MPDPS), essentially the glass cockpit, the updated electronic flight control system that is much more reliable(FCC, triple redundancy, etc), a modded ICMS system that replaces the hulking, environmentally sensitive boxes used today, but with the same basic function; and an all-inclusive AESA package.

Now, I've heard that this has been proposed as an alternative to the Raptor, which I don't agree with, as the F-22 is definitely the future and will reign as the premier fighter. I simply think it should be a cost-effective method to keep a high number of although not stealth, but more-than-capable air-superiority fighters.

In actuality, as currently stands, from what the local engineers here have told me, in Sep 05, Langley will begin sending their latest-model(85-86) C-models to Kadena AB to replace their oldest-model(78s) Cs, whilst Kadena begins filtering these jets to the Air National Guard. At the same time, of course, Langley should be building an active Raptor squadron, to begin replacing their F-15s before any other base(of course, the 1st Fighter Wing ). Now the Sep 05 figure is tentative, and has been pushed back before, so don't hold your breath.

All-in-all, don't expect the Eagle, and definitely not the Strike Eagle, to be going anywhere any time soon...they remain in the picture for years to come, as still no one truly comes close to it's force capability, whatsoever.

Oh I DO want to look it up because as far as I remember you never gave any technical data as such and all google rsults for raytheon AESA don't give the technicalities either..just the capabilities..which I've shown are more or less equal to the N011M..(unless one is in an engagement with over 50 aircraft)..So would you be so kind as to direct me to this hardcore data please..Much obliged..

I don't believe that you'll find a legal source of true specifications, even actual performance data, on the AESA APG-63 (V)2 radar system. Outside some of it's basic concepts, the whole system is quite highly classified.

i'm sry D i cant say that pilots name. i mean he might get into trouble;

Exactly my point...wonder what 'hardcore data he was talking about..:puuz:

Vishu..too bad, maybe you shouldn't have posted such in the first place, At least say if the guy is currently in Lohegaon, Pune and which squadron is he in..so I can maybe go and chat them up..

1. You /never/ use an offensive counter air platform like the Eagle in a DCA environment where you are tied to defense of a specific asset like a main operating base. Putting the hurt on the enemy's basing structure is OUR main objective. That's like a Cheyenne dog soldier tying his foot to the ground in the face of a Cavalry charge and saying "From here I shall not be moved!" Fixed asset defense is a problem for S2A systems to handle with their very much larger kill vehicles and multi-track radar systems plus ARM pits and decoys. The way you beat the IAF trying to attack YOUR airfield is by moving too far from their bases for their tiny jets to play ball. And putting a PAC-3 ERINT battery on all the likely approach routes as well as sitting on the runway intersection. And the USAF is stupid if they think otherwise, just on sortie-robbing from effective prosecution of an OFFENSIVE airwar.

Now, if you want to talk /anti access/ strategies that keep us operating on a very long AAR tether from whomever will let us in...

2. Everyone knows that the F-15 is a cripple when it comes to penetrating a well developed IADS, possessed of a MASSIVE all round signature, even the FQ mod ALQ-135 cannot fully mask, it has no HARM or HARM-cue capabilities (thanks to the weak wingtips and aggressively nasty underwing acoustics environment, the outboard pylons will never be activated and the inboards are almost de-rigeur tanked because the internal fuel fraction is so low) and this is why the F-16CJ.50 is the prefered offensive aircraft that the theater CINCs give the call to. And has been since the mid-90's when the Serbs made trolling attempts to drag us across the border into the S2A thickets of The BOz. Certainly the Numero Uno of A2A ops: radar functionality, is more up to date in the APG-68V8 thru 10 series apertures than it is in the APG-63V(1).
That said, the 3rd TFW is in fact the sole operator of the APG-63(V2) with one squadron of aircraft being so equipped with a 'brick level' AESA radar. Largely so that Boeing could then offer the equivalent technology for export. Nobody has taken them up on it because the radar is so massively heavy that it requires something like 400lbs of aft ballasting, which cannot be helpful to the type's aero performance. The APG-63V(3) will take this technology down to the 'tile' if not 'button' level and vastly improve the overall reliability and efficiencies of the airframe. Yet it is ONLY being considered (funded thru Raytheon as an R&D program I believe) if the F-15 itself receives a full 'Golden Eagle' modification which will be akin to the Hog Up/Falcon Up and Falcon CUPID programs in going where MSIP should have gone some 15 years ago. It will still be lipsticking the pig or crutching the geriatric however and particularly without rerated ramp system and 132/232 EFE engines, the Eagle is apt to become very sluggish with the added mass of structural bandaids.

3. Given the above, I would be very surprised if we /ever/ use F-15s again without AEW and proactive EA/DEAD support. Yet the presence of these assets is unlikely due to the dubious decision to operate over an _Indian_ instrumented EW range. Given they are direct technical allies of the FSU, I find little of merit in our being there at all. Furthermore, I see _no_ reference to S-300 or equivalent Gen-3/4 SAM systems being used and -that- is the primary threat driver. Similarly there is no mention of advanced illuminator/striker type detached section tactics using the MIDS/IDM modem which the 3rd TFW also has. These two systems would theoretically allow an AIM-120C7 or D equipped team (with 2-way, digital, datalinks to the missile) to attack the threat from highly divorced spatial positionings using a missile with an _11"_ motor extension. Since the lies about the doppler notch are largely exaggerated given the monopulse swing angle and multi-PRF tracking (which takes away the famous Russian 'anti-AMRAAM' tactic of cutting airspeed and then recovering for an MRM shot), the metric then becomes one of 'my six AIM-120 vs. your four R-77 or R-27AE' and the U.S. should be able to use COE or Contempt Of Engagement tactics to dictate pole numerics from the outset of engagement.

4. The notion of a need for 'Better Red Air' is contemptibly /laughable/ given the FACT that Nellis based Aggressors were doing anti-AMRAAM/anti-Wall-Of-Eagle tactics in the late 80's and were in fact _disbanded_ because they showed a gross lack of 'tact' in humiliating the the AIM-120/F-15 'big stick, little ball' combination. And we couldn't have that, now could we?. Snort.
Keeping in mind they were doing this with early generation F-16C.25 or .32 with the Pratt 220 motor and no AMRAAM option themselves, it is not in anyway unsurprising that roughly equivalent MiG-21 mod 'Bison' and early delivery Su-30 were able to challenge the F-15s ten years older. I would, again, be more interested in seeing the unrestricted use of radars over our MOAs and thus a comparitive evaluation of things like AIM-9X vs. Python-4/5 and Derby which the IAF is supposedly buying for their MiGs and Jags. MICA on the Mirage 2000 is another 'interesting' option. Because I think what you will see is that 60` bore on an 8-12nm (impact distance) AIM-120B or 12-15nm AIM-120C5 is going to BEAT the extant Russian and Israeli and French SRM classes. But that the '20km seeker on a 10km motor' AIM-9X (which was taken to Cope India btw.) will AGAIN cripple the Eagle as a platform too large to be doing WVR crap, with a micromissile intended for the 'small fighters' like the F/A-18 and F-16. God knows that's what killed all functionality in the AMRAAM until they got the electronics small enough to stuff another 5+void-6 inches of motor inside.

5. Until and unless they start giving us REAL flight test data on the F/A-22 (how fast, how far, what kind of an internal fuel fraction for wingloading/thrustloading/G-rating XYZ in terms of sustained supercruise) there will be no validity to the types claims of enhanced performance. Right now, the advertisment is for 100nm in and out at Mach 1.5 or better with a 400-450nm combat radii. This is NOTHING compared to the 800nm overall mission with 'half' (over enemy territory) in SSC. Stealth is worthless if it doesn't bring with it the legs to employ _away from_ such incredibly high signature, high risk (in a MEADS/Aster and S-400 age of 300+km weapons) assets as tankers BEFORE you cross the fence. Equally, if we are talking anti-access and 'raid-ial' distances from outside 500nm, ONLY sustained supercruise will buy you decent sortie numbers over target. Here, I am actually very optimistic. Because Air Force lies, and prevaricative silence actually reinforces the notion that a Raptor with 20-25,000lbs of internal fuel (the equivalent of an F-15C with 2-3 610 gallon tanks) is actually right up there in the 7-league-boots area. And we are only holding back on this fact until the utterly worthless JSF can be purchased. Of course the USAF 'never planned' on losing the F/A-22 as a viable production airframe 'in addition to' the F-35 so there may still be some hard choices when you are looking at a 2-3hr vs. 7-10hr cruise speed difference in the 700-800nm radius category. 1.25:1 manning ratios simply don't support the notion of a high value (limited inventory $$$$) force that can only generate 1 mission per day, per airframe, without KILLING the aircrew with fatigue. The UCAV is the only other option and the Armed Forces don't seem to care for our national security as much as they do assuring squatters rights for their 'voting majority' of cockpit unionists.

8. Lastly, and most worrying in many ways. Given VLO /works as advertised/, Air Supremacy shouldn't really be separated from Strike IMO. While 'Air Dominance' is about 80% DEAD and 20% A2A. The first means that if you tie an F/A-22 to a legacy force of F-Teens, _it's_ best cruise performance and ability to reach-back beyond the frontal layers of air defense will be no more or less than the loiter and coverage required to make the 15E/16C/18F pylon-mission happen with bigger bombs. And that is a shame because 90%+ of the target set can be dealt with using very small charges in a penetrating case munition, and the F/A-22 is the ONLY stealth jet to have nominally demonstrable LO carriage of these munitions in the GBU-39 on the BRU-61 in it's weapons bays. At the same time, ICAP-3 was cancelled by the USN after a single squadron of 'testing the electronics for the EA-18G' showboating while the rest of the Prowler fleet languishes and the AARGM was similarly abandoned in the hopes that Congress would once again step in and assure funding for these _critical_ EA/DEAD systems while the HG&U admirals went after more pretty hulls for their so called inshore/littoral program. Except Congress hasn't. And so you are once more looking at a 'purely air superiority' platform in the Raptor which _cannot defend itself_. But you are also staring in the eyeball an escort system (made up of 300nm small weasels cued on by RC-135) that itself is /highly/ vulnerable to the Gen-4 (ARH on a long loft IMU) SAMs. And may be facing DEWs in another 10 years or so.
ALL this is 'bad, very bad' when you consider the fact that the Raptor is supposed to itself be the 'enabler' force. The doorkicker element of GSTF which protects the B-2 and F-117 and EA-6B /before/ the F-legacy jets get into play.
And it can (now) only do so with a glide-out ballistic weapon whose average Mach point is going to be less than 1.4 for targets in the 20nm category. AND less than .75 for targets in the longreach areas of 50-80nm. HSAD/HSARM are in the running to replace HARM with a potentially ramjet driven + Quickbolt autonomously seekered (no more 'microwave oven' decoys!) _internal carriage_ weapon. But it too is very young as a program and thus apt to cribkill vulnerabilities as benchwork transitions to producing flight test hardware for a major weapons qualification.
ESPECIALLY given the low numbers of F/A-22 being purchased, the low numbers and protracted delays that are looking likely for the F-35. And the U.S. armed forces utterly moronic notions of why they won't buy UCAVs to act as sacrificial droid-air /instead/ of running a manned systems risk; there is simply no justification whatsoever to support the F/A-22 as a JDAM/SDB weasel aircraft. It cannot provide coverage of the flanks and forespace areas of even a small raid package against threats with such huge envelope bubbles and the abiltiy to put 'torpedo spread' salvoes of missiles into a seeker cube that is NOT dictated by launch-site detection threshold WEZ dynamics as the older SARH and CG systems were 1-shot:1-plane limited to.
S2A fires have claimed, by far, the majority of downed aircraft from the very earliest days of our taking warfare into the 3rd dimension. We MUST therefore begin to look at these platforms, no matter what the nominal letter in front of them, as systems which divorce themselves from the nominal 'predictive zone' of sensor-here, missile box there, cross coverage. While maintaining the ability to WIN missile chicken games, either with hypervelocity ramjet (HSARM) or sustained supersonics (Lethal MALD) that pushes our weapons out further, faster than their SAMs can come back at a very limited procurement of VLO assets.
I would also advocate the development of very low observable, endurant, UAVs to supplement the Darkstar scaleup used in OIF. Because these are the systems which will have to be available to use both LPI doppler radar and IRST lookdown in backtracing the launch plume and speed-rise of missiles coming out of 'dumbfire' launch boxes which are little more sophisticated than a U-Haul trailer with an ADGE datalink or 'roadside plugin' ability to take shot handoffs from other, outside, cueing sensors.
Missiles with hunting, classification capable, sensors are _worthless_ if you are flinging them upwards of 200km without precise cueing as to seeker footprint and restrictor data for trajectory optimization and no-collaterals flyout. And only a separate aperture can achieve this needle-from-hay localization from 'on-high'.
Can the Indian's help define this new operational metric by making (deliberate) fools of the USAF using predictably (AIMVAL/ACEVAL) and Bore-only AIM-9L shooting F-5Es 'beating' F-15s with AIM-7F) 'golf handicapped' tactics vs. technology leveraging?


I doubt it. KPl.

Being retired Air Force myself I'll give you some facts and not opinions about our capability. During my 20+ years of service I saw first hand what your tax money is paying for. Ninety percent of our weapons system are recycled crap. During the past fifthteen years I must say the equipment is getting better. When I served this nation on active duty what we had were
only paper tigers.
The soviet union were the true inovators in the aerospace field not us. Our military operated like a large corporation that was always on the verge of bankruptcy. This is still going on. Take a close look at the F-22 program and see how many airframes they have cancelled.
Hardware was not the only problem I encountered but finding funds to train
people how to use it was another. For example I was required to maintain my marksman proficiency anually. The military provided me with nothing to maintain my shooting ability. When I arrived at the shooting range they gave me a M-16 and one clip of ammunition. I was expected to hit the target down range at least six times. Assumig I past this does not make me a qualified marksman. On paper it looks great but in reality this was a shame. These proceedures happen all the time but do not add to your protection or safety.
As a civilian I had the opportunity to work closely with our mechanized Army and saw the same things happening that I whitnessed in the Air Force.

Hmmm i read about the India vs American engagement. Heard America lost 90 % but were also outnumbered, no use of AIM-120, NO AWACS etc and were on India turf. OUCH. Pretty damm good that we won 10%!

and lost 90%.yeah too damm good.still why did they lose.i mean the americans.im not big at this.im just a maldivianour country doesnt have an airforce but still i do love wars planes everything about warfare.

They lost because as the title of the thread states, the USAF needs to upgrade its training doctrine (if it has not already done so)

Putting it simply, USAF assumes while training that it is fighting an inferior enemy. It assumes certain things about wht 'enemy' aircraft are capable of and wht their pilots are capable of.

Plus the Americans were expecting the IAF to follow the Soviet doctrine of engagement, and were 'caught with their pants down' when the IAF did nothing of the sort. The IAF has developed its own 'rules of engagement' using a mixture of Soviet and Western techniques (the IAF gained indepth knowledge of Western Techniques from their many exercises with the French)

Uhh... yup no one is saying the IAF is not well trained, in fact they did 'surprise' us, so to speak. But I'm willing to bet the fact that we were outnumbered, outgunned, and had ROE and technology restrictions also helped them a bit, don't you think? After all how can this be a lesson for the USAF when we were forced to fight with a totally different doctrine (then the one we plan to use) in an unrealistic scenario?

Well what you forget is that the same restrictions applied to the IAF too. It was a mutually accepted decision.

And about the 'outnumbered' part. Thats a myth. Several missions were run where the sides too turns being attacker & defenders. And ALWAYS the attackers outnumbered the defenders. So if the USAF was 'attacking' they outnumbered the IAF.

Look i am not trying to downplay the abilities of the USAF but, the fact remains that the USAF themselves have felt the need to upgrade their training doctrines. They have the very good hardware, good pool of talented pilots and the fact that they have realised that they need to improve on the training aspect will only make them deadlier

SORRY TO SAY BUT.....INDIA WILL NEVER BUY.....F-22.......WILL GO FOR RUSSIAN FIGHER .....LIKE SU-37 OR MIG-35 OR MIG-29 ( LETEST VIRSION), OR ANY EUROPIAN FIGHER LIKE.......RAFEL, EURO-FIGHER TYPHOON.......


THIS IS TRUTH......I KNOW THIS.....
www.bharat-rakshak.com...

[edit on 14-9-2006 by bhargav]
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Please do not use 'All Caps'

You have a U2U

[edit on 14-9-2006 by masqua]www.bharat-rakshak.com...

[edit on 14-9-2006 by bhargav]

Dude, that's fine. But heck, you've got to give some solid reasons why you wouldn't want to buy the F-22.

And for Christ's sake, switch your 'Caps Lock' to the 'off' position!!

What are you talking about? Please could you quote the post next time if you are going to write a specific answer.

And why would India not buy the Raptor. Its is the most capable a/c right now and if it was offered (without dilution of tech, and at a price India found reasonable) then they would def go for it.

Just in case you do not know, the rumours doing the round are that the MRCA contract for the IAf will be split between Russain & AMERICAN contractors. They will raise the order to 200 and split it 126-74 in favour of the Russians.

That would truly be amazing!! Already the IAF had one of the most eclectic mis of aircraft, what with Russian, French, British equipment, but to have American equipment added to that would be truly mind-boggling!!

No not quite, there's a thread already covering this so I wont go over it but the US jets were handicapped with restrictions that did not apply to the IAF.

As for the rest I agree with you, we do need to keep training and changing our doctrine to fit the current threat, and we shouldn't get complacent.

Nobody was forced to fight anybody. Its a mutually consented exercise in Disimilar Combat Training.
The USAF has never(since WWII) engaged an Air Force with equal capability and firepower, forget encounters where the odds are against them. Other AFs have done that. The USAF has never(to my knowledge) engaged aerial forces in the recent past w/o AWACS, superior numerical odds or firepower. I'm not saying that this makes them any less capable than those who do so, but the USAF likes to play it safe.

On the other hand India has never had a MAJOR numerical/technological advantage over its foes(Yes even Pakistan) until recently because of logistical,geographical and infrastructural restrictions. The primary cause for a skewed A2A ratio in the 65 (and partially 71) wars with Pakistan was mainly due to the fact that a/c such as Canberras, Mysteres,Ouragaons, Vampires, Hunters etc conducted deep (really deep) interdiction strike missions into Pakistan mostly w/o having enough air escort because the interceptors (Folland Gnat and MiG 21 FL) simply did not have that range. Hence one will observe that many more IAF jets got shotdown in these wars as compared to PAF jets. The PAF again operated in a very restricive defensive role mostly involving intercepts and really short range interdiction missions, and even storing some of their prized StarFighters on Iranian bases well out of the reach(political and geographical) of ridiculously daring IAF fighter-bomber sqdrns.

Fast forward Cope India 04:
Both parties agreed that a DACT exercise would help each side play roles never really operationally addressed by them: Here a significant numerical majority (12:4 if I remember correctly) for the IAF which would employ strike roles while the USAF F-15Cs would use the doppler radars and employ a defensive role. Would the USAF ever face such situations in reality. Not probable but not impossible either. A surprise attack from say Iran on USAF bases anywhere in the Middle east/central Asia could put the bases' defenses at a severe disadvantage: a disadvantage played out in Cope India 04.

Also note that 12:4 ratio wasn't purely Su30 vs F-15Cs:
The strike sqdrn consisted of MiG-27MLs designated as primary ground strike platforms, MiG 21 Bis as primary escort and aerial intercept platforms and the Su 30Ks as overall air superiority and mission command platforms the would provide data via links to other a/c.


Cope Thunder 04(in Alaska) involved IAF Jaguars which conducted deep strike low alt missions against USAF ground targets. That exercise also had..well results favoring the IAF.

Cope India 05 and 06 followed suit. I am unaware of the technicalities of both exercises but both involved IAF Mirage 2000Hs along with a/c from 04. IAF Mig 29s may have been involved (I forget) and USAF F-16s were involved in Cope India 06.
Results weren't so public this time

Please.. understand the purpose of these exercises. They aren't publicity stunts and F-22 justifiers (only)..

Ok i went back to the COPE India thread, and i admit, i was a bit off the mark with certain statements

But still as DD stated, the exercises were designed to test the abilities of both AFs in unfaniliar circumstances. While the IAF seemed to relish the numerical advantage the USAF had some trouble, to put it mildly, with dissimilar combat.

Again this only stresses upon the need to update the USAF doctrine. Atleast we agree on that