reply to post by Dimitri Dzengalshlevi
The Chinese have already informed that they are using this as a training carrier.. One cant just shout "Abracadabra" and learn how to operate
carriers and develop Doctrines for it... Fielding a carrier is one thing Using it is something else..
Take a look at this Article
Troubled Waters: the Implications of China's First Aircraft Carrier Far from transforming Asia's naval balance, the launch of China's first
aircraft carrier will only begin to expose China to the rigours of modern naval warfare. The region should respond to the strategic ripples by
steering carefully between complacency and alarmism. By Ashley Townshend and Shashank Joshi for RUSI.org
The seas have always had a special pull on strategy. From 1898 to 1912, Germany's five Naval Laws saw it establish a fleet of battleships intended to
secure the country's 'place in the sun'. Britain, sensing the Royal Navy's supremacy was coming under threat, quickly stitched up alliances with
Russia, France, and Japan. A decade later, Japan launched the world's first purpose-built aircraft carrier, the Hôshô, from a dockyard in Yokohama.
The Imperial Japanese Navy not only matched the United States Navy for total displacement by 1940, but a year later it also launched the Yamato, a
battleship of unprecedented size and firepower.
The adoption of new and symbolic military technology by rising powers produces inevitable strategic ripples. China's launch of the ex-Soviet carrier
Varyag is no exception. But do its sea trials herald a Sputnik moment for the Indo-Pacific? And is the refurbished Varyag actually capable of
projecting Chinese sea-power throughout Indo-Pacific Asia?
A glance at the warship's operational potential suggests there is little to fear about China's first carrier.
An imperfect new carrier
Although its Cold War-era hull has been outfitted for the Twenty-first century, the ex-Varyag is an entry-level carrier by modern naval standards. At
a modest 60,000 tonnes, China's newest warship will be dwarfed by every one of the United States' eleven Nimitz-class nuclear-powered
super-carriers. The Japan-based USS George Washington, for instance, displaces over 100,000 tonnes, carries up to 90 fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters, permits simultaneous catapult-launch and aircraft recovery, and can sail for over 20 years without having to refuel.
By contrast, the refurbished ex-Varyag carries just twenty-six fixed-wing aircraft and twenty-four helicopters, exhibits a 'Stobar'  deck
configuration which forgoes steam-powered catapults for a less versatile ski-jump, can travel for just forty days before needing to refuel, and is
replete with new sensors and weapons systems that have yet to be integrated into People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) doctrine and expertise.
The ex-Varyag's ability to deploy aircraft into combat also appears questionable. While the PLAN's first carrier-based airframe, the J-15 'Flying
Shark', may soon have the potential to perform close-in fighter operations, maritime/ground strike, and air support missions, it is not particularly
well-suited to the ex-Varyag's ski-jump flight deck. As Gabriel Collins and Andrew Erickson explain, using a ski-jump for take-off imposes strict
limitations on the size and weight of the aircraft being launched. This means that China's J-15s, however advanced, will have to compromise on
payload and fuel in order to safely take-off from the carrier's deck. 
Making matters worse, the ex-Varyag will be unable to launch the hefty tankers, cargo aircraft, and fixed-wing surveillance and reconnaissance assets
that carrier power projection missions invariably require. This will further reduce the combat radius of China's J-15s and force the ex-Varyag's
crew to rely on suboptimal helicopter-based aerial early warning - a longstanding PLAN weakness.
The challenges of carrier warfare
Leaving the ex-Varyag's technical limitations aside, carrier warfare is one of the most complex challenges any modern military can undertake. The
PLAN's own doctrine has been oriented towards crippling carriers, not using them in battle. Learning new ways of fighting is time-consuming and hard.
Mike Horowitz, in a recent study of disruptive military innovations, has argued that:
carrier warfare is one of the only ... major military innovations requiring high levels of both financial intensity and organisational capital to
adopt ... operating a floating airfield and the ship itself, plus coordinating with support ships, is simply a much harder set of tasks than lining up
the big guns of a battleship and firing.
Just how difficult carrier operations are is evident from figures, recorded by Robert Rubel, which show that between 1949 and 1988 the US Navy and
Marine Corps lost 12,000 aircraft and 8,500 aircrew.