War Plan Red-America planned to attack UK!
In the more than 200 years since the American Revolution, the United States and Great Britain have moved from enmity to a firm alliance often spoken
of as the "special relationship." However, the road to this friendship was not smooth.
The hostility aroused in the United States by the American Revolution was inflamed by various disputes that arose between the two nations during the
Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). The main issue was the forcible seizure of American seamen by the British Navy but disputes also arose about commerce,
Indian policy, and boundaries. The spiraling anger culminated in what is known in the United States as the War of 1812, a conflict considered in
Britain as a sideshow to the struggle against Napoleon. More or less a draw, the war was concluded in 1814 by the Treaty of Ghent. The treaty resolved
none of the issues for which the United States had fought, but it created a framework for future friendly relations between the United States and
In the following decades, the two nations quarreled about the Canadian boundary but settled the disputes by negotiation. The American Civil War
brought Britain and the United States to the edge of hostilities because of attacks against Union commerce by Southern ships fitted out in British
ports. After the war the British apologized to the United States for their part in the actions of the Confederate marauders and paid a large indemnity
for losses suffered, a sign that the United States had emerged from the war as a powerful nation whose good will Britain now wished to secure.
The last significant foreign-policy dispute between the United States and Britain occurred in 1895 over an American demand that Britain submit to
international arbitration its dispute with Venezuela about the western boundary of British Guiana, near which gold had been discovered. Because
neither the United States nor Britain wanted trouble, the dispute was resolved amicably.
Ever since the United States fought at Britain's side during World War I, relations between the two countries have grown so close that they habitually
act in concert in war and diplomacy. The alliance of what Winston Churchill memorably called the "English-speaking peoples" in World War II is still
fresh in many memories. The "special relationship" shows no signs of weakening.
In PLAN RED, the Atlantic Strategic War Plan, the strategists theorized that there would be a war with Great Britain. They did this because England
was locked in a strategic alliance with Japan, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which was renewed and lasted until the Washington Conference of
1921-22. American planners thought that England's imperial reach would bring it into conflict with the US.
Another contingency war plan they developed was the RED-ORANGE PLAN, which hypothesized a two-theater war, seeking to win first in the Atlantic,
against England, while fighting a holding battle in the Pacific, and then defeating Japan. When World War Two broke out, military and naval planners
simply dusted off the old RED-ORANGE PLAN and substituted Germany for England in the Atlantic Theater.
For Uncle Sam, the resentments arising from two wars, one for independence and one for sailors' rights, became traditional, an inheritance handed from
one generation to another. Knowing little of Europe except England, he personified in that country, really most like himself, many of those
assumptions of caste which he had discarded. John Bull, on the other hand, or at any rate his dominant classes who were the only vocal part of him in
the Napoleonic era, agreed with most other European observers that our political system was a short-lived experiment, foredoomed to failure. Knowing
little of democracies except the recent " red fool fury of the Seine," he believed as a matter of course that our great and growing empire and
population would in time outgrow the ignorant turbulence of an unbalanced suffrage or else would crash in chaos.
One powerful influence for harmony was the English adoption of a free trade policy in 1846 which changed the traditional English attitude towards
commercial competition, and drove even the sons of old Tories in Canada into the arms of the United States in the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. When
Cobden, the apostle of free trade, became the oracle of England's economic policies, colonists were considered only as customers. Their allegiance was
a matter of indifference. Cobden was thinking of a federation of the world and not of British imperial unities. The Tories believed that colonies,
which under free trade could not be exploited, would become an intolerable burden. The Whigs argued that free trade would be as advantageous for
colonies as for the motherland, but that if a colony wanted political as well as economic freedom it ought to have it. In this doctrine all leaders.
Peel and Disraeli as well as Gladstone and Russell, coincided. Consequently, English sentiment, intent more and more exclusively upon commercial
wealth, agreed that the United States should assume control of Central America, and offered but mild censure of the many voices that were raised in
Canada for annexation.
The genesis of this British view of Anglo-American diplomatic relations may be traced, long before the days of Cobden and free trade, as far back as
the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1818, in which Lord Castlereagh prevailed over his colleagues in the Ministry who would have guarded Canada with fleets
and armies. Instead it was agreed that neither the United States nor England should maintain a warfleet upon any of the Great Lakes. This was the most
outstanding example of a diplomatic triumph of economic common-sense over political rivalries in the nineteenth century prior to the Geneva
arbitration. In the same spirit the long-protracted boundary disputes affecting Maine and Oregon were settled in 1842 to 1846, the Central American
and Isthmian questions disposed of in 1850 and 1856 on the basis of joint Anglo-American interest in a neutralized canal, and the old British claim to
a right of search was abandoned in 1858.
Lincoln's repression of Seward's rash desire to quarrel with England and France in 1861 was exactly duplicated in England six months later by the
Prince Consort and Queen Victoria, who took the sting out of Lord Russell's dispatch concerning the seizure of Mason and Slidell. Both nations were
happy in the possession of rulers who remained sane, even when the people were angry and politicians lost their heads.
It was already determined in 1864 that the United States would not renew the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, which would come to its term in 1866.
That treaty was doomed not only by the resentment against both England and Canada, but also by the rapid growth of protectionist sentiment in the
United States under the new war tariff.
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10-10-2011 by scotsdavy1 because: put new link in