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WIKILEAKS Cablegate : Password Released, Post your Finds

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posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 08:15 AM
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Originally posted by alfa1

Originally posted by xavi1000
All 251,287 US embassy cables
www.cablegatesearch.net...



This worked for a while, but now i'm getting a This Account Has Been Suspended message.

Either the PTB have cracked down, or they just didnt buy enough bandwidth.



They are under attack all the time




posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 08:22 AM
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Most of the websites have been giving me a 404 error. Bloody censoring cowards!

edit on 2-9-2011 by CasiusIgnoranze because: .



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 09:25 AM
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A bit off-topic, but what is some software for my mac that will decrypt the wikileaks stuff?



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 09:29 AM
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Gonna offload as many of these cables, the more incriminating ones at least, to a thumbdrive or 2 before they "disappear".

Edit: so are ALL of the cable links freaking dead now? Really?

...
edit on 2-9-2011 by Jugtalicus because: (no reason given)



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 09:34 AM
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Great finds. Really glad we have a lot of members sifting through this massive data dump.

I wanted to say there would be little, if anything, to find in this because that was a nagging thought. I figured, this type of thread will serve as confirmation that leaks like this are necessary for governments to remain transparent.

Thanks for helping me, and I hope it helps others. Ill try to post anything else I find here, as well as references to other finds in news outlets and such.

Hey. Let's make this a project?



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 09:43 AM
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Originally posted by ecoparity
Report that soldiers executed women and children while handcuffed:

Cablegate-06GENEBA763


So when are these murderers going to have their trial for war crimes at the Hague?

People still wonder why the Iraqis hate the US.



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 10:06 AM
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This one is pretty interesting LINK

It concerns Sudan and any oil developments over there, nothing really major although it seems a little messed up in context. Check it out:



A. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) WHICH EXTERNAL COUNTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN ENSURING A POST-2011 WEALTH SHARING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL CONGRESS PARTY (NCP) AND THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (SPLM)? HAS THERE BEEN ANY ACTIVITY BETWEEN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND EITHER THE NORTH OR SOUTH IN NEGOTIATING A POST-2011 WEALTH-SHARING DEAL, AND IF SO, WHAT ARE THESE ACTIVITIES?

B. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) WHAT ARE NCP'S PERCEPTIONS AND INDICATIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON OIL SHARING, AND WHAT ARE THEIR RED LINES FOR A POSSIBLE DEAL? WHAT CONTINGENCY MEASURES MIGHT THEY HAVE TO CONTROL MILITARILY THE OIL FIELDS IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES OR FOLLOWING SOUTHERN SECESSION?

C. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) WHAT ARE SPLM'S PERCEPTIONS AND INDICATIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON OIL SHARING, AND WHAT ARE THEIR RED LINES FOR A POSSIBLE DEAL? WHAT CONTINGENCY MEASURES MIGHT THEY HAVE TO CONTROL MILITARILY THE OIL FIELDS IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES OR FOLLOWING SOUTHERN SECESSION?

D. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY DISAGREEMENTS AMONG SPLM LEADERS ABOUT WHETHER TO WORK WITH THE NORTH ON A POST-2011 OIL SHARING DEAL OR INSTEAD TO CLAIM OWNERSHIP OF SOUTHERN OIL FIELDS?

E. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) WHAT ARE THE NORTH'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATUS OF CUSTOMS, TAXES, AND FOREIGN RESERVE TRANSACTIONS WITH THE BANK OF SOUTHERN SUDAN?

F. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) WHAT ARE THE SOUTH'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATUS OF CUSTOMS, TAXES, AND FOREIGN RESERVE TRANSACTIONS WITH THE BANK OF SUDAN?

G. (S/REL TO USA, FVEY) HOW SERIOUSLY ARE SOUTHERNERS PURSUING AN ALTERNATE PIPELINE THROUGH KENYA, AND WHAT ARE THE COST AND TIME PROJECTIONS FOR SUCH A PROJECT? WHAT IS KHARTOUM'S POSITION ON SUCH A PROPOSAL?


God they want that oil.....



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 10:34 AM
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My country and NATO: Criminal home invasion burgler thugs. People who are properly armed take care of that mess. Too bad, too sad, for the family homes of Libya and Iraq. Who's home in the global neighborhood is next? Who next is a defense-inadequate sitting duck, for the heavily armed marauding gang bangers? No 911 to call. The cops are the criminals, here. Putin is flexing his muscles to strippers in pillowed rooms, and the Chinese leader is showing off his big boats. So what.



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 10:56 AM
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IMHO, these leaked "classified files" are a mixture of both real and fake documents. If Julian were to reveal such damning evidence against every government in the world, we would have never heard of him in the first place, let alone have such a website like wikileaks ever exist. The fact that Wikileaks is being paraded by the mainstream media essentially means that they are a major disinfo group.
No way are they going to reveal that 9/11 was an inside job, or they purposely want the dollar to fail, or they invade other countries not because of humanitarian reasons, but for natural resources and strategic significances.

I mean like, come on guys...lets get real here.

If it were this easy to access "damning classified information" then my oh my - the CIA, MI6, Mossad etc. must be a bunch of lousy intelligence agencies!


If anyone can find any evidence from these wikileaks documents which hint at any future false flag attacks/operations, then please share with us.

edit on 2-9-2011 by CasiusIgnoranze because: .



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 12:17 PM
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I'm not so sure these days. I'm posting from a mobile so I can't put the link exactly. If you go to drudgereport.com there is an article about how the CIA has become a murder racket and fails at intelligence gathering in comparison the forerunners.

Either we are purposefully and or falsely being painted as weak morally, diplomatically, financially, economically, militarily, educationally, technologically and creatively or it's true.

I think most of it is true, with the exception of morals, military and technology.

Its disheartening to admit, to say the least, I wish if this were a farce our leaders would come out and tell us it is a psyop that is being directed by foreign powers and become transparent.



This thread reminds me of why I started posting on ATS. Let's learn more.



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 12:20 PM
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The released password is:

CollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay#


But I don't think it was for the insurance file, more of a personal password between Assange and a reporter.



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 12:46 PM
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Originally posted by crudos
A bit off-topic, but what is some software for my mac that will decrypt the wikileaks stuff?


OpenSSL is built into the OS and will decrypt the Cablegate releases.

The Insurance file, which has not been decrypted yet, requires PGP. Mac free version - GPGTools for Mac

You can download already decrypted versions on the torrent sites, however. The "Cablegate 2" release on Piratebay was already decrypted when I downloaded it.



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 12:53 PM
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Originally posted by woogleuk
The released password is:

CollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay#


But I don't think it was for the insurance file, more of a personal password between Assange and a reporter.


That is the password for one of the Cablegate releases, not the "Insurance File".

The password for the Insurance File has not been released yet.

Cryptome has a summary of the leaks archives and progress on decrypting them.

There are 4 releases total named, "x, y, y-docs and z" with 1 having been decrypted so far:

x.gpg (Returns xyz_x.gpg, 409MB. No passphrase yet)

y.gpg (Returns xyz_y.gpg, 88MB. No passphrase yet)

y-docs.gpg (Returns xyz_y-docs.gpg, 8MB. No passphrase yet)

z.gpg (Returns xyz_z.gpg, 368MB. Passphrase released)

"xyz_z.gpg" and "z.gpg" appear to be identical and both decrypt to "z.7z." The decrypted file is "z.7z," 368MB, which unzips to "cables.csv," about 1.7GB in size, dated 4/12/2010.


edit on 2-9-2011 by ecoparity because: (no reason given)



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 02:27 PM
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reply to post by ecoparity
 


I'm downloading the "full unencrypted file" from this link here..

www.twitlonger.com...

but you say there's files x, y, z, etc. so can you provide the link to the ones you are talking about? or is it the same one i'm downloading ?



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 02:44 PM
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Regarding the OP......

How old is that cable? It refers to Soviets.

Soviets haven't been around since 1991, right?



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 02:52 PM
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reply to post by Tom_Proctor
 


All are saying "404 - Not Found"



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 03:27 PM
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thought this was interesting

Cable from berlin

S E C R E T BERLIN 003059 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/AGS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 10/31/2007 TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], GM [Germany] SUBJECT: GERMAN COMMENTS ON U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY REF: SECSTATE 167334 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta , for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Please see the action request in paragraph 9. ¶2. (S) Summary: Global Affairs officer briefed German officials in Bonn on the U.S. National Space Policy October ¶16. Although the German officials appreciated the information, they also expressed some reservations. In sum, they contended that: 1) Germany, unlike the United States, is open to a new Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty and to limiting the weaponization of space; 2) the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, though preventing the deployment of WMD in outer space, might be inadequate to prevent the weaponization of space; 3) the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) program might constitute weaponization of space; 4) the USG might be overlooking the potential for a space arms race with China; 5) the U.S. National Space Policy's emphasis on U.S. leadership is not conducive to promoting international partnerships; and 6) the United States protects its domestic space industry at the expense of partnerships with foreign entities. Lastly, the German officials asked for responses to queries requesting the U.S. stance on the accidental release of radioactivity in the event of a failure of a nuclear-powered space vehicle and regarding U.S. plans for the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). End Summary. ¶3. (S) Global Affairs officer met Dr. Karl-Friedrich Nagel, Office Director of the Space Program General Issues Division in the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi); Dr. Klaus Keller, desk officer of BMWi's Space Program General Issues Division; Jacob Stuebig, desk officer of the BMWi's Space Program Projects and Applications Division; and Marc Haese, International Cooperation officer in the German Aerospace Center (DLR), at the BMWi in Bonn October 16. ¶4. (S) Nagel raised question about the reasons for the USG opposition to a PAROS treaty; emboff responded drawing on reftel points that the USG considers a new arms control treaty for outer space unnecessary because there is no arms race in space. Nagel also asked whether the USG foresees a future arms race with China and therefore might want to consider concluding a treaty to prevent such an eventuality. He noted that Germany too favors guaranteed space access and also said any weaponization would be a threat to the peaceful use of space. In response to the point that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty rendered any new treaties redundant, Nagel acknowledged that although the treaty had prevented the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, it would not necessarily prevent weaponization of space. Heller asked whether the U.S. NMD program amounts to a weaponization of space, to which emboff noted that the NMD is purely defensive and should not be considered as weaponization. ¶5. (S) The German Aerospace Center's International Cooperation officer Marc Haese raised a question of whether the U.S. space policy's emphasis on U.S. leadership in space is the best basis for forming international partnerships. Emboff noted the importance of partnerships in exploring space and that Germany is one of the most important. Haese and Heller argued, however, that the USG only values partnerships out of self-interest. They said the United States has not been interested in partnerships in situations where Europe has different goals. For instance, they said that the United States tends to focus on large endeavors, such as manned missions to the Moon and Mars, while the Europeans pursue more modest scientific missions, such as probes of asteroids. Emboff noted the United States and Europe can complement each other in joint missions, such as with the Cassini-Huygens mission to Saturn, in which NASA provided the launch vehicle and the European Space Agency (ESA) supplied the probe. ¶6. (S) The German officials also argued that the U.S. space market is closed to foreign competition. Haese claimed Germany has superior robotics and laser optical equipment, for instance, but the USG is only willing to give contracts to U.S. firms. Haese said Germany was willing to contribute re-entry vehicles to international space projects, but that the USG awarded a new contract to Boeing instead. Emboff pointed out that the new U.S. space policy provides for using commercial space capabilities and services when suitable for USG requirements, including from foreign providers. When Heller urged the United States to open its satellite market to foreign competitors, emboff cited the new U.S. space policy's commitment to the commercial sector and suggested that Europeans could compete in it. ¶7. (S) Heller asked questions about the U.S. space poli



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 03:43 PM
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this one also..!!

Wow the US sure likes to control what people say...

S E C R E T STATE 029932 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2034 TAGS: MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], PREL [External Political Relations], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], KPAO [Public Affairs Office], KN [Korea (North)], KS [Korea (South)], JA [Japan; Okinawa; Ryukyu Islands] SUBJECT: (S) ALLIANCE COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A TD-2 LAUNCH Classified By: EAP A/S Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

¶1. (S/NF)

For alliance management reasons and in order to shape public perceptions, it is important that our Embassies and military Commands in the ROK and Japan work closely with host governments and provide consistent messaging in responding publicly to the expected North Korean Taepodong-2 launch.

The State and Defense Departments appreciate the excellent work of Embassies and Commands on this matter thus far, in particular the superb cross-agency coordination.

Based on input received from Embassies Seoul and Tokyo, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), as well as the plans of the ROK and Japanese governments, Department issues the following guidance, to be implemented under the direction of the Chiefs of Mission in Seoul and Tokyo, and supported by Commander USPACOM and Commanders at USFK and USFJ. Embassy and Commands may share these instructions with host governments for coordination purposes, drawing on talking points in para 4 to reinforce the continued importance of message discipline to serve shared strategic objectives. This message has been coordinated with the Department of Defense.

¶2. (S/Rel JA, KS) In the event of a North Korean missile launch, Chiefs of Mission in Seoul and Tokyo may, if requested/invited, call on the Blue House/Kantei for discussions and to exhibit coordination.

¶3. (S/Rel JA, KS) Either the White House or the State Department may issue a public statement following a North Korean missile launch. Embassies should not/not release press statements. Prior to a launch, Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may respond on-the-record to press inquiries using the pre-cleared language contained in para 6. Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may also share the points contained in para 7 with the ROKG and GOJ in advance of a launch and recommend that the ROKG/GOJ use the same points in order to ensure a consistent message. Because any missile launch is expected to occur during the day in Seoul and Tokyo (overnight in Washington), to ensure roll out of a coordinated post-launch message, Embassies Seoul and Tokyo are also authorized to respond on-the-record to press inquiries using the pre-cleared language contained in para 6. (NOTE: When directed by OASD Public Affairs, and in coordination with the post-launch White House or State Department public statement, NORTHCOM will be prepared to issue a press release confirming the launch, as NORTHCOM has the responsibility and capability within the Defense Department to provide launch characterization. END NOTE).

¶4. (S/Rel JA, KS) Country teams with the support of the military Commands, should make the following points to counterparts in the ROKG and GOJ as context for coordinating public diplomacy related to the TD-2 launch. -- It is important to avoid creating a crisis atmosphere that will reduce our flexibility and give advantage to North Korea. -- We understand that North Korea,s actions create domestic pressure in your countries to appear responsive. The demands of the news cycle only heighten the pressure. However, we strongly urge you to use public statements as a means to reduce public anxiety and project our joint preparedness as well as the in-depth cooperation that continues among our three countries. -- We expect that the international response to a North Korean launch will be centered largely in the UN Security Council based on the violation of UNSCR 1718. It would be unwise and potentially counterproductive to speculate publicly on the outcome of our joint efforts there. -- We are concerned by continued leaks, which place sources and methods at risk and undermine the unified careful message we have developed together. It is important that our governments not confirm leaked information that appears in the media.

¶5. (S/Rel JA, KS) PACOM, USFK, USFJ, Missile Defense Agency, and STRATCOM should not/not release press statements following a DPRK launch. As authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Commander PACOM, USFK and USFJ personnel may respond to media questions on background, to explain in general terms, using unclassified information, the extent of U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK information-sharing and military-to-military coordination in advance of and during the launch.

¶6. (SBU) Before the TD-2 launch, Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may use the following points to respond to press inquiries. These points are similar to the standing guidance being used by the State Department spokesperson.



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 03:46 PM
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-- We are closely monitoring North Korea,s activities and intentions, which have indicated they are preparing to launch a Taepodong-2 (TD-2) for delivery of a so-called &experimental communications satellite.8

-- Through close consultations, the governments of the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan have tried to discourage North Korea from launching a TD-2 or other rocket.

-- This provocative act would not be helpful to stability and relations in the region.

-- Any launch would only further isolate North Korea from the international community.

-- North Korea should focus instead on the Six-Party Talks process and denuclearization, and on improving its relations with its neighbors.

-- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 requires North Korea to suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and to abandon its ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.

-- The (ROK)/(Japanese) and U.S. governments agree that the launch of a TD-2 or other rocket by North Korea would be a violation of UNSC Resolution 1718, even if the North characterizes it as the launch of a satellite or a space launch vehicle. The equipment and technology necessary to launch a satellite into orbit are virtually identical to and interchangeable with the equipment and technology necessary to launch a ballistic missile weapons payload.

-- Our governments will continue to be in close communication as this situation further develops.

¶7. (S/Rel JA, KS; SBU after launch) Following a TD-2 launch, Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may draw from the following points in response to press inquiries. All other questions should be referred to Washington.

-- On XX, North Korea launched (a Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) long-range missile.) The launch resulted in (delivery of a payload to orbit) (failure to deliver a payload to orbit) (failure of launch vehicle). -- We have long expressed our concerns regarding North Korea,s ballistic missile programs.

-- North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles, missile-related materials, equipment, and technologies pose a serious threat to the region and to the international community.

-- This launch is a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, (even though the DPRK has characterized this as a (satellite) (space launch vehicle) launch).

-- The United States believes that any missile test by the DPRK violates UNSCR 1718, even if the DPRK characterizes it as a launch vehicle. Ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles derive from nearly identical and interchangeable technologies.

-- UNSCR 1718 requires that North Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and that it abandon its ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. If asked about the DPRK characterization of the event as the launch of a space-launch vehicle:

-- Given the clear statement of the United Nations Security Council in two resolutions (1695 and 1718) that missile-related activities must cease, the United States believes any launches of this type conducted by the DPRK violate UNSCR 1718, even if the DPRK seeks to characterize them as space launch vehicles. If asked about North Korea's motives:

-- We will not speculate about North Korea's motives. If asked regarding North Korean missile exports:

-- We are greatly concerned about North Korea's continued export of ballistic missiles and related equipment, materials, and technologies to countries of concern. Such exports violate UNSCR 1718.

-- North Korea has marketed its missile technology and equipment worldwide.

-- The United States imposed sanctions on North Korean entities multiple times for missile-related transfers, most recently in February 2009. If asked about the future of the Six-Party Talks:

--The United States remains committed to the Six-Party Talks process, and calls on the DPRK to fulfill its commitments under the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. If asked about UN actions:

--The United States considers this launch a violation of UNSCR 1718. (Refer to Washington for further comment.) If asked about U.S. bilateral and/or unilateral actions/sanctions:

-- (Refer to Washington for further comment.) If asked about U.S.-ROK-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation:

-- The United States, ROK, and Japan have worked closely as alliance partners to better monitor, understand, and respond appropriately to North Korean actions in support and execution of a missile launch. If asked about when the United States shared data with (Japan) (the ROK) about the launch:



posted on Sep, 2 2011 @ 03:47 PM
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-- The United States and (Japan) (the ROK) have exchanged information before and immediately after the launch through a variety of diplomatic and military channels. We will continue to consult closely with our (Japanese) (ROK) allies. We cannot, however, discuss details of our military operations, plans or intelligence, or the content of our diplomatic exchanges. If asked about the U.S. commitment to defend (Japan) (the ROK):

-- The United States is prepared to meet fully its obligations under the (U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security) (U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954). Our forces in Korea, Japan, and throughout the region train rigorously in order to be prepared to meet our treaty obligations. End Text of Press Guidance.

CLINTON NNNN

End Cable Text



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