Nuclear Weapons Transport: Best Use of Available Cover

Given the rising tensions between the US and Pakistan (following the "termination" of Osama bin Laden by un-vetted US forces in Pakistan), there is increased concern that retribution against the US may come in the form of a "stolen" weapon from Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Of course we have assurances from all the relevent governmental and military authorities that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe and secured against unauthorized access.

But then, we also have relatively recent proof that, even in the US, supposedly "secure" nuclear weapons are subject to lapses in that security, with frightening results. The incident at Minot AFB for example.

And Minot, beyond the usual conspiracy theories circulating at the time (and still), was, for all intents and purposes, just an accidental lapse in procedure; a benign fluke.

In Pakistan, at this jucture, there is reason to believe that true animosity against the US exists amoung the Pakistani military and intelligence forces. Forces which are known, historically, to be widely sympathetic towards, and, in some cases, supportive of, the goals espoused by bin Laden's Al-Quieda.

I do not think that it is too far fetched to believe that, many in Pakistan, who might be in position to facilitate the "un-authorized" release of nuclear weapons from Pakistan's arsenal, might be more inclined to do so now. Especially if they percieve the intended target of those "loosened Nukes" to be the US. In their eyes, it would be just punishment for the insult perpetrated by the US against Pakistan, on Pakistan's own soil.


But if hostile (towards the US) parties were to gain posession of pilfered Pakistani nukes, how could those weapons ever leave Pakistan without being immediately detected and confiscated by US monitoring forces? Some of which are, assumedly, very sophisticated, space-based sensors.

One pre-suppooses that trans-shipment within the country's borders would be easy enough to accomplish by using "authentic enough" authorization documents for weapons transfer between arsenals. In this case, the theft would appear as nothing more than the usual re-deployment of resources between stockpiles.

The weapons would be conveniently shipped to an arsenal closely proximate to a sea port, where, possibly disguised as some benign cargo, with orders given by the appropriate intelligence agencies not to inspect the cargo too closely, it would be loaded aboard a non-descript freighter; destined for somewhere off the east coast of Japan.


There, in mid-ocean, under the cover of the ever-spreading cloud of radiation from the destroyed Fukushima reactor complex, the deadly cargo could be safely loaded aboard a waiting vessel. That vessel would then sail eastward, across the Pacific, under the radioactive cover of the Fukushima cloud, hidden from the space-based radiation sensors monitored by the US (and others) to anywhere along the west coast of North America.


Making "best use of available cover" to defeat one of the most sophisticated defense systems ever developed, to deliver a horrible act of mis-guided retribution.

Much respect on a well thought out plan

If the terrorists didnt already have something similar lined up I bet they do after reading this

reply to post by IkNOwSTuff


Thank you.

I've always be a proponent of the old adage "Forewarned is Fore-Armed"!


But then, I've also always been a victim of "Cassandra's Curse": No ever listens to my warnings.

reply to post by Bhadhidar


...nice post man...and yes i bet a lot of people r worried about pak's nukes..i bet some r missing or better yet..pak has trasnferred neccessary know how and materials to al qaeda ...i remember paks top nuke scientist A Q Khan

involved in controversy...read up

Pakistani officials proudly boast that their nuclear stockpile is secure & has reputedly constructed a series of underground storage facilities for it's weapons, believed to be between 80 and 100 warheads. Most of those are allegedly "low yield" (i.e. a Hiroshima sized ... only our wildly deluded nuclear strategists could describe such a monstrous weapon as "low yield"). Others can reasonably be described as city busters, with yields 20-30 times that of the Hiroshima weapon.

How safe are these weapons ? God alone knows. The US certainly doesn't, Pakistan hasn't revealed the location of the storage facilities, although they're believed to be "dispersed" for survivability purposes. You'd have to assume the facilities were underground, near good road links, possibly near military air bases or civilian airports. But one thing you can say with certainty is this ; there's no other nation on Earth with this unique combination of political instability, terrorist zeal & expanding weapons production. That's why the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme represents such a grave threat.

I disagree with the OP though. Provided they understand the properties of the weapon they steal (with the assistance of some helpful Pakistani officials, no doubt) they'd be better flying the weapon straight out of the country before it's loss is discovered. And a one-way, once in a lifetime trip to their unfortunate destination of choice follows thereafter. That's the way to do it.

reply to post by Niall197


Wouldn't a fast moving radiation signature, poorly shielded as it would have to be to make it transportable by air, be quickly and easily discernable from the background radiation sources normally ignored by "Spies-in-the-Skies"?

And once identified as an anomaly, wouldn't the source of such a fast moving radioactive blip be quickly investigated and destroyed?


Much more effective, I would think, to sheild any stray radiation that might leak from a stolen device under tons of ocean-going steel, perhaps buried deep in a ship's hold, or even in a water-tight container under the ship, and slowly drift to the target; following the same path as the ever-expanding Fukushima cloud.

Far less chance of detection, and thus, less chance of interdiction.