posted on May, 14 2011 @ 01:55 PM
Given the rising tensions between the US and Pakistan (following the "termination" of Osama bin Laden by un-vetted US forces in Pakistan), there is
increased concern that retribution against the US may come in the form of a "stolen" weapon from Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Of course we have assurances from all the relevent governmental and military authorities that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe and secured against
But then, we also have relatively recent proof that, even in the US, supposedly "secure" nuclear weapons are subject to lapses in that security,
with frightening results. The incident at Minot AFB for example.
And Minot, beyond the usual conspiracy theories circulating at the time (and still), was, for all intents and purposes, just an accidental lapse in
procedure; a benign fluke.
In Pakistan, at this jucture, there is reason to believe that true animosity against the US exists amoung the Pakistani military and intelligence
forces. Forces which are known, historically, to be widely sympathetic towards, and, in some cases, supportive of, the goals espoused by bin Laden's
I do not think that it is too far fetched to believe that, many in Pakistan, who might be in position to facilitate the "un-authorized" release of
nuclear weapons from Pakistan's arsenal, might be more inclined to do so now. Especially if they percieve the intended target of those "loosened
Nukes" to be the US. In their eyes, it would be just punishment for the insult perpetrated by the US against Pakistan, on Pakistan's own soil.
But if hostile (towards the US) parties were to gain posession of pilfered Pakistani nukes, how could those weapons ever leave Pakistan without being
immediately detected and confiscated by US monitoring forces? Some of which are, assumedly, very sophisticated, space-based sensors.
One pre-suppooses that trans-shipment within the country's borders would be easy enough to accomplish by using "authentic enough" authorization
documents for weapons transfer between arsenals. In this case, the theft would appear as nothing more than the usual re-deployment of resources
The weapons would be conveniently shipped to an arsenal closely proximate to a sea port, where, possibly disguised as some benign cargo, with orders
given by the appropriate intelligence agencies not to inspect the cargo too closely, it would be loaded aboard a non-descript freighter; destined for
somewhere off the east coast of Japan.
There, in mid-ocean, under the cover of the ever-spreading cloud of radiation from the destroyed Fukushima reactor complex, the deadly cargo could be
safely loaded aboard a waiting vessel. That vessel would then sail eastward, across the Pacific, under the radioactive cover of the Fukushima cloud,
hidden from the space-based radiation sensors monitored by the US (and others) to anywhere along the west coast of North America.
Making "best use of available cover" to defeat one of the most sophisticated defense systems ever developed, to deliver a horrible act of