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Originally posted by CarlitosAmsel
Originally posted by Alfie1
Can someone please explain to me what is so impossible about a handful of arabs obtaining flight training and, with some muscle back-up, hi-jacking 4 civilian aircraft ?
It is not as though there haven't been multiple hi-jackings of planes by arabs in the past.
Can you explain how they managed to make the whole airforce stand down, in the most secure airspace in the world?
Angelo M. Codevilla, PhD – Former U.S. State Department Foreign Service Officer specializing in U.S. intelligence operations in Western Europe. Member of President-Elect Ronald Reagan's Transition Team within the State Department and principal author of the team's report on intelligence. Former Staff Member, U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee dealing with oversight of the intelligence services 1977 - 1985. Former U.S. Naval Officer. Currently Vice Chairman of the U.S. Army War College Board of Visitors.
Professor of International Relations, Boston University 1995 - present. Fellow of the Claremont Institute. Former academic appointments include Professorial Lecturer at Georgetown University; Senior Research Fellow for the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; Assistant Professor, Grove City College; and Assistant Professor, North Dakota State College.
Senior Editor of The American Spectator. Author of Advice to War Presidents: A Remedial Course in Statecraft (2009), No Victory, No Peace (2004), The Character of Nations: How Politics Makes and Breaks Prosperity, Family, and Civility (2000), Between The Alps and a Hard Place (2000), The Prince, by Niccolo Machiavelli, translated by Angelo Codevilla (1995), Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century (1992), While Others Build: The Commonsense Approach to the Strategic Defence Initiative (1988), Modern France (1974). Co-author of War: Ends and Means (1988), Arms Control Delusion (1987).
Essay in The American Spectator 3/13/09:
"Seven years after Osama bin Laden's last verifiable appearance among the living, there is more evidence for Elvis's presence among us than for his. Hence there is reason to ask whether the paradigm of Osama bin Laden as terrorism's deus ex machina and of al Qaeda as the prototype of terrorism may be an artifact of our Best and Brightest's imagination, and whether investment in this paradigm has kept our national security establishment from thinking seriously about our troubles' sources. So let us take a fresh look at the fundamentals.
Negative evidence alone compels the conclusion that Osama is long since dead. Since October 2001, when Al Jazeera's Tayseer Alouni interviewed him, no reputable person reports having seen him—not even after multiple-blind journeys through intermediaries. The audio and video tapes alleged to be Osama's never convinced impartial observers. The guy just does not look like Osama. Some videos show him with a Semitic aquiline nose, while others show him with a shorter, broader one. Next to that, differences between colors and styles of beard are small stuff.
Nor does the tapes' Osama sound like Osama. In 2007 Switzerland's Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence, which does computer voice recognition for bank security, compared the voices on 15 undisputed recordings of Osama with the voices on 15 subsequent ones attributed to Osama, to which they added two by native Arab speakers who had trained to imitate him and were reading his writings. All of the purported Osama recordings (with one falling into a gray area) differed clearly from one another as well as from the genuine ones. By contrast, the CIA found all the recordings authentic. It is hard to imagine what methodology might support this conclusion.
Also in 2007, Professor Bruce Lawrence, who heads Duke University's religious studies program, argued in a book on Osama's messages that their increasingly secular language is inconsistent with Osama's Wahhabism. Lawrence noted as well that the Osama figure in the December 2001 video, which many have taken as his assumption of responsibility for 9/11, wears golden rings—decidedly un-Wahhabi. He also writes with the wrong hand. Lawrence concluded that the messages are fakes, and not very good ones. The CIA has judged them all good.
Above all, whereas Elvis impersonators at least sing the King's signature song, "You ain't nutin' but a hound dawg," the words on the Osama tapes differ substantively from what the real Osama used to say—especially about the most important matter. On September 16, 2001, on Al Jazeera, Osama said of 9/11: "I stress that I have not carried out this act, which appears to have been carried out by individuals with their own motivation." Again, in the October interview with Tayseer Alouni, he limited his connection with 9/11 to ideology: "If they mean, or if you mean, that there is a link as a result of our incitement, then it is true. We incite…" But in the so-called "confession video" that the CIA found in December, the Osama figure acts like the chief conspirator. The fact that the video had been made for no self-evident purpose except perhaps to be found by the Americans should have raised suspicion. Its substance, the celebratory affirmation of a responsibility for 9/11 that Osama had denied, should also have weighed against the video's authenticity. Why would he wait to indict himself until after U.S. forces and allies had secured Afghanistan? But the CIA acted as if it had caught Osama red-handed."
Raymond L. McGovern – 27-year CIA veteran. Former Chairman, National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), the consensus reports of all U.S. intelligence agencies. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, NIE's "are the Intelligence Community’s most authoritative written judgments on national security issues." Responsible for preparing and presenting the President’ Daily Brief (PDB) to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush and for providing intelligence briefing to their Vice Presidents, Secretaries of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many other senior government officials. Upon retirement in 1990, McGovern was awarded the CIA’s Intelligence Commendation Medallion and received a letter of appreciation from then-President George H. W. Bush. Former U.S. Army Intelligence Officer.
"It has long been clear that the Bush-Cheney administration cynically exploited the attacks of 9/11 to promote its imperial designs. But the present volume confronts us with compelling evidence for an even more disturbing conclusion: that the 9/11 attacks were themselves orchestrated by this administration precisely so they could be thus exploited. If this is true, it is not merely the case, as the Downing Street memos show, that the stated reason for attacking Iraq was a lie. It is also the case that the whole 'war on terror' was based on a prior deception.
William Christison (1928 - 2010) – Joined the CIA in 1950, and served on the analysis side of the Agency for 28 years. From the early 1970s he served as National Intelligence Officer (principal adviser to the Director of Central Intelligence on certain areas) for, at various times, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa. Before he retired in 1979 he was Director of the CIA's Office of Regional and Political Analysis, a 250-person unit responsible for political analysis of every country and region in the world.
Endorsement of Debunking 9/11 Debunking 3/30/07
Essay Stop Belittling the Theories About September 11 8/14/06
Melvin A. Goodman, PhD – Former Division Chief and Senior Analyst at the Office of Soviet Affairs, CIA,1966 - 1990. Senior Analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department, 1974 - 1976. Professor of International Security at the National War College 1986 - 2004. 42-year Federal government career, primarily with the CIA, Department of Defense and State Department. Currently Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy and Adjunct Professor of Government at Johns Hopkins University.
The final report is ultimately a coverup. I don't know how else to describe the final report.
Robert Baer – Former CIA Case Officer, Specialist in the Middle East, Directorate of Operations. Awarded Career Intelligence Medal. 21-year CIA veteran. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh wrote that Baer “was considered perhaps the best on-the-ground field officer in the Middle East.”
Thom Hartmann: Are you of the opinion there was an aspect of 'inside job' to 9/11 within the U.S. government?
Robert Baer: There is that possibility, the evidence points at it.
Thom Hartmann: And why is it not being investigated?
Robert Baer: Why isn't the WMD story being investigated? Why hasn't anybody been held accountable for 9/11? We held people accountable after Pearl Harbor. Why has there been no change in command? Why have there been no political repercussions? Why has there been no -- any sort of exposure on this? It really makes you wonder.
2. The NMCC was now required to first forward requests for Department of Defense assistance to the Secretary of Defense for Approval.
Originally posted by Hessling
reply to post by TheMaverick
Some time back on another 9/11 thread a member commented on just how stupid bin Laden's plan was on paper. A plan that involved known hijacked airliners casually in the air for an hour before attacking. If it weren't for all the "coincidences" on how our air defenses failed that day the plan on paper was an abomination. They wouldn't have a had a chance of succeeding if things went normal that day.
You'd think one of his lieutenants in the cave eating couscous who'd have stopped an said, "You know Osama you're a serious dumbass. There's no way this crazy plan will work!"
Seems like this guy is basically saying the same thing.
It looks to me like a Fascist takeover in 2000 -- and it continues to look that way. They will create the disasters and have the "solutions" that reduce the power of the people.
Not only were most of the air defenses conveniently away on maneuvers in Canada and Alaska that day