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Japan declares 'nuclear emergency' after quake

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posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 01:14 AM
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And heres the latest version of Hayakawa's radiation map with the towns and cities mentioned above located. When you look at the numbers for Horiguchi above and how it's mapped on the rad map you gots to wonder what are the SPEEDI numbers for Fukushima and Miyagi.





posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 01:34 AM
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a interesting Interview!

GSDF commander says he thought Japan done for as he faced Fukushima nuke crisis



Toshinobu Miyajima, commanding general of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) Central Readiness Force when it was desperately trying to bring the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant under control, thought at one point that Japan was done for, he recalled in a recent interview with the Mainichi.

However, Miyajima pointed out that the highly risky mission demonstrated to the world that Japan was truly serious about containing the crisis, which led the United States and other countries to extend major assistance to disaster areas. Excerpts of the interview follow:

Question: When were you ordered to serve as the commander of the response to the disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant?

mdn.mainichi.jp...

We still have Holidays here in Japan,
everything restarts tomorrow!
edit on 3-1-2012 by Human0815 because: (no reason given)


@ Zworld,
can you overlay the Safecast.org Map?
blog.safecast.org...
edit on 3-1-2012 by Human0815 because: (no reason given)



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 01:36 AM
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reply to post by zworld
 


What units are these in? Millibecquerels?



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 07:30 AM
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0.76 microSv/h from Seaweed from Korean east coast

That's really hot. And the nuke cartel isn't even showing radiation indications around there...



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 09:49 AM
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Michigan rain rad readings.



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 10:15 AM
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Originally posted by GhostR1der
reply to post by zworld
 


What units are these in? Millibecquerels?

I was assuming microbecquerels but now thinking about it it could be counts per minute. Ill check

ON EDIT: I meant microsieverts, not Bqs. Still checking though
edit on 3-1-2012 by zworld because: (no reason given)



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 11:39 AM
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Oh, this can't be good. Remember the braces they installed under the #4 spent fuel pool?
enenews.com... l



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 12:20 PM
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Oh, this isn't good either...

fukushima-diary.com...



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 12:24 PM
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Why do they make everything so hard. I still haven't totally tracked down the system being used for the SPEEDI readings, but I found where they state later readings are in nanograys/h (nGy/h), even though all of METI and Tepco are in uSv/h, and Radnet and CTBO are in CPM. 1 nGy/h = 0.001 uSv/h. But if it is in nGy/h then the readings at Horiguchi are less than what people are experiencing today throughout northern Japan. I really find it hard to believe that the peak of contamination on the 15th only registered 4000 nGy/h (4 uSv/h). My dog has more rads than that.

WAIT A MINUTE. According to the SPEEDI maps below the readings are in uGy/h which is the same as microSv. So at the peak on the 15th into the 16th there were consistent readings between 1 and 4 milliseiverts an hour in Ibaraki. Thats what I suspected from the beginning.

And this is an incredible vid of SPEEDI data, hour by hour maps.
www.youtube.com...
Ive learned alot watching it. First, the spikes are wind driven plumes and not spikes. SPEEDI readings should only be used for mapping and laying a timeline for plume dispersion and not spikes. In fact there is no way to know if a spike happened, most blew out to sea and wasn't monitored in any form. There could have been a spike but since it deposited in the ocean we'll never know. Monitoring points don't tell us anything about east moving plumes.

In fact, since all early data came from Tepco, SPEEDI and the test ban sites, we really have no clue how much was really released from the plant. The levels of seawater contamination give a reference before dilution, but this is still far too hit and miss as surveys were sporadic at first.

What SPEEDI does show us is the randomness that occurs with atmospheric dispersion. If you follow the plume maps above from 4AM on the 15th to 6AM on the 16th, there is nothing that explains why Horiguchi got nuked for such a long period of time and neighboring towns received much less.

Here are some SPEEDI maps showing how the Ibaraki spikes were primarily caused by shifting winds.

4:20 AM 3/15 spike

Midnight 3/15 3/16

5 to 6 AM 3/16 spike



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 12:42 PM
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reply to post by Aircooled
 
From Fukushima Diary fukushima-diary.com...

I can't believe they are going to take the top trusses and support structure apart before offloading the SFP. This is insane. The engineers tweeting are concerned that without the over head support holding the walls together as one structure, an EQ could cause the walls to go split apart.



Not sure what Tepco is thinking, but I dont like it. Theyre rolling the dice again. This is all that is going to be keeping the walls from disjoining.



Does looking at that flimsy design that is holding up enough uranium and plutonium to damn near end life on this planet if it all went critical give you warm and fuzzy feelings. I didn't think so.



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 02:35 PM
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Originally posted by Human0815
@ Zworld,
can you overlay the Safecast.org Map?
blog.safecast.org...


They appear to be similar. I think Hayakawa's map (I think thats the spelling) used the safecast data as well as agency data but I dont know for sure. It was supposed to be the most comprehensive map out there.

What I want is the SPEEDI data for Fukushima and Miyagi perfectures. I found how to get everything off their site except that. Its hiding somewhere. You gotta love a public agency that uses public money to monitor things that directly affect the public but doesn't want the public to know. That is so fugging EPAish that its scary.



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 02:42 PM
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Originally posted by zworld
reply to post by Aircooled
 
From Fukushima Diary fukushima-diary.com...

I can't believe they are going to take the top trusses and support structure apart before offloading the SFP. This is insane. The engineers tweeting are concerned that without the over head support holding the walls together as one structure, an EQ could cause the walls to go split apart.



Not sure what Tepco is thinking, but I dont like it. Theyre rolling the dice again. This is all that is going to be keeping the walls from disjoining.



Does looking at that flimsy design that is holding up enough uranium and plutonium to damn near end life on this planet if it all went critical give you warm and fuzzy feelings. I didn't think so.


Remember as a kid, playing Kerplunk or "House of Cards"? I'd very much appreciate it if they didn't play these games with several TONS of Uranium and Plutonium.

Because eventually, someone will pull out that magic card..



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 06:41 PM
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I was chatting with AC and was asking if anyone had seen this report.

Cesium-137 deposition and contamination of
Japanese soils due to the Fukushima nuclear accident

www.pnas.org...

Tried to input pics,to no avail.



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 06:55 PM
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Originally posted by zworld/AC




Anyone notice how every picture has a similar shade of cesium/iron rust browny orange colour? There must be a terrific amount of leaching. I was told concrete rebar usually fails because the steel rusts and expands the concrete, causing cracks, could it be what we are seeing - earthquake weakened, then radioactive steam, heat and other products attacking the concrete as well.

reply to post by matadoor
 


From your fukushima dairy link regarding stained concrete



I don’t know if it’s because they gave sea water to cool down or because it’s brackish area, if natrium (sodium salt) of sea water made a chemical reaction with calcium carbonate in the concrete to become diuranate natrium (sodium diuranate) or not, it looks yellow as yellow cake.



Bottom sample. Pic courtesy of Fukushima diary



Originally posted by zworld
You gotta love a public agency that uses public money to monitor things that directly affect the public but doesn't want the public to know. That is so fugging EPAish that its scary.


National radiation labs here have been a bit clammy like that too. Taking an awful amount of time to verify data. We won't see it until later this year!

Also regarding the blowout panels, the insulation on the building is white, so warm-hot. The panels are cold, perhaps they are a efficiently heat-sinking aluminum design? Or are open and appear cold because of some airflow?
edit on 3/1/12 by GhostR1der because: (no reason given)



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 07:09 PM
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reply to post by kdog1982
 


Here you go, K



edit on 3-1-2012 by Aircooled because: Nobodies perfect



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 07:18 PM
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Originally posted by qmantoo
Thorfourwinds...

Unit 4 was shut down and had been in an outage since November 30, 2010. All the fuel was in the spent fuel pool to facilitate reactor pressure vessel shroud work. The cavity gate was installed, isolating the spent fuel pool from the upper pools...


Could you tell us which press releases these quotes are taken from please?


Greetings qmantoo:

Absolutely top-notch effort on your part, my friend.

Thank you for all you do.

We too, are making an effort to aid in what you’re doing by ensuring links are descriptive in their own right.

Since the Internet “scrub” seems to be gaining in momentum daily, we have been back-tracking links and deleting the “dead” ones and replacing and downloading everything. Another member’s data disappearance stories are interesting to take heed of.

Here is the where the information came from. We actually thought we had hot-linked the info (as usual) in the previous post; obviously not.

The entire 2.2 MB Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is available for download here.

We are excerpting the “Unit 4 Narrative” here so interested parties don’t have to go look for it to have a good read, and the fact we want to highlight certain blatant “anomalies” that are interesting unto themselves, but overall, just part of the TEPCO/JAPGOV cover-up.

One must keep in mind the authors and their superiors and their stated mission:


Our Mission . . . to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability – to promote excellence – in the operation of commercial nuclear power plants.

Here we go...


Page 33

4.4 Unit 4 Narrative

[color=FDD017]Unit 4 was shut down and had been in a refueling outage since November 30, 2010. All of the fuel had been removed from the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool to facilitate shroud work. The reactor was disassembled with the head off at the time of the earthquake. The cavity gates were installed, isolating the spent fuel pool from the upper pools. Spent fuel pool temperature was approximately 80.6*F (27*C).

Following the earthquake and tsunami, the operators in the Units 3-4 control room focused the majority of their efforts on stabilizing Unit 3. Because of the low decay heat load in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool, operators may not have been immediately concerned with taking action to fill or cool the spent fuel pool.

On March 15, however, a hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 4 reactor building. This was unexpected, as workers did not believe there was enough decay heat in the pool to result in overheating and the subsequent high-temperature interaction of zirconium and water to produce hydrogen gas.

After the explosion, however, some people suspected that the spent fuel was overheating, and they became concerned about subsequent hydrogen explosions caused by the fuel in the spent fuel pools on other units. Some resources may have been diverted from attempts to stabilize the reactors, as extensive actions - such as helicopter water drops and the use of water cannons - were taken in an attempt to refill the pools.

[color=00FFFF]Subsequent analysis and inspections determined that the water level in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool never dropped below the top of fuel and that no significant fuel damage had occurred.

Is that an “updated fact?"


There are various theories regarding the cause of the hydrogen explosion in Unit 4. Hydrogen water chemistry was used at Fukushima Daiichi, and hydrogen was also used to cool the main generators. Both of these sources of hydrogen were reviewed, and it appears that neither source caused the Unit 4 explosion.

The most widely accepted theory is associated with the backflow of gases from Unit 3 during venting. The containment vent exhaust piping from Unit 3 is connected to the Unit 4 exhaust piping. The dampers on the Unit 4 standby gas treatment system (SGTS) are air-operated and fail open on a loss of power or air (except the cross-connect between SGTS filter trains).

Additionally, the system does not have a backflow damper installed in the piping that connects to Unit 3. With no power or air, and no fans in service to direct the gases from Unit 3 up the exhaust stack, the exhaust gases from Unit 3 would be directly aligned to the Unit 4 SGTS filters. This piping arrangement may have allowed gases from the Unit 3 containment to be vented to the Unit 4 reactor building via reverse flow through the Unit 4 standby gas treatment system.


To be continued...



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 07:18 PM
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(Continued from previous...)



To confirm this theory, on August 25 TEPCO personnel performed radiation surveys on the Unit 4 SGTS filters. The survey results, shown in Figure 4.4-2, revealed higher radiation levels at the locations closer to Unit 3.

These survey results support the conclusion that there was backflow from Unit 3 to Unit 4. Further inspections are needed to confirm this theory; but based on this information, it is postulated that the hydrogen explosion in the Unit 4 reactor building was caused by hydrogen from Unit 3.







Background

As shown, the spent fuel pools (SFPs) for units 1-4 contained different amounts of spent fuel at the time of the event, generating different heat loads. [color=Cyan]The Unit 4 SFP had the greatest heat load because the entire core had been offloaded into the SFP to support ongoing outage work.

Approximately 60 percent of the spent fuel on site is stored in a separate building in a common spent fuel pool. This pool contained 6,375 fuel assemblies (about 80 percent of pool capacity), but the heat load was very low because the assemblies were stored in their respective units’ SFPs for 19 months or longer before being set in the common pool.

[color=Chartreuse]Calculations determined that cooling can be lost to this pool for 30 days before it becomes a concern. The common spent fuel pool uses fans and air for cooling, so cooling is maintained if the seawater ultimate heat sink is lost; however, AC power is required to power the fan motors and circulating pumps.

Dry cask storage is also used for spent fuel. [color=FDD017]At the time of the event, the station had nine casks containing 408 spent fuel assemblies.

[color=00FFFF]There are no mixed-oxide fuel assemblies in any of the spent fuel pools or in the dry cask storage facility.

However, Unit 3 was loaded with Mox, and that fact seems to have disappeared from any mention when discussing the explosions at Unit 3.

We recall that on the 17th of March that a CNN talking head was interviewing a guest "nuclear expert" and the anchor asked something about the dangers of Mox in a meltdown and the guest launched into this soliloquy about containment integrity and completely sidestepped the question. Of course, the CNN beauty queen did not press the question and said something she thought was witty about being contained...

What is Mox fuel and how much stronger is it then normal uranium? According to World Nuclear News, in August 2010 Japan loaded Mox fuel into the Fukushima #3 reactor.

“Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (Tepco’s) Fukushima I unit 3 is set to become the third Japanese nuclear reactor to load mixed oxide (MOX) fuel after receiving approval from the governor of Fukushima Prefecture, Yukei Sato.”

Third reactor in Japan to use MOX fuel - Fissile material

The first two units, Genkai-3 and Ikata-3, began operations with MOX fuel in November 2009 and March 2010 respectively. Use of MOX fuel in light-water power reactors is part of Japan's "pluthermal" program, which plans to have 16-18 reactors using MOX fuel by 2015. 

Greenpeace’s Shaun Burnie on Mox fuel

Shaun Burnie, an independent nuclear energy consultant and former head of nuclear campaigns at Greenpeace, said the presence of a percentage of fuel core loaded with plutonium Mox fuel in the No 3 reactor posed a grave threat to the surrounding area.

“Plutonium Mox fuel increases the risk of nuclear accident due the neutronic effects of plutonium on the reactor,” Burnie told the Guardian. “In the event of an accident – in particular loss of coolant – the reactor core is more difficult to control due to both neutronics and higher risk of fuel cladding failure. In the event of the fuel melting and the release of plutonium fuel into the environment, the health hazards are greater, including higher levels of latent cancer.”




To be continued...



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 07:18 PM
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(Continued from previous...)


Event Progression

Spent fuel pool cooling flow was lost for all pools because of the loss of off-site power and was not restored after the emergency diesel generators started. [color=Cyan]The existing water inventory in the spent fuel pools provided sufficient cooling to remove decay heat, as long as the fuel remained covered. Unconfirmed reports were that sloshing of the water in the SFPs during the earthquake resulted in a loss of some inventory; however, this has not been verified. After the tsunami impacted the site, operators were able to use the 6B emergency diesel generator (EDG) to provide power to cooling systems for the Unit 6 spent fuel pool. After installing temporary cables, the 6B EDG provided power to Unit 5 spent fuel pool cooling.

Hydrogen explosions in the Units 1, 3, and 4 reactor buildings, coupled with the loss of the blowout panel in Unit 2, resulted in the SFPs of all units being exposed to atmosphere.

[color=Chartreuse]The explosions may have also caused additional inventory to be lost from the pools. After the explosion on Unit 4, a concern arose that the SFP may have boiled dry and resulted in fuel damage and hydrogen generation. In response to this concern, station personnel took numerous actions to ensure the spent fuel had sufficient cooling.

“Additional inventory?”

Are we talking about water or spent fuel?

Can’t be “sloshing” water, as this was stated in the fifth paragraph of the narrative:
[color=FDD017]...The water level in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool never dropped below the top of fuel...

And we can’t really see the spent fuel jumping out of the “intact” SPF...so WTF are they talking about?

This report will go right up there with the Warren Commission travesty as poorly received works of fiction that some people actually believe.


Fire engines from the surrounding area, including water cannons from the Japan Self-Defense Force, were brought to the site to spray water into the SFPs to keep the fuel assemblies covered. The water cannons could only reach the floor surrounding the SFP, so little water got into the pool. On March 17, helicopters attempted to drop large loads of water into the SFPs. Because of high radiation levels, the helicopters needed to maintain a high altitude; and that, coupled with the prevailing winds, resulted in this effort not being successful.

Concrete pumping trucks were flown to Japan for use in pumping water into the SFPs. These trucks, which have long, articulated booms normally used for transferring concrete, were lined up to pump water into the spent fuel pools on March 18. This operation was successful; however,
the trucks did not start refilling the SFPs until several days after the event began. [color=Cyan]The delay in refilling the SFPs may have contributed to increased radiation levels in the area around the spent fuel pools because less shielding was provided with the reduced water level.

The exact impact, however, was not known because radiation levels were not monitored as the pools were refilled.

An inspection of the dry cask storage facility revealed that, while the building was damaged by the tsunami, the dry storage casks do not appear to be damaged. The casks were wetted by the tsunami, but they were not moved from their storage locations by the force of the waves or debris. The fuel stored inside the dry casks has not yet been inspected.



This report was delivered on 11/11/11, 9 months after 3/11.

And on Page 61 of this report, the “area of explosion” for Units 1 & 3 is pinpointed in the Secondary Containment, here:


The report is well worth reading, not only because of the “anomalies” and other interesting tidbits like this:


7.6 Operator Training

Initial operator training programs for reactor operators and above are provided by BWR Training Center Corporation (BTC), which is located close to Fukushima Daiichi. TEPCO is one of the shareholders of the company. The site superintendent certifies initial qualifications for senior operators, main shift operators, and auxiliary operators on site. By law, shift supervisors are required to be licensed. The licensing process includes an evaluation of their knowledge and skills. The Japan Nuclear Technology Institute (JANTI) performs this evaluation and issues the license.


Hope all this raises more questions, including the veracity the of previous reports from the same people...






Peace Love Light
tfw
[align=center][color=magenta]Liberty & Equality or Revolution[/align]



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 07:43 PM
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reply to post by Aircooled
 

Thanks,AC.



posted on Jan, 3 2012 @ 08:58 PM
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Fukushima Whistleblower: Container vessel melting like honeycomb — “Can you believe it is out of the container vessel”? (PHOTOS)


fukushima diary
enenews

Looks like the core samples from the photo I posted earlier have been leaked. This is proof the monster has left the jar! Sample exceeds 500msv. Photographer has probably put himself in harms way taking these shots. Very beautiful sample though (from a crystal/rockhound POV).




Proof of how soft the rock is (crumbly sand stone)



They wouldn't be able to use them if it was real rock! They use similar sized machines in NZ for drilling pipes through clay and soil materials.
edit on 3/1/12 by GhostR1der because: edit to change sample pic to highres from Fukdiary





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