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Originally posted by Truth1000
I was actually working that mission. The loss is unconscionable since the Morton Thiocol engineers initially called a "No Go" due to weather and the record of the O ring burn throughs at much higher temperatures. Two engineers resigned in protest when Thiocol switched to a "Go" call, because of the pressure brought to bear against them! One of the engineers even left a letter on his desk predicting an O ring burn through!
RIP Challenger crew!
Originally posted by Truth1000
I was actually working that mission. The loss is unconscionable since the Morton Thiocol engineers initially called a "No Go" due to weather and the record of the O ring burn throughs at much higher temperatures. Two engineers resigned in protest when Thiocol switched to a "Go" call, because of the pressure brought to bear against them! One of the engineers even left a letter on his desk predicting an O ring burn through!
The origin and consequences of the erosion and blow-by were not
understood. They did not occur equally on all flights and all joints;
sometimes more, and sometimes less. Why not sometime, when whatever
conditions determined it were right, still more leading to
catastrophe?
In spite of these variations from case to case, officials behaved as
if they understood it, giving apparently logical arguments to each
other often depending on the "success" of previous flights. For
example. in determining if flight 51-L was safe to fly in the face of
ring erosion in flight 51-C, it was noted that the erosion depth was
only one-third of the radius. It had been noted in an experiment
cutting the ring that cutting it as deep as one radius was necessary
before the ring failed. Instead of being very concerned that
variations of poorly understood conditions might reasonably create a
deeper erosion this time, it was asserted, there was "a safety factor
of three." This is a strange use of the engineer's term ,"safety
factor."...
There was no way, without full understanding, that one could have
confidence that conditions the next time might not produce erosion
three times more severe than the time before. Nevertheless, officials
fooled themselves into thinking they had such understanding and
confidence, in spite of the peculiar variations from case to case.
Originally posted by Truth1000
I was actually working that mission. The loss is unconscionable since the Morton Thiocol engineers initially called a "No Go" due to weather and the record of the O ring burn throughs at much higher temperatures. Two engineers resigned in protest when Thiocol switched to a "Go" call, because of the pressure brought to bear against them! One of the engineers even left a letter on his desk predicting an O ring burn through!