OFFICIAL COURT FINDS HIM TO BE AN ILLEGAL ALIEN ...
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GREGORY S. HOLLISTER,
: CIVIL ACTION NO.
BARRY SOETORO, a/k/a Barack
Hussein Obama, in his capacity as
a natural person; in his capacity as
de facto President in posse; and in his :
capacity as de jure President in posse :
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his capacity :
as a natural person; in his capacity as :
de jure Acting President in posse; in his :
capacity as de jure President in posse; :
and in his capacity as de jure Vice-
President in posse;
NATURAL and UN-NATURAL
DOES 1-10 INCLUSIVE,
COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER AND
DECLARTORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintif through his Counsel, Philip J. Berg, Esquire and Lawrence J. Joyce,
Esquire allege the following in support of his Complaint for Interpleader, Declaratory and
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This is a claim in the nature of Interpleader, with Jurisdiction in this Court based upon
28 U.S.C. § 1335 with diversity of citizenship; there is complete diversity of
citizenship between the Plaintif and al Defendants in this suit. This case is also brought pursuant to the aforementioned statute and Federal Rule of
Plaintif Gregory S. Hollister is a resident of the State of Colorado; Defendant Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama is a resident of Illinois,
D.C. and may be a Foreign National; and Joseph R. Biden, Jr. is a resident of the State of Delaware and possibly Washington, D.C.
Plaintiff, Gregory S. Hollister [hereinafter “Hollister”] is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Colorado Springs, Colorado;
Defendant, Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama, [hereinafter “Soetoro”] is an adult individual and is a resident of Illinois, possibly
Washington, D.C., and may be a Foreign National with an office addres of Presidential Transition Team,
451 Sixth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20270;
Defendant, Joseph R. Biden, Jr. [hereinafter “Biden”] is a citizen of the United States with an office addres of Presidential Transition Team, 451
Sixth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20270 and is a resident of Delaware and possibly Washington,
Plaintif Hollister is a retired Colonel from the United States Air Force. Hollister joined the United States Air Force and began active duty in 1978.
Hollister served twenty  years of honorable service and retired in 1998.
Hollister took the Oath of Enlistment which states “I, Gregory S. Hollister, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against al enemies, foreign and domestic; that I wil bear true faith and allegiance
to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to
regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God” [emphasis added]
As a result of Hollister having served a regular commission, he is in what is called
the “Individual Ready Reserve.” That means he is subject to Presidential recal for the rest of
his life. Hollister’s discharge papers are attached hereto as Exhibit “A”.
Plaintif is in possession of certain property. This property consists of duties owed by the Plaintif to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the United States and to al others above Plaintiff’s rank in his chain of command, and this property also consists of certain relationships. It has
been held in the federal jurisdiction that property can pertain to intangible res. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-27, 108 S.Ct. 316, 320-
321, 98 L.Ed.2d 275, 283-284 (1987). Other federal courts have stated that property can be recognized in other types of an intangible res as well.
First Victoria National Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096, 1106-1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (“rice history acreage”, like “good will of a
business”, is property); Matter of Nichols, 4 B.R. 711, 717 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary at 1095 for proposition that
“property” encompasses al things “corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible…”). Significantly, the District of
Massachusetts has found that property can be recognized in a relationship, such as a landlord-tenant relationship, or an employer-employe
relationship. Glosband v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 21 B.R. 963, 971-972. (D. Mass. 1982).
The statute Plaintif relies on for bringing this case in the nature of Interpleader does not state a requirement that the property be tangible or
intangible. Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F.R.D. 621 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (a case in the federal jurisdiction in which an
intangible res [a duty] was the subject of Interpleader). The Plaintif has found no case in which a Court held that intangible res cannot be the
subject of Interpleader; and the wording of the statute upon which the Plaintif relies to bring this case in the nature of Interpleader must be
considered in light of two holdings by the Supreme Court on statutory construction:
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 760, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) and N.O.W. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 9 (1994).
In light of Martin v. Wilks and N.O.W. v. Scheidler, any attempt to read into the federal Interpleader statute a requirement that the property rights
pertain only to a tangible res would constitute an impermissible addition of an element not contained in the statute itself.
Plaintiff’s duties themselves are the duty to obey lawful orders, the duty to disobey at least certain unlawful orders, and the duty to support and
defend the Constitution against al enemies, both foreign and domestic; put another way, the Plaintif is in possession of obligations he owes to the
Acting President or President (and al others above the Plaintif in his chain of command) to receive the performance of these duties from the
Plaintiff. Each of these duties is worth Five Hundred [$500.00] Dollars.
The relationships are the superior/subordinate relationships that Plaintif has with each person above him in the chain of command, including the
Acting President or President, and the relationship Plaintif and the Department of Defense reciprocally have with each other as employer/employee.
Each of these relationships is worth Five Hundred [$500.00] Dollars or more.
Plaintif has reason to believe that Soetoro may not be a “natural born” United States Citizen and therefore is not qualified pursuant to the
United States Constitution to serve as President of the United States. Article II, Section I, Cl. 5 states that only a “natural born” United
States citizen shal be eligible to the Office of President.
Plaintiff’s questions regarding Soetoro’s eligibility to serve as President of the United States pursuant to the Constitution arose when Plaintif
learned Soetoro may have been born in Kenya to a U.S. citizen mother and a foreign national. This was further complicated when Plaintif learned that
Soetoro attended a public school in Indonesia under the name of Barry Soetoro, as an Indonesian Citizen.
The American publics’ knowledge of Soetoro is based in substantial part on his memoir, “Dreams from my Father”. Although Soetoro is silent about
his birthplace in his Memoir he speaks in detail about his life in Indonesia. Unfortunately, Soetoro’s records pertaining to his life are
confidential either by being sealed or by statute, depriving Plaintif and all citizens acces to such documents.
Evidence points to the fact that Soetoro, at the time of birth his name was Barack Hussein Obama, was born at Coast Hospital in Mombasa, Kenya located
in Coast Province.
Soetoro’s father was a Kenyan citizen and Soetoro’s mother a United States citizen who was not old enough and did not reside in the United States
long enough to register Soetoro’s birth in Hawai as a “natural born” United States citizen.
Under the laws in effect between December 24, 1952 and November 14, 1986 (Soetoro was born in 1961), a child born outside of the United States to one
citizen parent and one foreign national, could acquire “natural born” United States citizenship if the United States citizen parent had been
physically present in the United States for ten (10) years prior
to the child’s birth, five (5) of those years being after age fourteen (14). Nationality Act of 1940, revised June 1952; United States of America v.
Cervantes-Nava, 281 F.3d 501 (2002),
Drozd v. I.N.S., 15 F.3d 81, 85-8 (2d Cir.1998), United States v. Gomez-Orozco, 18 F.3d 422, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1999), Scales v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 232 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2000), Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005). Soetoro’s mother was only eighteen
(18) when Obama was born in Kenya and therefore, did not meet the age and residency requirements for her child to have acquired “natural born”
U.S. citizenship even under the statute. Therefore, Soetoro could not be a “natural born” United States citizen in any event under these facts.
The law that applies to a birth abroad is the law in effect at the time of birth, Marquez-Marquez a/k/a Moreno v. Gonzales, 45 F. 3d 548 (5th Cir.
2006), Runnet v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that "the applicable law for transmitting citizenship to a child born abroad when
one parent is a U.S. citizen is the statute that was in effect at the time of the child's birth").
Soetoro’s Kenyan grandmother, Sarah Obama, has repeatedly stated Soetoro was born in Kenya and she was present in the hospital during his birth.
Bishop Ron McRae, who oversees the Anabaptists Churches in North America, and Reverend Kweli Shuhubia, had the opportunity in or about October 2008 to
interview Sarah Obama. Reverend Kweli Shuhubia went to the home of Sarah Obama located in Kogello, Kenya. Reverend Kweli Shuhubia called Bishop McRae
from Ms. Obama’s home and placed the cal on speakerphone. Bishop McRae asked if it was okay to tape the conversation, which permission was
Because Ms. Obama only speaks Swahili, Reverend Kweli Shuhubia and another grandson of Ms. Obama’s translated the telephone interview. Bishop McRae
asked Ms. Obama where
Soetoro was born; Ms. Obama answered in Swahili and was very adamant that Soetoro was born in Kenya. Bishop McRae asked Ms. Obama if she was present
during her grandson’s birth and Ms. Obama answered, “Yes.”
Reverend Kweli Shuhubia left after interviewing Ms. Obama, and traveled to Mombosa, Kenya. Reverend Kweli Shuhubia interviewed personnel at the
hospital where Ms. Obama said Soetoro was born in Kenya. Reverend Kweli Shuhubia then immediately had meetings with the Provincial Civil Registrar.
Reverend Kweli Shuhubia learned there were records of Ann Dunham giving birth to Barack Hussein Obama, Jr. in Mombosa, Kenya on August 4, 1961.
Reverend Kweli Shuhubia spoke directly with an Official, the Principal Registrar, who openly confirmed that the birthing records of Soetoro under the
name “Barack H. Obama, Jr.” and his mother were present; however, the file on Barack H. Obama, Jr. was classified. The Official explained Barack
Hussein Obama, Jr.’s birth in Kenya is top secret.
Soetoro continues to verbally deny he was born in Kenya and states he was born in Hawaii. Upon investigation into the alleged birth of Soetoro in
Honolulu, Hawaii, Soetoro’s birth is reported as occurring at two (2) separate hospitals, Kapiolani Hospital and Queens Hospital. The Rainbow
Edition News Letter, November 2004 Edition, published by the Education Laboratory School did a several page article of an interview with Soetoro and
his half-sister, Maya. The Rainbow Edition News Letter reports Soetoro was born August 4, 1961 at Queens Medical Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. In
February 2008, Soetoro’s half- sister, Maya, was again interviewed, this time by the Star Bulletin. Therein Maya stated that Soetoro was born August
4, 1961 in Kapiolani Medical Center for Women & Children.
Obviously an attempt by Maya to validate a birth in Hawai she knew did not occur.
Moreover, Soetoro allowed the Daily Kos, Factcheck and his campaign website to post a Hawaiian Certification of Live Birth (COLB), purported to be
Soetoro’s on their websites. There are several problems with this. The image posted on dailykos.com, factcheck.org and fightthesmears.com has been
deemed an altered and forged document according to document image specialists. Moreover, even if this document purported to be Soetoro’s
Certification of Live Birth was an accurate document, it still could not prove “natural born” U.S. citizenship status. The Hawai Department of
Health issues a
Certification of Live Birth to births that occurred abroad in foreign countries as well as births that occurred at home and not in a hospital.
Certifications of Live Birth are issued to those
born as “naturalized” U.S. citizens as well as “natural born” U.S. citizens. It should be noted, Soetoro’s sister, Maya Soetoro-Ng was born
in Indonesia in 1970, she was born a “natural” citizen of Indonesia, however, her birth was registered in Hawai as a birth abroad and she is only
a “naturalized” citizen, not “natural born”; despite this she was issued a Hawaiian Certification of Live Birth (COLB).
A Certification of Live Birth is not sufficient evidence to prove one is in fact a “natural born” U.S. citizen.
Additionally, Dr. Fukino, Director of the Hawaiian Department of Health released a press release stating she saw Soetoro’s “vault” version birth
certificate in a file. Although, Dr. Fukino does not claim Soetoro was born in Hawai or the U.S. for that matter, she does confirm the “vault”
version birth certificate exists. Once again, Soetoro refuses to release acces to this “vault” version birth certificate that if it were
legitimate, would show doctors signatures, city, state and country of birth, and of course would solve the issue of where he was in fact born.
It appears that Soetoro became an Indonesian citizen. When Soetoro was approximately four (4) years old his parents divorced and thereafter,
Soetoro’s mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, married Lolo Soetoro, a citizen of Indonesia. Evidence points to the fact that Lolo Soetoro either signed a
government form legally “acknowledging” Soetoro as his son or “adopted” Soetoro, either of which changed any citizenship status Soetoro had to
a “natural” citizen of Indonesia.
All Indonesian students were required to carry government identity cards or Karty Tanda Pendudaks, as well as family card identification called a
Kartu Keluarga. The Kartu Keluarga is a family card which bears the legal names and citizenship status of al family members.
Soetoro was registered in a public school as an Indonesian citizen by the name of Barry Soetoro and his father was listed as Lolo Soetoro, M.A.
Indonesia did not allow foreign students to attend their public schools in the late 1960’s or 1970’s, and any time a child was registered for a
public school, their name and citizenship status was verified through the Indonesian Government. Se Constitution of Republic of Indonesia (Undang-
Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945), Chapter 13, Law No. 62 of 1958 (all citizens of Indonesia have a right to education). The school record,
attached hereto as Exhibit “B”, indicates that Soetoro’s name is “Barry Soetoro;” his nationality is “Indonesia;” and his religion as
“Islam”. There was no way for Soetoro to have attended school in Jakarta, Indonesia legally unless he was an Indonesian citizen, as Indonesia was
under tight rule and was a Police State. Se Constitution of Republic of Indonesia (Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945), Law No. 62 of 1958.
These facts indicate that Soetoro is an
Indonesian citizen, and therefore he is not eligible to be President of the United States.
Under Indonesian law, when a male acknowledges a child as his son, it deems the son, in this case Soetoro, an Indonesian State citizen. Constitution
of Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 62 of 1958 concerning Immigration Affairs and Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Perdata) (KUHPer)
(Burgerlijk Wetboek voor Indonesie).
Furthermore, under the Indonesian adoption law, once an Indonesian citizen adopts a child, the adoption severs the child’s relationship to the birth
parents, and the adopted child is given the same status as a natural child and the child takes the name of his step-father, in this case, Soetoro. Se
Indonesian Constitution, Article 2.
The Indonesian citizenship law was designed to prevent apatride (stateless) or bipatride (dual) citizenship. Indonesian regulations recognized neither
apatride nor bipatride (stateless or dual) citizenship. Since Indonesia did not allow dual citizenship; neither did the United States (since the
United States only permitted dual citizenship when ‘both’ countries
agree); and since Soetoro was a “natural” citizen of Indonesia, the United States would not step in or interfere with the laws of Indonesia. Hague
Convention of 1930.
As a result of Soetoro’s Indonesian “natural” citizenship status, Soetoro could never regain U.S. “natural born” status, if he in fact he
ever held such, which we doubt.
Soetoro could have only become “naturalized” if the proper paperwork were filed with the U.S. State Department, after going through U.S.
Immigration after his return to the United
States; in which case, Soetoro would have received a Certification of Citizenship indicating “naturalized.”
Plaintif is informed, believes and thereon alleges Soetoro was never naturalized in the United States after his return. Soetoro was ten (10) years old
when he returned to Hawai to live with his grandparents. Soetoro’s mother did not return with him. Therefore, it appears that she did not apply for
citizenship for Soetoro in the United States. If citizenship of Soetoro had been applied for in 1971, Soetoro would have a Certification of
If Soetoro returned in 1971 to Hawai without going through U.S. Immigration, today he would be an “illegal alien” – and obviously not able to
serve as President, but also his term as
a United States Senator from Illinois for nearly four (4) years was illegal. Plaintif believes Soetoro might have reentered the United States at age
ten (10) by showing a copy of his
aforementioned Hawaiian Certification of Live Birth or his Indonesian Passport.
Moreover, Plaintif has been unable to locate any legal documents wherein Soetoro’s name was legally changed from Barry Soetoro to Barack Hussein
Plaintif is literally caught between a rock and a hard place. If reactivated, he comes under a duty to obey lawful orders. He would come under a duty,
under at least certain circumstances, to disobey unlawful orders. He would come under a duty to support and defend the Constitution against al
enemies, both foreign and domestic. But to whom will these duties be owed from January 20, 2009 on? And against whom wil these duties
operate? Soetoro or Biden?
This dilemma is particularly distressful to the Plaintif in light of the current state of the law on obeying or disobeying unlawful orders. The Armed
Forces themselves construe their oath to obey orders to require only that they obey lawful orders.” Se the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
809.ART.90 (20) (military personnel need only obey the "lawful command of his superior officer"); 891.ART.91 (2), (servicemember must obey the
"lawful order of a warrant officer"; 892.ART.92 (1) servicemember must obey the "lawful general order"), and 892.ART.92 (2) ("lawful order").
And the courts have recognized even the affirmative duty of servicemembers to disobey unlawful orders, most notably in the notorious “My Lai
Massacre” case, United States v. Calley, 2 USCMA 534, 48 CMR 19 (1973).
In the instant case, the first question Plaintif is concerned about is, “Does United States v. New, 5 M.J. 95 (2001) apply to a case in which the
claim by the person declaring that he is President is a claim that is false? And does this vary according to whether the claim to be President is
‘palpably illegal on its face?’” Se New, 5 M.J. at 108 U.S. v. New applies on its face to a soldier’s duty to obey legal orders and disobey
certain illegal orders, of course. But does it also apply with respect to the underlying question of whether the person giving the orders is even
legitimately in office to give those orders in the first place?
Plaintif faces the possibility of a conflict in his duties and multiple claims against him for the performance of these duties. It has been held that
Interpleader may be brought even though no demand has yet been made on a Plaintif for the property in question. Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d 506
(5th Cir. 1974). Instead, the mere fact that the Plaintif has a real, reasonable, bona fide fear of exposure to multiple claims or the hazards and
vexation of conflicting claims is sufficient. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 164 (D. Virgin Islands
1975). Se also, Underwriters at Lloyd’s v.
Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966) (in such circumstances, court has a duty to allow Interpleader).
Plaintif especially asks this Court to keep in mind that if Soetoro is sworn in, he could be blackmailed by anyone possessing prima facie evidence of
his lack of natural-born
citizenship. The blackmail could be for money, or could be for changing policy, whether foreign or domestic.
Plaintif fears the hazards and vexations of multiple conflicting orders and responsibilities with respect to his aforementioned duties, al of which
may interfere with, and may possibly sever, their relationships with al those above him in the chain of
command, including, but not limited to, the Acting President or President, and al of which may interfere with, and may possibly sever, their
employer/employe relationship with the Department of Defense. These hazards and vexations can include court-martials, incarceration, reduction in
rank, los of benefits and privileges, a dishonorable discharge, and claims against him for damages, al of which might come, possibly in contradictory
manner, from more than one source of authority, or at least from more than one claimed source of authority, above him. Each of these injuries, and al
of them, would constitute irreparable harm to the Plaintiff. With respect to relief from each of these injuries, and al of them, damages wil not
suffice for Plaintiff, and there is no adequate remedy at law.
It is particularly important to the Plaintif to know whether Soetoro is eligible to be President before he is reactivated because if Soetoro issues an
order to reactivate him, he wil have to know whether that is an order he is required to obey, or perhaps (at least in certain cases) whether that is
even an order he is required to disobey. The evidence that Soetoro is not a “natural-born” citizen is so substantial that as things stand right
now, unless this Court affirmatively declares that Soetoro is indeed constitutionally qualified to be President, Plaintif wil be of the opinion that
he must refuse to recognize as being lawful the reactivation order and any other orders to him pursuant to the reactivation order.
If the ordinary processes of law would then be available to the Plaintif for a resolution of these conflicts upon their reactivation, perhaps his
distres today would not be quite as pronounced as it is. But the ordinary processes of law would not be available to the Plaintif in the event that he
is reactivated. As this Court itself has held (and as was affirmed
by the D.C. Circuit), Congres has by statute precluded members of the Armed Forces from having acces to the Article II Courts until and unles they
have first disobeyed an order and have been court-martialed for having done so, and al their appeals in the military courts have been exhausted.
United States ex rel. New v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1996); aff’d sub nom. New v. Cohen, 129 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. den., 523 U.S.
1048, 118 S.Ct.
1364, 140 L.Ed.2d 513.
Thus, the ordinary processes of the law in the Article II Courts are not available to the Plaintif for a consideration of his plight once he is
reactivated and deemed in active status. This, of course, adds to al the other grounds the Plaintif has for having a real, reasonable, bona fide fear
of exposure to multiple claims or the hazards and vexation of conflicting claims.
Plaintiff’s concern over how to conduct himself, and his concern over multiple conflicting civil and criminal claims against him if Soetoro is sworn
in is further increased by a recent Supreme Court decision, Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003). In Nguyen the Supreme Court took note of the
fact that the usual rule regarding the acts of de facto officers is that ordinarily they are equally valid as those of de jure officers. The Court
held nonetheles that the judgment of the Ninth Circuit had to be vacated on the grounds that there was a constitutional defect in the authority of the
Article IV Court Judge to hear the appeals. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 77-81, 123 S.Ct. 2130, 2135-2137, 156 L.Ed.2d 64,
Plaintif is in need of the assistance of this Court. Without a determination by competent authority as to whether Soetoro is or isn’t
constitutionally eligible to be President, the Plaintif wil be left on his own to determine his duties should he receive what is purported to be his
reactivation orders from Soetoro, or conflicting orders from his superiors in the chain of command, or orders which may conflict with his duty to
support and defend the Constitution. In that respect, the Plaintif retains an interest in the alleged properties at issue in this case. Accordingly,
if this Court does find that Soetoro is indeed constitutionally qualified to hold the Office of President, Plaintif wil need for this Court to base
such a finding upon a clear showing by affirmative evidence, consistent with Soetoro’s burden of proof under Interpleader, that Soetoro is indeed a
“natural born” United States citizen and qualified to be President in order to reduce any possibility that the deference to this Court might start
to weaken among those above them in the chain of command with respect to this most crucial issue concerning the various duties of al members of the
Armed Forces of the United States.
This Court has to act now. Judgment on the merits is the only thing that can prevent a horrible state of affairs for the Plaintif and the members of
our Armed Forces, the Courts and the nation. Plaintiff, members of the Armed Forces and the civilian populace have to know, and they have a right to
know, who is lawfully entitled to be the Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States---who is lawfully entitled to “push the
button”, and who is not.
In that hour when---God forbid---it actually becomes necessary to decide, one way or the other, whether to use America’s nuclear arsenal, wil the
senior members of our military be under a legal duty to obey the orders of the would-be Commander-in-Chief, or wil they be under a legal duty to
disobey the order of an apparent enemy (foreign, or domestic) of the Constitution who holds the office of President? We ask the Court to bear in
mind that, depending on what facts are ascertained at trial, the Court may conclude that Soetoro is in fact, right now, an illegal alien.
The bottom line, then, is this: As things stand now, without this Court’s intervention, the Plaintif in the instant case wil be left completely out
in the cold following Inauguration Day if he should happen to face a possible conflict between his duties to obey lawful orders on the one hand and
his duties to disobey unlawful orders and defend the Constitution on the other hand, particularly if the unlawful order is “palpably illegal on its
"face”, whatever their “interpretation of applicable law” may be, especially if the would-be Commander-in-Chief’s claim to hold office is
palpably subject to disbelief simultaneously.
And if this is the case with respect to this Plaintiff, what then wil likewise be the case for the Joint Chiefs of Staf if Soetoro is in fact sworn
in? Dare he speak up beforehand, if no national crisis is at hand? And wil it be to late for him to speak up if in fact a national crisis does later
Plaintif moves this Court for the Court’s Orders to be issued nunc pro tunc in the event this Court declares Soetoro to be constitutionally
ineligible to serve as President of the United States, after Soetoro has been sworn in.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Claim for Relief
28 U.S.C. § 1335 and F.R.C.P. 2
Plaintif hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 48 as if fully set forth herein.
Plaintif is in possession of certain property. This property consists of the rights pertaining to the duties owed by the Plaintif to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and to al others above him in his chain of
command, and this property also consists of certain relationships. The rights pertaining to each of these duties is worth Five Hundred [$500.00]
Dollars or more.
The rights pertaining to each of these relationships is worth Five Hundred [$500.00]
Dollars or more. Plaintif wil deposit with this Court, if necessary, a Bond in the amount of Two Thousand [$2,000.00] Dollars for the combined sum of
the properties that the Plaintif possesses pertaining to the duties and relationships alleged in this Complaint.
Plaintif is also in possession of Soetoro’s Indonesian School Record showing his name as Barry Soetoro and his citizenship status as Indonesian, and
Plaintif is in possession of his discharge document and has requested copies of his own enlistment papers. The document denominated as Soetoro’s
Indonesian School Record showing his name as Barry Soetoro and his citizenship status as Indonesian has a value of Five
Hundred [$500.00] Dollars or more; Plaintiff’s discharge document has a value of Five Hundred [$500.00] or more and has been deposited with this
Court. Plaintif has requested copies of his enlistment papers, which likewise have a value of Five Hundred [$500.00] Dollars or more, and copies of
this documents wil be deposited with this Court once they are received from United States Department of Defense. Of
course, Plaintiff’s original enlistment papers are in the possession of the United States Department of Defense.
52. Plaintif knows that each of the Defendants, and those acting under either of them, may have competing rights between themselves to the property
rights in these duties,
relationships, and documents, and the right to claim al the property rights with respect to al of these duties, relationships, and documents shal
belong to either Soetoro or Biden as of Noon, Eastern Standard Time, on January 20, 2009, but Plaintif does not know which of these two persons may
properly claim the property rights in these duties, relationships, and documents.
53. Plaintif has a real, reasonable, bona fide fear of exposure to multiple claims or the hazards and vexation of conflicting claims brought by either
or both of the Defendants, or by those acting under either of them.
54. Likewise, the document denominated as Soetoro’s Indonesian School Record showing his name as Barry Soetoro and his citizenship status as
Indonesian, which we have filed with this Court as Exhibit “B”, is a chattel of peculiar value not fungible with other chattels, and the Plaintif
has a real, reasonable, bona fide fear that he could be subject to injunctive relief over it and possible criminal prosecution by Soetoro, Biden or
those acting under either of them for unlawfully withholding it.
55. Plaintiff’s discharge documents, which is filed with this Court as Exhibit “A”, and his enlistment papers are also chattels of a peculiar
value not fungible with other chattels, and the Plaintif has a real, reasonable, bona fide fear that if he is expelled from the military by Soetoro or
Biden or by those acting under either of them, the substance of the provisions of those papers would lose much of their meaning and value.
56. By virtue of these fears and concerns, which, if realized, would subject Plaintif to irreparable harm as to which damages would not suffice, and
as to which there is no adequate remedy at law, Plaintif is entitled to use Interpleader under 28 U.S.C. §
1335 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 to join Soetoro and Biden as Defendants to cause them to come forward with the proof of Soetoro’s
constitutional eligibility to serve as President of the United States pursuant to Article II, § 1, Cl. 5 of the U.S.
Constitution and proof as to which of them may be entitled to the rights pertaining to the property which the Plaintif alleges that he holds, so that
Plaintif might receive from this Court a declaration of the Plaintiff’s rights and duties with respect to each Defendant, and Injunctive Relief as
may be appropriate against either or both Defendants on behalf of the Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Plaintif respectfully prays that this Court:
Declare Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama, in his capacity as a natural person is hereby constitutionally ineligible to be President of the
United States pursuant to Article II, § 1, Cl. 5 of the Constitution of the United States and
the same is hereby Ordered to refrain from assuming, or taking the oath of, said office or exercising the duties and functions thereof, and to refrain
from interfering with, or claiming, the properties of the Plaintif alleged in this Complaint; or
Declare Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama, in his capacity as de facto President of the United States in posse is hereby constitutionally
ineligible to be President of the United States pursuant to Article II, § 1, Cl. 5 of the Constitution of the United States and the same is hereby
Ordered to refrain from
assuming, or taking the oath of, said office or exercising the duties and functions thereof, and to refrain from interfering with, or claiming, the
properties of the Plaintif alleged in this Complaint; or
Declare if this Court finds on the merits that Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama is not eligible to be President after Barry Soetoro a/k/a
Barack Hussein Obama has been sworn in as President, that Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama is further barred and prohibited nunc pro tunc from
Office of President and from exercising the functions and duties of said Office, and from interfering with, or making any claim to, the properties of
the Plaintif alleged in this Complaint; and
Order Plaintif to refrain from recognizing Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama as President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces thereof; or
Declare Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama, in his capacity as a natural person is hereby eligible to be President of the United States,
pursuant to Article II, § 1, Cl. 5 of the Constitution of the United States, and that he may rightfully claim the properties of the Plaintif alleged
in this Complaint upon assuming the Office of President of the United States; or
Declare Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama, in his capacity as de jure President of the United States in posse is hereby eligible, pursuant to
Article I § 1, Cl. 5 of the Constitution of the United States, to be President of the United
States, and that he may rightfully claim the properties of the Plaintif alleged in this Complaint upon assuming the Office of President of the United
Order Plaintif to recognize Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama as de jure President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces thereof from the time of his inauguration into that office and Joseph R. Biden as de jure Vice-President of the United States from the time of
inauguration into that office, for the term of each office beginning at Noon, Eastern Standard Time, January 20, 2009; or
Order Plaintif to look to Joseph R. Biden for Orders if this Court finds Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack Hussein Obama constitutionally ineligible pursuant
to Article II, § 1, Cl. 5 of the U.S. Constitution; and
Retain Jurisdiction of this action to ensure the Court’s Orders are being fully enforced; and
Award Plaintif his Attorney Fees and Costs and Grant Plaintif such other and further relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper.
s/ Philip J. Berg
Dated: December 29, 2008
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Philip J. Berg, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintif
55 Andorra Glen Court, Suite 12
Lafayette Hill, PA 19444-2531
Identification No. 09867
s/ Lawrence J. Joyce
Dated: December 29, 2008
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Lawrence J. Joyce, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintif
1517 N. Wilmot Road, Suite 215
Tucson, AZ 85712
Arizona Bar No. 020856
For Further Information Contact:
Philip J. Berg, Esquire
555 Andorra Glen Court, Suite 12
Lafayette Hill, PA 19444-2531
Cell (610) 662-3005 (610) 825-3134 (800) 993-PHIL 
Fax (610) 834-7659