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The Boeing-Sikorsky RAh-66 Comanche Stealth Helicopter

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posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 03:41 AM
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Allright, let me rephrase. They will take over. It's very well known that UCAV are more cheaper to maintain than choppers. A chopper like the RAH-66 has no possibilities to compete with a UCAV. maybe, as you said part of the reason was the software, but I have hard to believe that that was the only reason.

[edit on 1-1-2007 by Figher Master FIN]




posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 10:47 AM
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Originally posted by Figher Master FIN
Allright, let me rephrase. They will take over. It's very well known that UCAV are more cheaper to maintain than choppers. A chopper like the RAH-66 has no possibilities to compete with a UCAV. maybe, as you said part of the reason was the software, but I have hard to believe that that was the only reason.

[edit on 1-1-2007 by Figher Master FIN]


Yes, I firmly believe that UAV's and UCAV's will take over the role eventually, but this will probably be the LAST combat role that they take over - the mission is significantly more complex than a UCAV at altitude dropping an SDB or popping off a sidewinder. In the case of the RAH-66, it's demise had much more to do with the program not getting the money it needed, when it was needed, and being years behind in development. If money had been put into the Comanche instead of the AH-64D (which is much more of an underperformer than people realize) it might be a different story now.



posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 11:09 AM
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Originally posted by crusader97


the AH-64D (which is much more of an underperformer than people realize)


Compared to what the RAH would have been I agree, the Apache would not even have put up a fight. However, the fact remains, the RAH doesn't exist. I can dig up extracts after extracts saying that the Apache is the best attack chopper at the moment. Even compared to the faster and more capable Mi-28.



posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 01:01 PM
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Originally posted by Figher Master FIN

Originally posted by crusader97


the AH-64D (which is much more of an underperformer than people realize)


Compared to what the RAH would have been I agree, the Apache would not even have put up a fight. However, the fact remains, the RAH doesn't exist. I can dig up extracts after extracts saying that the Apache is the best attack chopper at the moment. Even compared to the faster and more capable Mi-28.


The RAH doesn't exist, but it is much more likely that the ARH will, and be very effective in the role. I'm sure the Apache is the greatest, but the -A model is more like driving a nimble motorcycle and the -D model is like driving a Ferrari with a Yugo engine in it - it has the potential to be great, but it's just tremendously underpowered.



posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 05:13 PM
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RAH-66 = A tremendous waste of time that was of questionable utility when it was conceived (in a combination of Army Jones-Envy over USAF Stealth and the deliberately misconstrued perception of the Ka-50 as more than a 'Hokum' of fighter-helicoptering).

The sad reality is that the only /useful/ thing the ADOCS/ACAP/ARTI effort could have provided in the 'LHX' chosen configuration was a _civillian UTIL_ technology base followon so that the existing (themselves LOH driven) H500/Bell-206 technology lines would not be rendered completely dated by European competitors, ten years later.

Indeed, the Army had not an iota of understanding **WHAT STEALTH IS** when they chose to render the RAH-66 as not only a conventional penny-farthing layout (slow from the start, and mechanically vulnerable to being fast, -ever-) but also a nose-forward SCAT rather than cabin driven UTIL optics and radar STANDOFF bird.

What you want in a stealth scout is not something that can creep through the weeds looking for threats to go toe-to-toe /with/ the AH-64s. But rather something which can stand back 20-60km and popup to 1,500-3,000ft in taking the DEEP LOOK like an Mi-24K with massive bore optics (and perhaps the Orchidae/SOTAS equivalent as well) looking LATERALLY across an enormous terrain swath.

This means completely redesigning the airframe signature parameters towards a side-on protection scheme and probably applying a compound system of ducted fan propulsion to get the airframe up to take a picture and down to get back into clutter/masking and then /away/ to a new location at 'rather more' than 160 knots.

Something which is utterly impossible in a conventional helo where forward cruise propulsion and climb are directly disk-linked. And RBS is driven by pitch values on non-rigid blades.

In this, ignoring the 'fancy electronics' (of which only the EOTAS was important and itself dated as a 2Gen imager when compared to the AH-1 Hawkeye by the time the Comanche entered testing) the AH-56 Cheyenne, represented a superior understanding of the high energy, high maneuverability factors of performance necessary to survive in a NATO warfare environment.

Because you don't fight Russian helos with American helos. Anymore than you use Hellfire or TOW to plink Russian armor at LOS ranges under 6km.

You use tanks and conventional RT to channelize with direct fire and mines and then you shoot MLRS or ATACMS and take out entire regimental columns AFTER 'the breakout' into a controlled, cellular, defensive cordon.

These days, matters are even worse because the only way for a helo to be safe is to fly high and /very/ fast (250-300 knots) while DROPPING ordnance into target zones that may well have multistory builtup on 2 or 3 sides.

Only an idiot points his nose at the ground to deliver FFAR and ATGW when the climbout is going to drop him back to 70-90 knots and a 'shoot me I'm stupid' look up his tailrotor. As an alternative to 'skimming the rooftops' while every mook with a slingshot fires at him.

Yet that is effectively the force model that the RAH-66 /by configuration/ was designed to play at. And as such, it is no better than the Snake or the the Indian or the ARH which are themselves completely worthless in the modern environment.

And always will be. By Design. So how many BILLION did we chuck away on it?

Somewhere between 6.9 and 8 out of an expected 59 billion dollar investment for about 3 working prototypes, last I heard. That's 'only' the equivalent of 43,125 four year tuitions at $160,000 each. And we wonder why the Chinese are beating us black and blue in the economic REAL WORLD...


KPl.



posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 07:10 PM
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Originally posted by ch1466
RAH-66 = A tremendous waste of time that was of questionable utility...necessary to survive in a NATO warfare environment.


Reminds me of GEN Eric Shinseki talking to congress prior to the start of OIF. "We will need 250,000 troops to invade and at least that many to maintain control of the country" the experienced combat veteran said. And then the Secretary of Defense says "you are wrong - this is what we'll do" - and look where we are nearly 4 years later.


You use tanks and conventional RT to channelize with direct fire and mines and then you shoot MLRS or ATACMS and take out entire regimental columns AFTER 'the breakout' into a controlled, cellular, defensive cordon.


Someone forgot to tell the Iraqi insurgency and Taliban that's how we fight. Although this is part of recent doctrine, no foe that we have faced in recent memory has been dumb enough to really allow themselves to be put into this position. Much like we study theirs, they study ours.


These days, matters are even worse because the only way for a helo to be safe is to fly high and /very/ fast (250-300 knots) while DROPPING ordnance into target zones that may well have multistory builtup on 2 or 3 sides.


Not according to the military helicopter pilots I know (father, sister, uncle). You must constantly change airspeed and altitude - and mission dictates some of the other factors.



Only an idiot points his nose at the ground to deliver FFAR and ATGW when the climbout is going to drop him back to 70-90 knots and a 'shoot me I'm stupid' look up his tailrotor. As an alternative to 'skimming the rooftops' while every mook with a slingshot fires at him.


Agreed - I've never seen or heard of this actually being done (since Vietnam), and can't really think of a scenario when it would be in modern times.


Yet that is effectively the force model that the RAH-66 /by configuration/ was designed to play at. And as such, it is no better than the Snake or the the Indian or the ARH which are themselves completely worthless in the modern environment.


Not really. The Comanche was intended to be more of a heavily armed replacement for the OH-58 - which had performed extremely well in it's role since Vietnam but was badly in need of replacement. The recon/observation role is something that neither the Apache nor the Cobra are really equipped to do.



posted on Jan, 2 2007 @ 02:23 PM
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UH-72A Lakota , Thats why it was canx. period !
9/11 happened ,we went to war ,2003 funding was cut because of the money it was costing us to go to war ,our priorities at home changed .Lakota was concieved and built from the ground
up at the point RAH-66 was cut ,and now thats the newest Helicopter.

Also I have worked at Boeing's Military Helicopter plant since 1984 ,
and Have worked on every contract given to us by the US Military .



posted on Jan, 3 2007 @ 08:33 AM
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Originally posted by vertol
UH-72A Lakota , Thats why it was canx. period !


Are you aware that the UH-72A is a civilian helicopter?



Lakota was concieved and built from the ground
up at the point RAH-66 was cut ,...


The EC-145 (or UH-72A) had its first flight in 1999. And while it is a near complete redesign, it is very much based on the older BK-117. In fact, it made its flight certification under the name of BK-117-C2.



posted on Jan, 3 2007 @ 02:09 PM
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What do you mean by 'civilian helicopter'? In that the UH-72A is based on a commercially available design?

Personally I think that role of the Comanche can be done with cheaper and more conventional systems, recon/strike ARH and UCAV's.



posted on Jan, 3 2007 @ 03:02 PM
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en.wikipedia.org...

You may see it flying in the conus ,But it's not Civilian by any means.
And almost all fixed and or rotor craft are based off a design . ?



posted on Jan, 3 2007 @ 04:00 PM
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Originally posted by vertol
en.wikipedia.org...

You may see it flying in the conus ,But it's not Civilian by any means.
And almost all fixed and or rotor craft are based off a design . ?


It's a civilian aircraft modified for military use - much like the TH-57, OH-58, and TH-67.

The first line of your link - The UH-72A Lakota is a military version of the Eurocopter EC 145, and is built by EADS North America. - clearly states that the original design was not military by any means.

The UH-72 had nothing to do with the cancellation of the RAH-66, and only came about as a result of the cancellation of the RAH-66.



posted on Jan, 4 2007 @ 11:20 PM
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cancellation of the RAH-66 ,was due to the spending of the war .I said this already ? .

[edit on 4-1-2007 by vertol]



posted on Jan, 5 2007 @ 08:44 AM
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Originally posted by WestPoint23
What do you mean by 'civilian helicopter'? In that the UH-72A is based on a commercially available design?


By "civilian helicopter" I mean that it is a civilian helicopter, and NOT a modification based on one. See below for explanation.



Originally posted by crusader97

Originally posted by vertol
en.wikipedia.org...

You may see it flying in the conus ,But it's not Civilian by any means.
And almost all fixed and or rotor craft are based off a design . ?


It's a civilian aircraft modified for military use - much like the TH-57, OH-58, and TH-67.

The first line of your link - The UH-72A Lakota is a military version of the Eurocopter EC 145, and is built by EADS North America. - clearly states that the original design was not military by any means. ....


Just to clear this up once and for all:

The Wikipedia link is WRONG (BTW, I just edited that Wiki headline in case anyone wonders). The UH-72A is the EC 145 that the military USES, and not a military VERSION of the EC 145. It is NOT modified in any significant way to cater specific military needs, the only difference to the original model is that its subsystems are supplied by american companies if possible and -available.

Proof 1- The designation of the helicopter:
The type submitted for testing by Eurocopter is, as we all know, the EC 145. Now, Eurocopters designations are quite simple: the first number shows the purpose, the second the MTOW rounded up, the third one how many engines it has.

EC 145 means: [B]1 = commercial helicopter; 4 = MTOW of 4 metric tons; 5 = double engined (a "0" means only one engine).

Would it be a MILITARY helicopter, its designation would be EC 645. Likewise, the military model of the EC 135 (which DOES exist) is named EC 635, and the Eurocopter Tiger´s correct designation is EC 665. (BTW, no Eurocopter type designation has a hyphen in it)


Proof 2 - The LUH program focus:
The RFP called for both a COTS and NDI aircraft with existing FAA certification. The aim is to both minimize procurement as well as lifecycle cost.

1. Since it is a "commercially, off the shelf" helicopter, I think we can agree that it is not a "militarized" product - since there is no "militarized" version of the EC 145 (yet).
2. Since it should be a "non-developmental item", we can also agree that no modification was planned or done.
3. I don´t know the exact regulations, but since the program wants a helicopter with existing FAA certification and a redesign should be required to have a new FAA certificate, thats a third proof against any modification.
4. Lastly, a military-specific model will need a separate logistics chain, which would compromise the goal of "minimal cost". Mind you, the EC 145 is already the technically simpler helicopter compared to the EC 135.

Proof 3 - Army´s own words

... The UH-72A is a commercial aircraft designed to conduct light general support tasks in permissive, non-combat environments. ...

Army.mil source



Got it, Vertol?


[edit on 5/1/2007 by Lonestar24]



posted on Jan, 6 2007 @ 08:03 AM
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C97,

>>
Reminds me of GEN Eric Shinseki talking to congress prior to the start of OIF. "We will need 250,000 troops to invade and at least that many to maintain control of the country" the experienced combat veteran said. And then the Secretary of Defense says "you are wrong - this is what we'll do" - and look where we are nearly 4 years later.
>>

>
SEN. LEVIN: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?

GEN. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think --

SEN. LEVIN: How about a range?

GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.
>

en.wikipedia.org...

What A Piker.

Not least because he didn't make sure that Franks and Zinni or anyone else _backed_ his 'uhh well, uhhhh I guess I would have to rely on the combat commanders but uhhh about what we've got uhhhh mobilized?' statements. Critics are like hyenas. Roar the truth like a lion and they will wait and see how things play out with slitted eyes. Show uncertainty and weakness and they attack you regardless of proof of righteousness 'after the fact'.

And 'Good ol' Ric' was about as authoritatively READY TO SPEAK HIS WILL AS MUCH AS HIS MIND as a third grader giving his first book report.

Which I would guess why all his 'buddies' took one big step back and let him stand alone. In public.

NONE OF WHICH EXCUSES THE **NEXT THREE YEARS** as being anything more than 'sounds like typical military CYA' for not speaking up as the SOLE experts in the field during dozens of Congressional reviews /after/ the invasion. Just like Vietnam, "Yessir-yessir three bags full sir!" translates to continuing tactical mistakes as COMMAND DECISIONS which amounts to no less than a dereliction of duty to protect those with whom 'shoulder to shoulder we soldier' the battle is _supposed_ to really be about. On a day to day basis of least casualties and most gains.

Never let it be said that a general, right or wrong, will err to the side of his FORCE SECURITIES SAKE in falling on his political 'sword' if a terrorist's knife can take off a few private's head instead!

Conversely, the fact that (in another repeat of Vietnam) that the military has insisted on a 'lazy kind of war' in which rotations home guarantee that just as your people are getting good after a year of experience, they start to slack off on the 'short' basis of non-heroics is equally stupid. Because instead of compressing down until they are just simply too mean to be bleeped with as a MASSED force drawn from the worthless garrison theaters of Korea and no-help-here NATO, they instead go into and out of theater with an expectation of a tour based duty cycle rather than a WAR based 'them or us' definition of victory-as-survival before they are /allowed/ to come home. Nothing motivates you to find terrorists like the certainty that every idiot they kill, yours or theirs, amounts to another 6 months before the mission is considered done.

Which shortfalls in troops commited led to the PURELY MILITARY decision to play whackamole with force shifts between Anbar, the Triangle and the Capital. Something which itself screams out 'fire brigade mentality' of a running scratch force = not enough TOTAL FORCE.

_As Exploitable Weakness And Lack Of Commitment To Our Enemies_.

With all the above condemning the 'military approach' **do not** pull the political card on me. Because if you're the only ones allowed to say what you need and how you will use it, you had jolly well better SPEAK UP when you don't have enough of either to win. And NOBODY stood up to the CMIC and said: "No, he is _wrong_. And I am willing to put my career on the line to be the first not the last to say so in front of a TV Camera."

It is the generals who are the cowardly political animals because nobody says nothin' until they are safely retired and the war is _LOST_. If there is more honor among the political thieves who run this nation than the flag ranks of the U.S. military who nominally protect only themselves.

Why do even attempt to use them as your model of military virtue?

>>>
You use tanks and conventional RT to channelize with direct fire and mines and then you shoot MLRS or ATACMS and take out entire regimental columns AFTER 'the breakout' into a controlled, cellular, defensive cordon.
>>>

>>
Someone forgot to tell the Iraqi insurgency and Taliban that's how we fight. Although this is part of recent doctrine, no foe that we have faced in recent memory has been dumb enough to really allow themselves to be put into this position. Much like we study theirs, they study ours.
>>

The Comanche was designed in a European Hotwar climate where the combination of large conventional forces and high probability nuclear release in weather, IADS and counterforce (rocket+SWO attacks on MOBs) conditions unsuitable to fixed wing airpower meant that you had to do more with less as justification of the 'final 10 percent' pursuit of capability for it's own sake. Don't BS me with the notion that you didn't realize this was the relevant context I was speaking to because it is the context which LHX was formulated with, back when Ronnie Raygun was in office.

Having said that, the ability to realize how you are about to be screwed and being possessed of the ability to prevent it from happening ARE NOT the same thing.

Whether that be as a GSFG armor force _on the attack_ and thus exposed to all manner of observation and fires. Or an unlawful combatant whose keys to mobility, weaponry and C2 are all held by his conqueror. As is the case in Iraq.

>>>
These days, matters are even worse because the only way for a helo to be safe is to fly high and /very/ fast (250-300 knots) while DROPPING ordnance into target zones that may well have multistory builtup on 2 or 3 sides.
>>>

>>
Not according to the military helicopter pilots I know (father, sister, uncle). You must constantly change airspeed and altitude - and mission dictates some of the other factors.
>>

And they are undoubtedly, 'institutional men' whose Key West defacto mentality if not mendacity in endorsing 'the way -I- fight' deprives them of a balanced intuit into how they MIGHT as a functionally achieve the same mission, better, as much as how they SHOULD. Tell us, have any one of your annointed relations taken a ride in a UAV shelter or the backseat of a Marine F-18D to even /comment/ on 'my what a nice view you have up here'? What about an OV-10D? A Mohawk? A P-47?

I didn't think so.

No crossdiscipline experience = NO DAMN RIGHT TO JUDGE how 'well suited' their particular modeal is to any let alone the current situation. Because many platforms can do the same job but thanks to the idiocy of service turf as a budgetary implement of divisions of power only ONE weapons system approach is 'assigned' to a given services' combat arm.



posted on Jan, 6 2007 @ 08:04 AM
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How many helicopters have been shot down in Iraq? (87) How many fast jets? (13) How often has a fast jet been blown away by an 'improvised' AHM or an RPG while operating below 150ft? (0) How many times has a fast jet been downed by an old man and his Carcano rifle so that the crew AND their 'latest and greatest' airframe could be paraded around downtown Baghdad? (0) How long has it been since the USAr had 'real experience' with armed fixed wing CAS again? (40 years)

Asking someone in love with their uniformed union job whether their service and this nation would be better off with an alternative approach to doing it is like the farmer asking the fox to define what a chicken is. 'Sure, just let me inside the hutch to see if I can find one for you...' They have no reason to look for an alternative and so they will never find one.

>>>
Only an idiot points his nose at the ground to deliver FFAR and ATGW when the climbout is going to drop him back to 70-90 knots and a 'shoot me I'm stupid' look up his tailrotor. As an alternative to 'skimming the rooftops' while every mook with a slingshot fires at him.
>>>

>>
Agreed - I've never seen or heard of this actually being done (since Vietnam), and can't really think of a scenario when it would be in modern times.
>>

I guess you never went to The Mog where strafe and rocket attacks were all 'nose over and dddddoooowwn we go!' with Littlebirds and Snakes. Indeed, when 5 Apaches got all shot up and the Marines had to ride to the rescue on the OPENING DAY of Shah-i-Kot, I guess nobody put their nose below the ridgeline to fire a shot for fear of losing altitude or airspeed? How about OIF when 32 Apaches over Najaf suffered 80% attrition of their mission force? Did they also /refuse to shoot back at the trashfire/ because it would mean pointing the nose down to get at the source?

Tell me again, what /was/ the ratio of expenditure between 70mm, 30mm and AGM-114 in the OEF/OIF Apache and Cobra units again? 100:1? 1,000:1?

Why is it that the 101st Airborne in AfG counts the 2.75" as being among their top ten of 'oopsy!' frat fraggings?

If you want to properly handle a trashfire threat, you PE DROP ON IT FROM ABOVE their weapons floor so the ballistics ensures a good vertical hit and the lack of defensive engagement lets you do your job unpuckered.

As soon as you lose that option, you had bloody well better be able to both exploit high dive velocities and a constant forward propulsion vector on climbout. Which is impossible on a conventional helo, where RBS roll over happens above 170-180 knots. And climbout will bleed 10 knots a second as the disk can't stay level with the horizon to push while tilting the fuselage to slant the velocity vector forward.

Furthermore, ALL helos share line of sight with their enemies to both acquire, designate and fire upon small/cluttered targets in COIN wars, not least because ground designators/markers for SALH weapons are not often available and occasionally outright dangerous to mark with due to the sheer unpredictability of guerilla attacks. Even as the need to contain scatter with cheap ballistic weapons requires a short, hard, slant over an own-force and collateral rich target environments which -begs- the BHD scenario of troops in trouble having to run save their saviors.

And because they do all this with weapons systems that fire forward rather than down off a platform highly unsuited to operations above 3,000ft, helicopters are ALWAYS in the threat envelope of the LEAST CAPABLE (cheapest and most dense) of enemy systems. So when they are done with their pathetic gun or rocket run, the nature of their rotor and weapons systems -guarantees- that they will either be running at full speed and lower through often by miles of linear overflight.

Engineering Pragmatics and certainly /Physics/ haven't changed from Vietnam to the Present Day Crusader. The sad part is, neither has the Army.

>>>
Yet that is effectively the force model that the RAH-66 /by configuration/ was designed to play at. And as such, it is no better than the Snake or the the Indian or the ARH which are themselves completely worthless in the modern environment.
>>>

>>
Not really. The Comanche was intended to be more of a heavily armed replacement for the OH-58 - which had performed extremely well in it's role since Vietnam but was badly in need of replacement. The recon/observation role is something that neither the Apache nor the Cobra are really equipped to do.
>>

No. Exactly that. I said _force model_.

When you spot for or 'escort' for a bunch of helpless tank killers doing NOE or Low flight to 'avoid detection' as a function of scooting between hides to an ambush; you don't gain by having a compound/rigid rotor configuration to allow for a 250 knot capability on your scout because the FRIENDLY forces you are supporting are so damn slow and their effective weapons ranges so damn short that you can do the 'MMS+MLMS as AHIP equivalent' /as enabled by stealth alone/.

Most particularly when the threat is an OMG breaking out of Fulda and buying 50-100 tanks with one or two LO chopper losses may be a practical trade.

However; when that configuration is taken to the real world where the threat is deep, all optical and so dense that trashfire is coming from 10-20 muzzle sources at once, even as you are looking at a force structure model where the Cobra (and it's worthless teeter-rotor) is long gone and the Hellfire/Apache system _remains_ too expensive to indulge in lob-shotting with a GPS kit, the Comanche is no longer a night-ninja or one which can 'standoff' and still see a high signature threat coming towards it. Rather it is one helo hunting twenty or more goats hidden behind buildings or in crowds of biped sheep, right under it's rotor disk.

And thus just like any other VISUAL=Mk.1 Ball conventional helo platform when it comes to close in weapons delivery.

What's more, we would have HAD TO play with the Comanche as a direct CAS platform because it would have effectively been the replacement attack-not-scout helo, thanks to only about half the Apaches getting the full-D 701 engines + R&M upgrades. Which means that an overweight, underpowered, RAH-66 is _risking VLO technologies_ to some git with a 100 dollar rifle.

The irony here being that when jetnoise is heard, nobody looks up and thinks "Ooooh, the sound of freedom from persecution!" They hunker down and bow their heads with the notion "Daaaaaamn, I'd better not do anything stupid because Big Brother is watching _and I can't touch him that high and fast_."

Not so with rotary wing aviation. Rotary wing aviation is always a temptation to engage a weak, slow, low target.

There have been times when helicopters have been reduced to skulking behind buildings _in Baghdad_, solely because they are afraid to skyline themselves when they 'at least know who owns this structure'. Such is nothing if not an indictment of the performance, sensor orientation and weapons bias of the low-slow shooter.


KPl.



posted on Jan, 6 2007 @ 08:30 PM
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Not least because he didn't make sure that Franks and Zinni or anyone else _backed_ his 'uhh well, uhhhh I guess I would have to rely on the combat commanders but uhhh about what we've got uhhhh mobilized?' statements. Critics are like hyenas. Roar the truth like a lion and they will wait and see how things play out with slitted eyes. Show uncertainty and weakness and they attack you regardless of proof of righteousness 'after the fact'.

It was a stupid question on the Senator's part - why would you mobilize less than what you required? My point was simply that the career Army man had the experience to know and understand what was required, whereas the no military experience senator (sitting on the Armed Forces Committee no less), and the civilian Secretary of Defense (who spent the vast majority of his military service as a 'drilling' Navy reservist) deftly brushed off generals opinion. There's your Pikers. The original point was that you brush off the Comanche so deftly yet I don't think you have the military experience necessary to understand why it was required. Simply working in the 'defense complex' or reading trade magazines all day doesn't provide the expertise required. It may help form an opinion, but it's experience that provides the weight behind the opinion - and shows you that what seems good in theory doesn't work in reality.



Conversely, the fact that (in another repeat of Vietnam) ... yours or theirs, amounts to another 6 months before the mission is considered done.
This is because EXPERIENCE has shown that this is how we fight the best. You seem to forget (or may have never realized) that no war has ever been fought with endless resources. You have to manage within the constraints you are given.


The Comanche was designed in a European Hotwar ... I was speaking to because it is the context which LHX was formulated with, back when Ronnie Raygun was in office.
I don't disagree that this is where they thought it was most likely to be used, but 1. it's silly to think that after fighting WWII, Korea, and Vietnam that the US would design a multi-billion dollar weapon system that was theater specific to Europe? (that's basically what you are saying) and 2. Flexibility is built into weapon systems. Not just for where they can fight, but also the doctrine and tactics for which they can be used.


And they are undoubtedly, 'institutional men' whose Key West defacto mentality if not mendacity in endorsing 'the way -I- fight' deprives them of a balanced intuit into how they MIGHT as a functionally achieve the same mission, better, as much as how they SHOULD. Tell us, have any one of your annointed relations taken a ride in a UAV shelter or the backseat of a Marine F-18D to even /comment/ on 'my what a nice view you have up here'? What about an OV-10D? A Mohawk? A P-47?

I didn't think so.
Actually, my father was quite the rebel, and survived SEA with nearly 2 dozen air medals. I would say he probably knows what works, as that it was tactics tend to gravitate towards. He said it was a matter of experience, and not listening to what the REMF's thought. And yes, according to the e-mail I just received from my little sister in Iraq, she has ridden in the back of an F/A-18D.



posted on Aug, 7 2007 @ 04:31 AM
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Now that the US Army has abandoned the tandem seat, no passenger RAH 66 for the side-by-side ARH 70 which can take passengers, what are EADS, Agusta and all the rest going to do with their Tigers and Mangustas?

With the end of the cold war and the threat of Soviet armour gone, Europeans are converting the PAH concept to UHT (for instance with the German Tigers). The Westland Lynx had it right all along. We could have had up-armoured EC 155s (ËC 655) instead of the Tiger at half the price (the EADS Tiger actually costs more per unit than a Boeing Apache); or an Agusta A 109 Hirundo to do what the Tiger and Mangusta now claim to be their ARH roles.



posted on Aug, 7 2007 @ 06:55 AM
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Originally posted by jaehkimx
Now that the US Army has abandoned the tandem seat, no passenger RAH 66 for the side-by-side ARH 70 which can take passengers, what are EADS, Agusta and all the rest going to do with their Tigers and Mangustas?


They are still selling them as the ARH-70 is an armed recce helicopter while the other examples you name are attack helicopters. The USA won´t decommission their AH-1 and -64 either.

Anyway, what relevance has the US acquiring policy for other nations?


With the end of the cold war and the threat of Soviet armour gone, Europeans are converting the PAH concept to UHT (for instance with the German Tigers). The Westland Lynx had it right all along. We could have had up-armoured EC 155s (ËC 655) instead of the Tiger at half the price (the EADS Tiger actually costs more per unit than a Boeing Apache); or an Agusta A 109 Hirundo to do what the Tiger and Mangusta now claim to be their ARH roles.



posted on Aug, 24 2008 @ 04:51 PM
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they spent 6.9 billion on the comanche helicopter the better have goten something useful out of the program, and to put in retrospect the manhattan project cost about 2 billion.



posted on Sep, 22 2008 @ 11:48 PM
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I watched a Commanche fly over Rosemount, MN last week...I didn't know what the name of it was but it was Black as black can be ...So i searched and saw the picture on this website, it looks like it over very similar to it. It had the stealth look, geometry and I saw no features other than its silioutte against a blue sky....very cool, yes but other than that its a war machine. Us humans are never gonna make it...wonder how the dinosaurs would have done?



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