posted on Mar, 9 2003 @ 12:24 PM
In the summer of 1940 Roosevelt ordered the Pacific to relocate from the West Coast to Hawaii. When its commander, Admiral Richardson, protested that
Pearl Harbor offered inadequate protection from air and torpedo attack he was replaced.
On October 7 1940 Navy IQ analyst McCollum wrote an eight-point memo for Roosevelt on how to force Japan into war with U.S., including an American oil
embargo against Japan. All of them were eventually accomplished.
On 23 June 1941óone day after Hitlerís attack on RussiaóSecretary of the Interior and FDRís Advisor Harold Ickes wrote a memo for the President in
which he pointed out that ìthere might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get
into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of
On 18 October Ickes noted in his diary: ìFor a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan.î
The U.S. had cracked key Japanese codes before the attack. FDR received ìrawî translations of all key messages. On 24 September 1941 Washington
deciphered a message from the Naval Intelligence HQ in Tokyo to Japanís consul-general in Honolulu, requesting grid of exact locations of U.S. Navy
ships in the harbor. Commanders in Hawaii were not warned.
Sixty years later the U.S. Government still refuses to identify or declassify many pre-attack decrypts on the grounds of ìnational securityî!
On November 25 Secretary of War Stimson wrote in his diary that FDR said an attack was likely within days, and asked ìhow we should maneuver them into
the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the
first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to
do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors.î
On November 25 FDR received a ìpositive war warningî from Churchill that the Japanese would strike against America at the end of the first week in
December. This warning caused the President to do an abrupt about-face on plans for a time-buying modus vivendi with Japan and it resulted in
Secretary of State Hull's deliberately provocative ultimatum of 26 November 1941 that guaranteed war.
On November 26 Washington ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington, out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as possible". This order
included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection. On the same day Cordell Hull issued his ultimatum
demanding full Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and all China. U.S. Ambassador to Japan called this ìThe document that touched the button that
started the war.î
On November 29 Hull told United Press reporter Joe Leib that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7. The New York Times reported on December 8
(ìAttack Was Expected,î p. 13) that the U.S. knew of the attack a week earlier.
On December 1 Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI, 12th Naval District in San Francisco found the missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports from the
four wireless news services and several shipping companies that they were getting signals west of Hawaii.
On 5 December FDR wrote to the Australian Prime Minister, ìThere is always the Japanese to consider. Perhaps the next four or five days will decide