“2. The Inquiry Commission was set up jointly between ESA and BNSC and was chaired by the ESA Inspector General. The Commission included senior
managers and experts from Europe and also from NASA and Russia. Its remit was to:
· assess the available data/documentation acquired during development, integration and testing of the Beagle 2 lander on Earth and that pertaining to
the cruise phase operations prior to release of the spacecraft to Mars;
· analyse the programmatic environment (i.e. decision processes, funding level and resources, management and responsibilities, interactions between
the various entities) throughout the project;
· identify possible issues and shortcomings, both programmatic and technical, in the above and in the approach used, which might have contributed to
the loss of the mission.
All members of the Commission have signed a non-disclosure agreement.”
Regarding (The Potential for “Hijacking” Beagle 2 Lander, and it’s subsequent Cover-up).
From the same link, regarding SSMM “Hijacking Potential”;
For future planetary entry missions, a more robust communications system should be used, allowing direct commanding of the lander for essential
actuations and resets without software involvement – enabling recoveries in catastrophic situations.”
Regarding (The Potential for “Air-Bag Failure/Suss Tests by USA” on Beagle 2 Lander);
Adequate competencies in air bag and parachute technology must be available for future European planetary missions, making best use of existing
expertise e.g. in USA and Russia.”
Nice, but Tests WERE carried out by the USA scientists.
And (A PATHETIC ATTEMPT) to cover-up the MARSIS “Knobbling”;
Adequate and realistic deployment tests should be performed, and sufficient time and resources must be available in the development of a new planetary
AGAIN, Tests WERE carried out (by the USA company)!;
And (still), from the same link (COVER-UP!);
“The Commission of Inquiry, which included senior managers and experts from within Europe and also NASA and Russia, held several meetings in the UK
and in ESA, interviewing the key actors, directors, managers, scientists, and engineers, who participated in the development of Beagle 2. The report
has been submitted to the UK Minister for Science and Innovation and the Director General of ESA and accepted. No single technical failure or
shortcoming was unambiguously identified but a few credible causes for Beagle 2's loss were highlighted. More importantly, the Board made it clear
that there were programmatic and organisational reasons that led to a significantly higher risk of Beagle 2 failure, than otherwise might have been
The scope of the Inquiry covered a wide range of important issues of concern to the UK, ESA and other Member States in ESA. Some of these matters are
necessarily confidential between governments and the Agency and cannot be released.
Furthermore, the development of Beagle 2 entailed close working relations between many firms in the UK. Many of those firms invested their own funds
in the project and formed relations which remain commercially sensitive.
Although deciding that the Report should remain confidential, we believe it is important that the full set of Recommendations is published together
with our appreciation of lessons learnt.”
But perhaps the most telling comments, are Pillinger’s final words…;
“"We gave Beagle the very best shot we could within the constraints that were placed upon us," he said.”
[Edited on 3-6-2004 by Ixataar]