posted on Mar, 1 2010 @ 08:31 PM
This snippet from: " The Philosophy Of George Berkeley " sound's like what you are seeking, if I am correct.
Berkeley, like his predecessor Locke, is concerned with philosophical perplexity (i.e. philosophical questions and disputes that never appear to be
resolved). According to Locke the explanation of our perplexity was that human faculties are limited. By attempting to exceed the scope of human
understanding, we delve into areas that we cannot understand. In such a view, there is much that we don’t understand. (For example, we don’t have
a full understanding of the real natures of things. We don’t know how the mind thinks, we don’t know how particles of matter cohere together, we
don’t know whether the soul is immaterial or material). In this way Locke endorses a kind of ignorance. This Lockean ignorance is, for Berkeley, a
kind of skepticism that he seeks to oppose.
Before I go any further, let me mention a couple of other forms of skepticism that Berkeley is concerned to address:
(1) Skepticism about the External World. How do we know whether there is anything beyond our own experiences? Can we know for certain that there is
an external world? These are the types of questions associated with this kind of skepticism – the kind which is perhaps most familiar to us. Here
the issue is one of doubt or a lack of certainty or a kind of agnosticism. This is less important to Berkeley than you might have thought.
(2) Skepticism as the Distrust or Denigration of the Senses. Through the rise of the new science, the importance of mathematics came to the
foreground. For some philosophers and scientists the senses fell into a kind of disrepute. They were taken to be generally unreliable and faulty.
(3) Skepticism as the Denial of the Reality of Sensible Things. This kind of skepticism (which is central in Three Dialogues) is not about doubting,
but denial. According to this kind of skepticism sensible qualities don’t really exist or are, in some important sense, absent from the external
world. The world as it seems to us is not how it really is. (While it seems that there are colors, sounds, odors which are “out there”, in fact
nothing is “out there” except for particles which are extended, with shape, in motion.). Note that this kind of skepticism is deeply connected to
Lockean Ignorance of the true nature of things. For in Locke’s view, we are ignorant of the real essences of sensible things. For example, while we
know that gold is yellow, etc., we don’t know what its true nature is).
(4) Skepticism as Lockean Ignorance. See Above.
The main point to appreciate is that, for Berkeley, the skepticism he is opposed to flies in the face of common sense (i.e. against the vulgar). So,
for example, Locke appears to be professing ignorance of things that the vulgar know perfectly well. It is not against common sense to deny the
reality of sensible things. Also: It is against common sense to denigrate the senses. It is against common sense to be in doubt whether there is an
external world or not. Because skepticism has a tendency to undermine the vulgar’s respect of philosophical views, it is very harmful in