Originally posted by rhines
reply to post by December_Rain
I have already posted that link to IAEA in another thread, it shows that inspections have been blocked. Read the reports yourself thank you.
Nowhere in the report it mentions Iran has blocked access to IAEA inspectors. The report was submitted "after"
visit to Iran's facilities.
In fact the report itself mentions numerous visits carried out by IAEA inspectors:
6. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that the declared maximum enrichment level (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235
enrichment) has not been exceeded at either plant.6 Since the last report, the Agency has conducted two unannounced inspections at FEP, for a total of
31 since March 2007.
8. During a meeting with the Director General in Tehran on 4 October 2009, Iran agreed to provide the Agency with access to the Fordow Fuel
Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Under cover of a letter to the Agency dated 18 October 2009, Iran also submitted a preliminary DIQ for FFEP.
9. On 26 and 27 October 2009, the Agency carried out design information verification (DIV) at FFEP, which is located about 20 km north of the city
10. The DIV included a detailed visual examination of all areas of the plant, the taking of photographs of cascade piping and other process
equipment, the taking of environmental samples and a detailed assessment of the design, configuration and capacity of the various plant components
systems. Iran provided access to all areas of the facility. The Agency confirmed that the plant corresponded with the design information
provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility
18. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine
and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. The Agency carried out a DIV at TRR on 19 August 2009 and on 9 November 2009 at the MIX
Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.
19. The Agency has reviewed the updated DIQ for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan provided by Iran on 21 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55,
20. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV)
carried out at FMP in August 2009
(GOV/2009/55, para. 10), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at FMP as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within
the measurement uncertainties normally associated with fabrication plants of similar throughput. On 24 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV
at FMP. It confirmed that the status of the facility had remained unchanged and that no further assemblies, rods or pellets have been produced.
21. On 7 November 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was
ongoing. The Agency has continued using satellite imagery to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant,
which seems not to have been
operating since the last report.
22. On 25 October 2009, during the DIV at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan,
the Agency observed 600 50-litre drums said by Iran
to contain heavy water. In a letter dated 10 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm the number of drums and their contents, and to provide
information on the origin of the heavy water.
24. On 25 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF. At that time, the plant was undergoing maintenance.
Here is from the latest report; IAEA Board Report, 16 November 2009:
14. The Agency further indicated that it still had questions about the purpose for which the facility had been intended and how it fit into
Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency also indicated that Iran’s declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of
other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not
been declared to the Agency.
And what is wrong with it? Do not cut the sentence half, read it complete
The Agency also indicated that Iran’s declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear
facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to
After Iran declared it's new facility to IAEA asked this question from Iran and mentioned it's concern which was duly replied by Iran in next bullet
15. In light of the above, the Agency requested access to the FFEP project manager and those responsible for the design of FFEP, along with access
to original design documentation, such as engineering drawings, with a view to confirming Iran’s statements regarding the chronology and
purpose of the facility.
16. Iran stated that it did not have any other nuclear facilities that were currently under construction or in operation that had not yet been
declared to the Agency. Iran also stated that any such future facilities would “be reported to the Agency according to Iran’s obligations to the
Agency”. In a letter dated 6 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct, or to authorize
construction of, any other nuclear facility which had not been declared to the Agency.
17 .... Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007,
Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements
to its Safeguards Agreement.
This is the full paragraph:
17. For reasons set out in previous reports to the Board of Governors, Iran remains bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements
General Part to which it had agreed in 2003,7 which requires that the Agency be provided with preliminary design information about a new nuclear
as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facility is taken. The revised Code 3.1 also requires that Iran provide the
Agency with further design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning
phases.8 Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007, Iran’s
failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
To which it's mentioned in summary:
33. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. While Iran recently submitted preliminary design
information on the Darkhovin reactor, it continues to assert that
it is not bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it agreed in 2003, and which it ceased to implement in
35. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security
Isn't it already mentioned under "C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects" that IAEA is carrying out inspection there?
Iran is upping the number of centrifuges and the efficiency of the same.
You mean upto 20%? To make a efficient nuke 80% or more enrichment is needed, I hope you are aware of that. 20% enriched uranium is used in LEU
Low-enriched uranium (LEU)
Low-enriched uranium' (LEU) has a lower than 20% concentration of 235U. For use in commercial light water reactors (LWR), the most prevalent power
reactors in the world, uranium is enriched to 3 to 5% 235U. Fresh LEU used in research reactors is usually enriched 12% to 19.75% U-235, the latter
concentration being used to replace HEU fuels when converting to LEU.
I am still convinced that Iran is speeding up to make nuclear weapons AND that they already have an effective delivery system (rockets) that
also can be used to launch satellites into orbit. Anyway, we will see this February what it is and what happens. Interesting times.
Even though they are currently inaccurate, ballistic missiles are valued in Iran both as war-fighting tools and deterrents to attack even when armed
with purely conventional warheads. The U.S. intelligence community judges that Iran is currently focusing on further developing ballistic missiles
which can target other countries in the region, rather than outside of it. Such missiles make strategic sense for conventional warheads as well as
As experts at the U.S. Air Force-funded Rand Corporation recently observed:
"Based on their experience in the Iran-Iraq War—during which
exchanges of ballistic missiles caused modest destruction yet had great impact on civilian morale—Iranian leaders appear convinced that ballistic
missiles are the most reliable means for attacking deep targets, and that they would have psychological effects disproportionate to their destructive
Source: Rand Corp., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Rand Corporation, 2009), p.
Many of the people who “just know” that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon are the same people who “just knew” that Saddam Hussein had a
nuclear weapons program
[edit on 8-2-2010 by December_Rain]