A memorandum of conversation between Israeli Ambassador to the US Abba Eban and Ambassador Morehead Patterson, President Eisenhower's special emissary on atomic energy, concerning bilateral agreement for cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

This document is a portion of a "top-secret" 21-page report prepared by Professor Ernst David Bergmann, the chairman of the IAEC, about the Geneva Conference. Even though two critical pages in this document are missing, the document reveals clearly that the Israeli strategy was to use the "Atoms for Peace" program to build a much larger and more complex reactor than the United States was ready to sell Israel.

This document is a 4-page letter from Dr. Amos de-Shalit to Munya Mardor dated August 28, 1956. The letter provides another perspective about the hidden Israeli nuclear agenda at the time.

This is a memorandum of conversation that took place on 18 August 1955, during the Geneva conference, between Ambassador Patterson and Professor Bergmann, the head of the IAEC. As Bergmann surveyed Israel's plans in the area of nuclear energy, he told Patterson of Israel's interest in a more advanced reactor, which utilizes a core of enriched uranium and a blanket of natural uranium.

This is a memorandum of conversation that took place on 11 April 1956, between the Israeli delegation that came to the United States to study and negotiate the reactor deal. The Israeli delegation told its American counterparts that "they decided to construct a heavy water 10 MW reactor fueled by natural uranium."

This is a two-page memorandum of conversation dated 19 April 1956, relating to the last meeting between Bergmann's delegation and its counterparts from the USAEC. The Israelis told their American hosts that they had already given their specifications to a number of American firms and expected to have bids in "about five or six weeks."

This is a two-page memorandum of conversation that took place on 4 December 1956 between the Israeli science attaché in Washington, Dr. Ephraim Lahav, and his American counterparts concerning Israel's nuclear program. Notably, Israel was now interested in a pool-type experimental reactor. Israel was still interested in the 10 tones of heavy water; an item France could not supply Israel.

In response to the blunder concerning the late discovery of Dimona the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) asked on 13 December 1960 the CIA to prepare a "detailed post-mortem report on why the intelligence community did not recognize this development [Dimona] earlier." On January 31, 1961, ten days after President Kennedy took office, and in response to his explicit request, the 17-page "post-mortem" report was forwarded to his office. The report confirmed that "information was available to some elements of the intelligence community as early as April 1958 that could have alerted … Israeli intentions."

A telegram from the American Embassy in Paris to Washington (directed to the USAEC), dated 24 November 1960, was written in response to a specific request for further information a bout "French participation in the alleged construction of nuclear power plant in Beer Sheba, Israel." The drafter of the telegram, the USAEC representative in Paris, discussed the matter with "an appropriate member of the French Atomic Energy Commission," and that individual "stated flatly that the French CEA was not collaborating with the Israelis in the construction of a nuclear power reactor." While, semantically speaking, this statement was not an outright lie-because the Dimona reactor was NOT a power reactor-it was nothing but a deliberate effort to mislead the United States.

A telegram, sent from the American Embassy in Paris on 26 November 1960, is the first reference to Dr. Gomberg's preliminary report that Israel was engaged in a secret nuclear project that he "discovered" while visiting Israel as a guest of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission.

A two page Memorandum of Conversation, dated 1 December 1960, is the first debriefing Dr. Henry Gomberg (his name is still deleted in this document) had in Washington as to the findings he made concerning Israel's secret project. Gomberg made clear that he was convinced that Israel was secretly constructing a "Marcoul-type reactor" near Beer Sheba.

Telephone log of Secretary of State Christian Herter dated 9 December 1960. Two days after Secretary Herter summoned Israeli Ambassador Harman, and asked explanation about the Dimona reactor, he made a call to the French Charge D'affairs in Washington, Mr. Label, asking about French involvement in the project. Herter noted that according to information the United States had ascertained Israel had been involved in constructing a reactor since 1958 "which is at least ten times as large as claimed," and that the design appeared not for power but for plutonium production, hence, it would provide Israel "Considerable weapons potential."

A partially sanitized memorandum of conversation dated December 19 between President Eisenhower and his senior aides concerning the discovery of the Dimona project. The purpose of the meeting was to form a policy on the Israeli nuclear matter, given the imminence of publicity. Allen Dulles, CIA Director, referred explicitly to Israel's efforts to confuse the Dimona plant, "which is a large production installation," with the small Soreq reactor.

These are partially sanitized cables sent by American Ambassador Ogden Reid on December 24 and 28 following his conversations with both Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Golda Meir. The Eisenhower administration's message to the Israeli leaders was that the United States was pleased with the public and private assurances about the "peaceful purposes" of the program.

This is a document submitted on the last day of the Eisenhower Administration (19 January 1961) to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The document is a summary of all the answers the administration received from Israel concerning the Dimona reactor.

On 30 January 1961, ten days after President Kennedy assumed office, Secretary Rusk submitted a two-page memo to President Kennedy on the subject of Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities. The memo, and its attached chronology, summarizes the diplomatic exchanges that had taken place between the Eisenhower administration and the Israeli government, saying that "categoric assurances" were obtained from Ben Gurion "that Israel does not have plans for developing atomic weaponry.

On 31 January President Kennedy met former American Ambassador to Israel, Ogden Reid, who had resigned on 19 January. Kennedy wanted to know first hand about Dimona. Reid told him that he thought, "we can accept at face value Ben Gurion’s assurances that the reactor is to be devoted to peaceful purposes." He commented that an inspection of the Dimona site could be arranged, "if it is done on a secret basis."

These two memos reveal the state of the American-Israeli discussions concerning the Dimona visit and Kennedy’s personal interest in the subject of Israel’s atomic energy activities.

On 28 March 1961, Assistant Secretary Jones summoned Ambassador Harman to the State Department and told him that the United States had been faithfully waiting since early January for the promised invitation to visit Dimona, yet no such invitation arrived. He informed the Ambassador that the White House had inquired the previous day when the visit would take place and had requested a report on the matter by 31 March. The American lack of patience with the Israeli delays was evident.

On 30 March 1961, the Acting Secretary of State signed a "Memorandum for the President" on the subject of "Dimona Reactor." The State Department’s report included an account of the ongoing American-Israeli discussions on setting a date for the Dimona visit, accompanied with an updated chronology titled, "History of United States Interest in Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities."

On 10 April 1961, Ambassador Harman informed the State Department that the American visit to Dimona was tentatively scheduled for the week of 15 May. This document is a memorandum of Conversation between Assistant Secretary Jones and Minister Mordechai Gazit of the Israeli embassy about the Dimona visit.

Even in later April Israel still proposed to have the American visit after the meeting between Ben Gurion and Kennedy. This issue was raised in meetings on 1 May and 4 May between Mordechai Gazit and Armin Meyer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. In the end Israel reaffirmed the original arrangement and agreed to receive the two American scientists on 18 May.

By 5 May the State Department was in a position to inform the US Atomic Energy Commission of the final understanding concerning the visit of the AEC scientists at the Dimona reactor.

On 16 May, two days before the arrival of American scientists, Israeli senior diplomat Mordechai Gazit arrange an informal lunch meeting with met Philip Farley of the State Department to discuss the issue.

These are the official bios of the two USAEC scientists that visited Dimona: Ulysses Staebler, assistant director of the AEC Reactor Development Division, and Jesse Croach, a heavy water expert employed by Dupont at the AEC Savannah River facility.

The original report of the American visit to Dimona in May 1961 appears to be missing. First, a fifteen page draft titled "Notes on Visit to Israel," written by Staebler and Croach, which contains the raw data they collected during the visit. Second, a memorandum for National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, based on debriefing sessions with the scientists.

The hour and a half-long meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion was anticlimactic. The American and Israeli versions of the conversation are presented here in full. From these minutes it is evident that, on the matter of Dimona, both leaders wanted to avoid a confrontation.

On 5 July, less than ten days after Levi Eshkol became prime minister, Ambassador Barbour delivered a 3-page letter to him from President John Kennedy. Kennedy told Eshkol that the American commitment and support of Israel 'could be seriously jeopardized' if Israel did not let the United States obtain 'reliable information' about Israel's efforts in the nuclear field. In the letter Kennedy presented specific demands on how the American inspection visits to Dimona should be executed.

This 2-page memorandum of conversation, dated 13 August 1969, details a discussion between representative of the Atomic Energy Commission and the State Department regarding the last American visit in Dimona in July 1969 and the future of those visits. The document clearly depicts the sense of frustration of the members of the visiting team about the visit guidelines. The team draws the inference after the visit that "the US government is not prepared to support a real 'inspection' effort." They were right. These visits ended due to new American-Israeli understanding that was framed in the meeting between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir.

A background paper on the nuclear issue prepared by the State Department as part of a larger briefing book for Prime Minister Eshkol's visit ranch in January 1968. While elements in the CIA had recognized since 1966 that Israel had acquired a full nuclear weapons capability, it is evident that this information was not made official and not shared with the State Department. Still, the document strikes in its skeptical tone.

A memorandum for the president that was written by his national security advisor, Walt Rostow, on the eve of Eshkol's visit. The memorandum expresses the view prevailed at the time that Israel would eventually sign the NPT.

A telegram about the meeting between Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 10 September in which the Phantoms issue was at the center.

A note to Secretary of State Dean Rusk about the strategy under which the United States would negotiate with Israel the sale of the Phantoms. It is evident from this document that the linkage between the sale and the nuclear issue was planned to be at the core of the negotiations.

A memorandum prepared for President Johnson by the Secretary of State Office prior to the President's meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban on 22 October 1968. Rusk briefed the President on the Israeli ambiguous position on the NPT and suggested that the President would use the sale of the Phantoms as a leverage for Israeli signature.

A cable to Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv, dated 24 October 1968, provides full account of the Rusk-Eban talk. It depicts the positions of both the United States and Israel on the matter of the NPT on the eve of the formal negotiations of the Phantoms.

A cable from Ambassador Barbour, dated October 28, which contained a message from Prime Minister Eshkol. Eshkol clearly understood the message Eban brought with him from Washington-that there will be a linkage between the Phantom deal and the NPT-and urged the administration not to insist on such a linkage.

A cable to Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv, dated 31 October 1968, provides account of the opening meeting between Ambassador Rabin and Ambassador Parker Hart of the State Department. The meeting was about procedures: Hart asked Rabin to prepare a draft of agreement for the sale of the F-4s; Rabin responded that such a draft should be similar to the agreement signed in 1966 concerning the Skyhawks.

This document is the minutes of the first round of negotiation between Rabin and Warnke that took place on 4 November 1968. This was still a preliminary stage of the negotiations but Warnke laid the grounds for the battle over the NPT by stressing that these negotiations are much more serious and consequential that the negotiations over the sale of the 48 Skyhawks in 1966. This required discussing sensitive issues that Israel and the United States had hardly discussed before, nuclear weapons and missiles. On these issues the United States would need cleared and more explicit Israeli assurances. Such assurances should be incorporated into of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the sale of the Phantoms.

Unfortunately, the minutes of the second session (5 November) are still largely sanitized (the document was processed for declassification in 1984 which probably explains why so much of its contents are deleted). It appears that in that session Warnke submitted to Ambassador Rabin an American draft of the MOU. Of course, Rabin needed to consult about this document with his government, which explains why that session was so brief and lasted only thirty minutes.

These are the complete minutes of the third session of the Phantoms negotiations that took place on November 8, 1968 (they were originally classified "Top-Secret/Sensitive" and were declassifed only in 1997). Evidently, it was a tough session and the prime issue of discussion was the MOU that Warnke submitted to Rabin earlier.

These are the complete minutes of the fourth session of the Phantom negotiations that took place on November 12, 1968 (they were originally classified "Top-Secret/Sensitive" and were declassifed only in 1997). By now Warnke realized that the idea of the MOU was hopeless but he still wanted to use the negotiations to get better assurances and clarifications from Israel on the nuclear issue. In particular, he wanted to define operationally what the Israeli non-introduction pledge actually meant. This strategy led to an extraordinary Talmudic-like discussion about the definition of both "introduction" and "nuclear weapons."

These are the complete minutes of the fifth session of the Phantom negotiations that took place on November 22, 1968 (they were originally classified "Top-Secret/Sensitive" and were declassifed only in 1997). In that session the Israeli delegation raised more objections about the wording of the MOU. So it was agreed to scrap the idea of a joint one political document, an MOU, and to replace it with an offical exchange of letters between Rabin and Warnke. In such an exchange neither party has to endorse or condone the other's terms or definitions.

This is Rabin's letter to Warnke, as part of the agreed settlement of the Phantoms deal, dated 22 November 1968. In his letter Rabin does not provide any new assurances on the nuclear issue. He only reiterated the old non-introduction pledge that Israel had used since 1965; Israel also agreed not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapon carrier.

This is Warnke's letter to Rabin, as part of the agreed settlement of the Phantoms deal, dated 27 November 1968. In his letter Warnke expressed the position of the United States about what would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons. Specifically, physical possession and control of nuclear arms would constitute such introduction.

This is the memorandum of the final telephone conversation between Rabin and Warnke in the context of these negotiations. Rabin was concerned from the Warnke's language that might imply that Israel agreed to the American interpretation of the non-introduction pledge and this was not the case. Warnke assured Rabin that he understood the Israeli position, and accordingly was ready to change the last sentence in his letter to avoid misunderstanding on this matter.

This undated cover note was written by Harold (Hal) Saunders, the senior Middle East official at the National Security Council to Bromely Smith, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. The note was written probably in the summer of 1968 and it concerns material about Israel's nuclear weapons. The specific material itself, as well as the other 'eyes only' reports from CIA Director Richard Helms, is still unavailable. However, the content and the tone of this cover note reveals the extraordinary sensitivity surrounding discussion of Israel's nuclear weapons.

This 2-page telegram from the State Department to Ambassador Barbour, dated 23 Feb. 1967, refers to a previous telegram from the Tel Aviv Embassy (A-478) which suggested that "Israel could be much closer to nuclear weapons capability than we had supposed." This was consistent with previous intelligence reports from late 1966 that indicated that Israel could be only "weeks away" from assembling a nuclear device. The possibility of nuclear-armed Israel was not welcomed by the Johnson administration which left these reports "pending" further assessment and verification. In this telegram the State Department referred to these reports and asked Ambassador Barbour to press Eshkol on the matter of the next American visit to Dimona. It is evident from the cable that Israel did not respond to the American request for the visit since November 1966.

Originally posted by December_Rain
reply to post by seattletruth

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It's obvious from above stated documents Israeli Govt. used deceit and kept USA Govt. in dark. (which perhaps was willful). They acquired lott of Nuclear Support from USA under the guise of "Atoms of Peace" but acquired nuclear weapon capability from France. However, not all parts of US Govt. were blind to it, many people uncovered it early on but purposely kept other departments in dark. Even after it was verified the US Admin. lied there were no Nuclear weapons in Middle East.