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Yes, I lied to my kids about Santa
Originally posted by 12GaugePermissionSlip
When my first kid was born and Christmas came around I had to decide if I was going to deceive and lie to my child for probably the next 10 or so years about Santa Claus.
This meant also spending my hard earned cash on gifts and giving Santa the credit.
This also meant that someday my child would find out about my deception, count me as a liar, and have to come to terms with the fact, a person that they believed was real, admired for years, suddenly vanishing.
Let the kid be a kid for crying out loud. Let them enjoy the
magic of Christmas and Easter... like all their friends.
if you're going to be in for a penny, be in for a pound.
Remove all forms of fiction from their lives. Remove, Snow White, Rumpelstiltskin, Hansel & Gretel, Sleeping Beauty... Cartoons, Television, Movies, Novels... anything that may be considered a 'lie'.
If you stop giving your kids gifts on Christmas day
because you tell them that there is no Santa.
we fallow the tradition because most people do.
Quote from : Wikipedia : Santa Claus
Santa Claus, also known as Saint Nicholas, Sinterklaas, Father Christmas, Kris Kringle or simply "Santa", is a legendary figure who, in many Western cultures, brings gifts to the homes of the good children during the late evening and overnight hours of Christmas Eve, December 24 or on his Feast Day, December 6 (Saint Nicholas Day).
The legend may have part of its basis in hagiographical tales concerning the historical figure of gift giver Saint Nicholas.
A nearly identical story is attributed by Greek and Byzantine folklore to Basil of Caesarea.
Basil's feast day on January 1 is considered the time of exchanging gifts in Greece.
Quote from : Wikipedia : Dialectic : Hegelian Dialectic
Hegelian dialectic, usually presented in a three-fold manner, was stated by Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus as comprising three dialectical stages of development: a thesis, giving rise to its reaction, an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the thesis, and the tension between the two being resolved by means of a synthesis.
Although this model is often named after Hegel, he himself never used that specific formulation.
Hegel ascribed that terminology to Kant.
Carrying on Kant's work, Fichte greatly elaborated on the synthesis model, and popularized it.
On the other hand, Hegel did use a three-valued logical model that is very similar to the antithesis model, but Hegel's most usual terms were: Abstract-Negative-Concrete.
Sometimes Hegel would use the terms, Immediate-Mediated-Concrete.
Hegel used these terms hundreds of times throughout his works.
The formula, Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis, does not explain why the Thesis requires an Antithesis.
However, the formula, Abstract-Negative-Concrete, suggests a flaw in any initial thesis—it is too abstract and lacks the negative of trial, error and experience.
The same applies to the formula, Immediate-Mediated-Concrete.
For Hegel, the Concrete, the Synthesis, the Absolute, must always pass through the phase of the Negative, that is, Mediation.
This is the actual essence of what is popularly called Hegelian Dialectics.
To describe the activity of overcoming the negative, Hegel also often used the term Aufhebung, variously translated into English as "sublation" or "overcoming," to conceive of the working of the dialectic. Roughly, the term indicates preserving the useful portion of an idea, thing, society, etc., while moving beyond its limitations.
(Jacques Derrida's preferred French translation of the term was relever).
In the Logic, for instance, Hegel describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being (Sein); but pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing (Nichts).
When it is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same time, also returning to nothing (in life, for example, one's living is also a dying), both Being and Nothing are united as Becoming.
As in the Socratic dialectic, Hegel claimed to proceed by making implicit contradictions explicit: each stage of the process is the product of contradictions inherent or implicit in the preceding stage.
For Hegel, the whole of history is one tremendous dialectic, major stages of which chart a progression from self-alienation as slavery to self-unification and realization as the rational, constitutional state of free and equal citizens.
The Hegelian dialectic cannot be mechanically applied for any chosen thesis.
Critics argue that the selection of any antithesis, other than the logical negation of the thesis, is subjective.
Then, if the logical negation is used as the antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis.
In practice, when an antithesis is selected to suit the user's subjective purpose, the resulting "contradictions" are rhetorical, not logical, and the resulting synthesis is not rigorously defensible against a multitude of other possible syntheses.
The problem with the Fichtean "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis" model is that it implies that contradictions or negations come from outside of things.
Hegel's point is that they are inherent in and internal to things.
This conception of dialectics derives ultimately from Heraclitus.
Hegel has outlined that the purpose of dialectics is "to study things in their own being and movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories of understanding"
One important dialectical principle for Hegel is the transition from quantity to quality, which he terms the Measure.
The measure is the qualitative quantum, the quantum is the existence of quantity.
"The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised.
In other words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority.
On the one hand, the quantitative features of existence may be altered, without affecting its quality.
On the other hand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change.
[...] But if the quantity present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the quality corresponding to it is also put in abeyance.
This however is not a negation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the place of which is at once occupied by another.
This process of measure, which appears alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a sudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure of a nodal (knotted) line".
As an example, Hegel mentions the states of aggregation of water:
"Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase or diminution of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or ice".
As other examples Hegel mentions the reaching of a point where a single additional grain makes a heap of wheat; or where the bald-tail is produced, if we continue plucking out single hairs.
Another important principle for Hegel is the negation of the negation, which he also terms Aufhebung (sublation): Something is only what it is in its relation to another, but by the negation of the negation this something incorporates the other into itself.
The dialectical movement involves two moments that negate each other, a somewhat and an another.
As a result of the negation of the negation, "something becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum".
Something in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is self-related.
In becoming there are two moments: coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be: by sublation, i.e. negation of the negation, being passes over into nothing, it ceases to be, but something new shows up, is coming to be.
What is sublated (aufgehoben) on the one hand ceases to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained.
In dialectics, a totality transform itself, it is self-related.
Quote from : Wikipedia : Pontius Pilate
Pontius Pilate (pronounced /ˈpɒntʃəs ˈpaɪlət/; Latin: Pilatus, Greek: Πόντιος Πιλᾶτος) was the Prefect (governor) of the Roman province of Judaea from AD 26–36.
Typically referenced as the fifth Procurator of Judea, he is best known as the judge at Jesus' trial and the man who authorized his crucifixion.
Quote from : Wikipedia : First Council of Nicaea
The First Council of Nicaea was a council of Christian bishops convened in Nicaea in Bithynia (present-day İznik in Turkey) by the Roman Emperor Constantine I in A.D. 325.
The Council was historically significant as the first effort to attain consensus in the church through an assembly representing all of Christendom.
Quote from : Wikipedia : Second Council of Nicaea
The Second Council of Nicaea is believed to have been the Seventh Ecumenical Council by Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Old Catholics, and various other Western Christian groups.
It met in 787 AD in Nicaea (site of the First Council of Nicaea; present-day İznik in Turkey) to restore the honoring of icons (or, holy images) which had been suppressed by imperial edict inside the Byzantine Empire during the reign of Leo III (717 - 741).
His son, Constantine V (741 - 775), had held a synod to make the suppression official.