reply to post by turbofan
For turbofan, I printed up this link here,
...from the post I am responding to.
I could explain, in boring detail, just WHY you miinterpreted the points rasied in that paper.
But I won't, except to tell you how the FOQA program, and the QARs that are installed in most of the most recent Boeing designs (and being
retro-fitted into older designs, as the technology makes it simpler, and the airlines find it "cost effective") caused a great am,ount of distress
among the pilot's Unions, especially (in the USA) ALPA.
Airline Flight Operations Management would see those devics, the software, and the technology as a form of "instant snitch" on poor behaivor,
less-than-professional piloting techniques, and other mistakes made by pilots, etc, etc.
The Union, as a form of "protector" insisted on (and received, through negotiation) assurances that the FOQA data would be "de-identified" as to
specific flight information, and the crews involved in any "excurisions" from SOPs....so that there would be no disciplinary repurcussions with
HOWEVER, in very, very extreme instances, identity IS available and discussed, the Union reserves the right to intervene with private and personal
counseling firstly, but in gross negligence instances, Company Management will also wish to be involved, but that happens rarely. PER the
This FOQA data, as recorded and accessed from the QAR, is used in trend projections, and funneled to the Training Department, and incorporated, when a
trend is seen, as emphasis in training. Not only in recurrent annual groundschool (which is quickly an obsolete concept, as the USE of this FOQA data
allows airline companies to participate in the FAA-approved 'AQP' recurrent traing programs, therefore saving money in recurrent traiing
Really, really, really egregious examples of poor decision making, as noticed by the FOQA program, are exhibited for the ENTIRE pilot population to
view...such as one where one of our B-777 crews conducted the most unstable approach ever seen (some years ago, happened to be in Santo Domingo, an
airport I've flown into numerous times, so I understand HOW they got into the situation they did) yet because it resulted in no accident, it was only
known to Management (and the Union, beside the two pilots iun the cockpit) as a result. AND those of us who coould review all the decisions they
made, WHY they made those dedcisions, and HOWE to prevent such a mindset in future....lest there be a situation whaer an actual accident occurs.
THAT is the POINT of FOQA!!!
To learn from others' mistakes...because pilots make a lot of mistakes...some usually minor, and caught... the goal is to "manage" those mistakes,
in order to "break the chain' of circumstance that has been described as leading (ultimatly) to the accident, which is the focus of these studies
(Preventoion of future accidents, by examing past history).
Capisce? (I hope I explained this adequately)
Point being, the data from
the QAR is accessed, and viewed, in a way that would NOT allow it to flow INTO the FDR, if that makes sense....
I'm not really interested in whether, or not a physical flight data recorder can be connceted to a flight simulator. I have proven beyond a
shodow of a doubt that a flight data file can be produced using a simulator.
Can you see, now, this mis-comprension? Of, specifically, the one-way nature of data acquistion, depending on the device in question?
[edit on 28 January 2010 by weedwhacker]