Originally posted by really

Originally posted by mr-lizard

Iraq didn't really engage in a war with Iran, instead they used chemical weapons on the fringe or Iran. BIG DIFFERENCE.

[edit on 19-10-2009 by mr-lizard]

Actually, Iraq invaded Iran. Iran's soldiers weren't cutting it and the Ayatollah started using children, sending them in droves to the front lines, to overwhelm the Iraqis. I forget the name they gave to the children.
There is now a fountain in Tehran (I believe Tehran, might be another part of Iran) to commemorate these children. The water comes out red so as to look like blood.

www.matthiaskuentzel.de...

[edit on 19-10-2009 by really]

Perhaps it will help put things in context by looking at the supreme leader’s recent movements. On October 5th he went from Tehran to Now Shar, where he visited a naval base and academy. Later that day he went to the city of Chaloos, preached a sermon, delivered a speech and returned to Now Shar. On the 6th he traveled by automobile to Ramsar, a very beautiful resort city, and which is graced by a palace of the late shah. Khamenei was supposed to spend three days there, but he wasn’t feeling well, and complained of difficulty in breathing. He was therefore flown from Ramsar airport to Tehran.

He was treated at home by various specialists for several days. He received oxygen to help him breathe. The collapse came on Monday the 12th, and he was taken to a special clinic–originally built for Imam Khomeini–in Tehran. Foreign specialists began to arrive on Wednesday the 14th, when he was examined by foreign doctors. They included two famous Russian professors who had been in Iran previously, by three men described as “orientals” (could be Chinese or North Koreans; I don’t know), and two other doctors who identified themselves as swiss. Throughout, the Iranian doctors kept saying “give him more oxygen.” Medicine was delivered from abroad, coming straight from the airport to the clinic.

I am told he was still in a coma late Friday afternoon, Tehran time. And he is still very sick.

He has had only one important visitor outside his immediate family and advisers: Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Lebanese Hezbollah. Nasrallah flew in, I believe on Thursday night, went to the clinic, saw Khamenei for two-three minutes, and came out of the room “in tears.”

Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council (and the effective leader with Khamenei incapacitated), inadvertently confirmed Nasrallah’s presence in his Friday sermon when he referred to a conversation between the two. The Nasrallah trip had not been announced in any of the Iranian media.

On Saturday morning or late Friday night, Khamenei was transferred from the special clinic to his own residence [palace] and many pieces of medical equipment were also transferred.

At noon, Saturday, Rafsanjani attempted to visit Khamenei but entry was refused and he was told to report back at 1600. When Rafsanjani reported back at 1600 he was told by Khamenei’s son that he could not see Khamenei, so Rafsanjani left again.

As for the alleged photos of the alleged meeting between Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and Senegalese President Wade, I am confident that there was no such meeting. Wade only met with Ahmadinejad. The purpose of the short meeting was for Wade to deliver a formal complaint on behalf of various poor African countries. Iran, which this year chairs the Islamic Conference, had promised considerable aid to them, but as yet has failed to pay. So Wade asked Ahmadinejad to keep his promise.

I earlier speculated that the photos were falsified, but, as it turns out, the pics (and film broadcast on Iranian TV) were from the files. Wade had been four times to Tehran. The photo of Wade in a Western suit was taken at the meeting of the Islamic Conference in Tehran four months ago. The regime was in such a hurry to put paid to the stories about Khamenei’s illness that the news agencies failed to coordinate the pictures.

Finally, the most impressive evidence of the real condition of the Supreme Leader is that he did not appear in public after the terrible bombing today (Sunday). It would have been normal for him to go on television and address the Iranian people.

Because of this Ahmadinejad now has to create a non-false flag pretext for a broader war and in the process begin conquering the new territories that will make up the Persian New World Order State of Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India to be ruled by the new Shah on the Peacock Throne.

Too many suspicions from 9-11 for the Western Intelligence Agencies to pull another false flag, the people will demand an investigation this time, and intense public scrutiny including thousands of well funded private citizens on the trail of 9-11 would be on it from second one making it impossible to cover up who the real culprits are again.

in2thefray.wordpress.com...

Since the start of the U.S.-jihadist war in late 2001, and particularly since the rise of the Taliban rebellion within its own borders in recent years, Pakistan has been seen as a state embroiled in a jihadist insurgency threatening its very survival. Indeed, until late April, it appeared that Pakistan was buckling under the onslaught of a Taliban rebellion that had consumed large chunks of territory in the northwest and was striking at the country’s core. A Shariah-for-peace deal with the Taliban in the Swat region, approved with near unanimity by the parliament, reinforced the view that Pakistan lacked the willingness or capability to fight Islamist non-state actors chipping away at its security and stability.

In the last three months, however, the state has staged a dramatic comeback, beginning with an offensive in Swat and adjacent districts that has resulted in the state regaining control over most of the affected areas. (The offensive is still under way.) The government action in Swat was followed by limited air and groundoperations in the South Waziristan region, along with an intelligence campaign in cooperation with the United States, which has resulted in a two-month respite from any major insurgent suicide bombings. Most important was the killing Aug. 5 of top Pakistani Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in a bombing strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle.

While many observers still view Pakistan as a state beset by a jihadist insurgency, the government’s counterinsurgency campaign has clearly taken center stage. This does not mean that the jihadists no longer constitute a threat. They are and will remain a significant threat for the foreseeable future, but the state has recently gained the upper hand in the struggle — at least for now.

[…]

Between the re-taking of most of Swat, which has allowed for the return of some 765,000 displaced residents, and the elimination of Mehsud, Pakistan has gained an important edge in its struggle against its Taliban rebels that it can build upon to deliver a decisive blow. But there are a lot of moving parts in play that have to be dealt with in order to ensure continued progress.

Though the Swat Taliban have been damaged, they have not been entirely defeated, which will not happen until their leadership is captured or killed (or until they cannot recruit new fighters from their madrassas). And as displaced residents return to the region, a massive amount of reconstruction and development work is necessary to prevent unrest that the Taliban could exploit. Restoring the writ of the state entails the re-establishment of political administration and local law enforcement, and there are other areas in the NWFP — especially the districts that run parallel to the FATA — that also need to be brought back under government control.

In Waziristan and the rest of the FATA, Mehsud’s death has wounded the Taliban, but they are very much entrenched in the region, along with their al Qaeda and other transnational allies. Any counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal areas is going to be exponentially more difficult than the offensive in Swat. This is why the military is now aligning itself with pro-Pakistani tribal and militant forces to try and root out those waging war against the state. Being able to distinguish between those militants hostile to Pakistan and those focused on Afghanistan is going to be hard not only because of the fluidity of the Taliban phenomenon but also because itcomplicates U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Then there is the matter of how Islamabad balances its efforts to re-assert state control over areas on its side of the border with an international move to talk to the Taliban in Afghanistan. The challenge for Pakistan is to regain influence in its western neighbor by reviving its contacts and thus influence with the Afghan Taliban while rolling back Talibanization in its own Pashtun areas. Efforts to neutralize FATA-based domestic rebels impacts Taliban groups focused on Afghanistan, whose support Pakistan needs to crush the domestic insurgency and re-establish its influence in Afghanistan.

While Pakistan’s Pashtun areas are most affected by Talibanization, the phenomenon has made considerable inroads into Pakistan’s core, where the Taliban, like the LeT/JuD, manifest themselves more as social movement. This is why, in addition to the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaign, Pakistan has also begun focusing on anti-extremism and de-radicalization efforts — theideological battle — which is designed to drain the swamp in which the jihadists are able to grow and operate. While Pakistani public opinion has turned against the Taliban in a meaningful manner, there are still significant pockets of social support and a large number of people who remain ambivalent about the need for a comprehensive campaign against the jihadists.

Pakistan’s ability successfully to press ahead with this multidimensional effort depends on its ability to contain political instability within tolerable limits and improve economic conditions. While the judicial crisis ended with the reinstatement of the chief justice fired by former President Pervez Musharraf, political stability remains elusive because of the country’s fragmented political landscape and the weakness of its civilian institutions. And while a loan from the International Monetary Fund has helped Pakistan avoid bankruptcy, it will be some time before the economic conditions begin to improve to the point where Islamabad is able to meet its routine financial obligations and pay the multibillion-dollar cost of fighting the Taliban.

Originally posted by mrmonsoon
reply to post by ProtoplasmicTraveler

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Wow, just wow.

That has got to be the most comical statement's I have read in a long time.
(:lol

Iran thinks it will win wars with 2 nuclear powers (Pakistan and India).

Besides no links so it is just an opinion.
(Unproven/supported opinon's are ok, but they should be stated as such, not presented like fact)