posted on Oct, 12 2009 @ 04:51 PM
The following quote (according to policy of www.stratfor.com) is ok to be re-posted, so I'm using it to educate fellow ATSers
U.S. President Barack Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize last week. Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, established the prize, which was to be
awarded to the person who has accomplished “the most or the best work for fraternity among nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing
armies and for the promotion of peace congresses.” The mechanism for awarding the peace prize is very different from the other Nobel categories.
Academic bodies, such as the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, decide who wins the other prizes. Alfred Nobel’s will stated, however, that a
committee of five selected by the Norwegian legislature, or Storting, should award the peace prize.
* Special Series: Obama’s Foreign Policy Landscape
The committee that awarded the peace price to Obama consists of chairman Thorbjorn Jagland, president of the Storting and former Labor Party prime
minister and foreign minister of Norway; Kaci Kullmann Five, a former member of the Storting and president of the Conservative Party; Sissel Marie
Ronbeck, a former Social Democratic member of the Storting; Inger-Marie Ytterhorn, a former member of the Storting and current senior adviser to the
Progress Party; and Agot Valle, a current member of the Storting and spokeswoman on foreign affairs for the Socialist Left Party.
The peace prize committee is therefore a committee of politicians, some present members of parliament, some former members of parliament. Three come
from the left (Jagland, Ronbeck and Valle). Two come from the right (Kullman and Ytterhorn). It is reasonable to say that the peace prize committee
faithfully reproduces the full spectrum of Norwegian politics.
A Frequently Startling Prize
Prize recipients frequently have proved startling. For example, the first U.S. president to receive the prize was Theodore Roosevelt, who received it
in 1906 for helping negotiate peace between Japan and Russia. Roosevelt genuinely sought peace, but ultimately because of American fears that an
unbridled Japan would threaten U.S. interests in the Pacific. He sought peace to ensure that Japan would not eliminate Russian power in the Pacific
and not hold Port Arthur or any of the other prizes of the Russo-Japanese War. To achieve this peace, he implied that the United States might
intervene against Japan.
In brokering negotiations to try to block Japan from exploiting its victory over the Russians, Roosevelt was engaged in pure power politics. The
Japanese were in fact quite bitter at the American intervention. (For their part, the Russians were preoccupied with domestic unrest.) But a treaty
emerged from the talks, and peace prevailed. Though preserving a balance of power in the Pacific motivated Roosevelt, the Nobel committee didn’t
seem to care. And given that Alfred Nobel didn’t provide much guidance about his intentions for the prize, choosing Roosevelt was as reasonable as
the choices for most Nobel Peace Prizes.
In recent years, the awards have gone to political dissidents the committee approved of, such as the Dalai Lama and Lech Walesa, or people supporting
causes it agreed with, such as Al Gore. Others were peacemakers in the Theodore Roosevelt mode, such as Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger for working
toward peace in Vietnam and Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin for moving toward peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.
Two things must be remembered about the Nobel Peace Prize. The first is that Nobel was never clear about his intentions for it. The second is his
decision to have it awarded by politicians from — and we hope the Norwegians will accept our advance apologies — a marginal country relative to
the international system. This is not meant as a criticism of Norway, a country we have enjoyed in the past, but the Norwegians sometimes have an
idiosyncratic way of viewing the world.
Therefore, the award to Obama was neither more or less odd than some of the previous awards made by five Norwegian politicians no one outside of
Norway had ever heard of. But his win does give us an opportunity to consider an important question, namely, why Europeans generally think so highly
Obama and the Europeans
Let’s begin by being careful with the term European. Eastern Europeans and Russians — all Europeans — do not think very highly of him. The
British are reserved on the subject. But on the whole, other Europeans west of the former Soviet satellites and south and east of the English Channel
think extremely well of him, and the Norwegians are reflecting this admiration. It is important to understand why they do.
The Europeans experienced catastrophes during the 20th century. Two world wars slaughtered generations of Europeans and shattered Europe’s economy.
Just after the war, much of Europe maintained standards of living not far above that of the Third World. In a sense, Europe lost everything —
millions of lives, empires, even sovereignty as the United States and the Soviet Union occupied and competed in Europe. The catastrophe of the 20th
century defines Europe, and what the Europeans want to get away from.
The Cold War gave Europe the opportunity to recover economically, but only in the context of occupation and the threat of war between the Soviets and
Americans. A half century of Soviet occupation seared Eastern European souls. During that time, the rest of Europe lived in a paradox of growing
prosperity and the apparent imminence of another war. The Europeans were not in control of whether the war would come, or where or how it would be
fought. There are therefore two Europes. One, the Europe that was first occupied by Nazi Germany and then by the Soviet Union still lives in the
shadow of the dual catastrophes. The other, larger Europe, lives in the shadow of the United States.
Between 1945 and 1991, Western Europe lived in a confrontation with the Soviets. The Europeans lived in dread of Soviet occupation, and though
tempted, never capitulated to the Soviets. That meant that the Europeans were forced to depend on the United States for their defense and economic
stability, and were therefore subject to America’s will. How the Americans and Russians viewed each other would determine whether war would break
out, not what the Europeans thought.
Every aggressive action by the United States, however trivial, was magnified a hundredfold in European minds, as they considered fearfully how the
Soviets would respond. In fact, the Americans were much more restrained during the Cold War than Europeans at the time thought. Looking back, the U.S.
position in Europe itself was quite passive. But the European terror was that some action in the rest of the world — Cuba, the Middle East, Vietnam
— would cause the Soviets to respond in Europe, costing them everything they had built up.
In the European mind, the Americans prior to 1945 were liberators. After 1945 they were protectors, but protectors who could not be trusted to avoid
triggering another war through recklessness or carelessness. The theme dominating European thinking about the United States was that the Americans
were too immature, too mercurial and too powerful to really be trusted. From an American point of view, these were the same Europeans who engaged in
unparalleled savagery between 1914 and 1945 all on their own, and the period after 1945 — when the Americans dominated Europe — was far more
peaceful and prosperous than the previous period. But the European conviction that the Europeans were the sophisticated statesmen and prudent
calculators while the Americans were unsophisticated and imprudent did not require an empirical basis. It was built on another reality, which was that
Europe had lost everything, including real control over its fate, and that trusting its protector to be cautious was difficult.
The Europeans loathed many presidents, e.g., Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan. Jimmy Carter was not respected. Two were liked: John F.
Kennedy and Bill Clinton. Kennedy relieved them of the burden of Dwight D. Eisenhower and his dour Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was
deeply distrusted. Clinton was liked for interesting reasons, and understanding this requires examining the post-Cold War era.
The United States and Europe After the Cold War
The year 1991 marked the end of the Cold War. For the first time since 1914, Europeans were prosperous, secure and recovering their sovereignty. The
United States wanted little from the Europeans, something that delighted the Europeans. It was a rare historical moment in which the alliance existed
in some institutional sense, but not in any major active form. The Balkans had to be dealt with, but those were the Balkans — not an area of major
Europe could finally relax. Another world war would not erase its prosperity, and they were free from active American domination. They could shape
their institutions, and they would. It was the perfect time for them, one they thought would last forever.
For the United States, 9/11 changed all that. The Europeans had deep sympathy for the United States post-Sept. 11, sympathy that was on the whole
genuine. But the Europeans also believed that former U.S. President George W. Bush had overreacted to the attacks, threatening to unleash a reign of
terror on them, engaging in unnecessary wars and above all not consulting them. The last claim was not altogether true: Bush frequently consulted the
Europeans, but they frequently said no to his administration’s requests. The Europeans were appalled that Bush continued his policies in spite of
their objections; they felt they were being dragged back into a Cold War-type situation for trivial reasons.