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By 1940, diplomatic relationships between the United States and Japan had badly deteriorated. After the Japanese invaded French Indochina in 1941, the United States placed an embargo against Japan and stopped all trade and petroleum exports. In response to the embargo, the Japanese formulated a bold plan to seize the oil-rich East Indies and dubbed the plan, “Southern Operation.” Admiral Isokoru Yamamoto decided that an aerial attack on Pearl Harbor would protect the flank of the Southern Operation and sway the balance of power in the Pacific. By November the attack was ordered and Japan's First Air Fleet left the Kurile Islands for Pearl Harbor.
Since Mr. Baker’s column expresses such strong objection to the recent congressional initiative, and the author himself seems preoccupied with blame fixing, I think it would be useful to explain my purpose. My name was mentioned in the congressional amendment; my presentation of the operational realities that bore on what happened on December 7, 1941, was a factor in the congressional decision. Thirty-five years ago, in 1966, I commanded our carrier task forces in the Gulf of Tonkin. I quickly learned that timely intelligence helped accomplish missions and saved lives. I applied that knowledge and preached that gospel while on active duty in three subsequent assignments. In 1982, quite by chance, I had occasion to inquire into events surrounding the Pearl Harbor calamity. It quickly became clear to me that this was the perfect parable to help register in top-level administrative and military minds the fact that high-quality, timely information is essential. My purpose was to teach lessons from past mistakes so as to avoid repeating them; the theory that Roosevelt had been forewarned about the attack was peripheral to this objective.
A partial refutation of the Beard argument appeared in 1950 in Basil Rauch's Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor. The administration did not know in advance of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor, he argued. It did, however, expect an attack somewhere; and it made subtle efforts to "maneuver" Japan into firing the first shot in the conflict. But Richard N. Current, in Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (1954), offered an even stronger challenge to Beard. Stimson did indeed anticipate an attack, Current argued, but not an attack on American territory; rather, he anticipated an assault on British or Dutch possessions in the Pacific. The problem confronting the administration was not how to maneuver the Japanese into attacking the United States, but how to find a way to make a Japanese attack on British or Dutch territory appear to be an attack on America. Only thus, Stimson believed, could Congress be persuaded to approve a declaration of war.
The most thorough study of Pearl Harbor to date appeared in 1981: Gordon W. Prange's At Dawn We Slept. Like Wohlstetter, Prange concluded that the Roosevelt administration was guilty of a series of disastrous blunders in interpreting Japanese strategy; the American government had possession of enough information to predict the attack, but failed to do so. But Prange dismissed the arguments of the "revisionists" (Beard and his successors) that the president had deliberately maneuvered the nation into the war by permitting the Japanese to attack. Instead, he emphasized the enormous daring and great skill with which the Japanese orchestrated an ambitious operation that few Americans believed possible.
Originally posted by SpartanKingLeonidas
I know the honest truth behind history, it is all set into motion by the rich and power elite, just for profit, culling off the populace through population control, and grabbing land, as well as eradicating certain undesired segments of humanity, which to me is all sick, perverted, and wholeheartedly the way the elite use citizens of their nations as pawns on a giant chess board.
Reports of blasting and salvaging operations, some apparently conducted by or for the Royal Navy, dated back to 1946. In the 1980s, salvagers had removed two of the bow anchors and three of the four bronze propellers. But nothing prepared us for the actual scene of devastation
The people behind the scenes decided what better way to get rid of the out of date equipment, and use a pretext towards war, than to set a trap for the Japanese. It rebuilt the industry, rebuilt our economy, and as well rebuilt America's trust in its Government, albeit through deceit, treachery, and lies.
During World War II, Naval Intelligence became responsible for the translation, evaluation and dissemination of intercepted Japanese communications, and its budget and staff grew significantly.