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President Roosevelt (FDR) provoked the attack, knew about it in advance and covered up his failure to warn the Hawaiian commanders. FDR needed the attack to sucker Hitler to declare war, since the public and Congress were overwhelmingly against entering the war in Europe. It was his backdoor to war.
FDR blinded the commanders at Pearl Harbor and set them up by --
- denying intelligence to Hawaii (HI)
- on November 27 and later, misleading the commanders into thinking negotiations with Japan were continuing to prevent them from realizing the war was on
- having false information sent to HI about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet.
1904 - The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in
undeclared war. 1932 - In the Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercises, 152 aircraft carrier planes caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise. 1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.
7 Oct 1940 - Navy IQ analyst McCollum wrote an 8 point memo on how to force Japan into war with US. Beginning the next day FDR began to put them into effect and all 8 were eventually accomplished. 11 November 1940 - 21 aged British planes destroyed the Italian fleet, including 3 battleships, at their homeport in the harbor of Taranto in Southern Italy by using technically innovative shallow-draft torpedoes.
11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila to get into war. Navy Chief Stark objected: "I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested (more forces to Manila) and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6." (Charles Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424) March 1941 - FDR sold munitions and convoyed them to belligerents in Europe -- both acts of war and both violations of international law -- the Lend-Lease Act.
23 Jun 1941 - Advisor Harold Ickes wrote FDR a memo the day after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, "There might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia." FDR was pleased with Admiral Richmond Turner's report read July 22: "It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to the invasion of Netherland East Indies...it seems certain she would also include military action against the Philippine Islands, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war." On July 24 FDR told the Volunteer Participation Committee, "If we had cut off the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war." The next day FDR froze all Japanese assets in US cutting off their main supply of oil and forcing them into war with the US. Intelligence information was withheld from Hawaii from this point forward. 14 August - At the Atlantic Conference, Churchill noted the "astonishing depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for war." Churchill cabled his cabinet "(FDR) obviously was very determined that they should come in."
Purple Code - the top Japanese diplomatic machine cipher which used automatic telephone switches to separately and differently encipher each character sent. It was cracked by the Army Signal Intelligence Service (331 men). J-19 was the main Japanese diplomatic code book. This columnar code was cracked.
Coral Machine Cipher or JNA-20 was a simplified version of Purple used by Naval attaches. Only one message deciphered prior to Pearl Harbor has been declassified. AD or Administrative Code wrongly called Admiralty Code was an old four character transposition code used for personnel matters. No important messages were sent in this weak code. Introduced Nov 1938, it was seldom used after Dec 1940.
Magic - the security designation given to all decoded Japanese diplomatic messages. It's hard not to conclude with historians like Charles Bateson that "Magic standing alone points so irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is inconceivable anybody could have failed to forecast the Japanese move." The NSA reached the same conclusion in 1955. Ultra - the security designation for decoded military messages.
Warnings do no harm and might do inexpressible good
27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
31 March 1941 - A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan made war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had assumed that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet wherever it was - it was the greatest danger from Japan. The fleet was the only threat to Japan's plans. The fleet at Pearl Harbor was the only High Value Target. Logically, Japan couldn't engage in any major operation with the American fleet on its flank. Initial seriously crippling attacks on the US fleet in Hawaii would be the only chance the Japanese military would have for eventual victory. The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.
10 July - US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor.
July - The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
Why the Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese spying on PH has never been explained, but they blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall of 1941 to allow it to continue. The bomb plots were addressed to "Chief of 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff", marked Secret Intelligence message, and given special serial numbers, so their significance couldn't be missed. There were about 95 ships in port. The text was:
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible:
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"
Most of the conspirators were military men, all men of FDR's own choice, men who only followed orders and FDR never delegated authority. Stark, in answer to charges that he denied IQ to Hawaii, publicly offered a Nuremberg defense in August 1945 that everything he did pre-Dec 7, 1941 was on FDR's orders. The handful of military men in DC responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor were directly under the control of FDR and were later promoted and protected from investigation; promoted with FDR's full knowledge that they were responsible for not warning Hawaii. On the record, Intelligence tried to warn HI scores of times but were prevented by FDR's men.
- - '' Is there any huge war Not orchestrated by the Power ?? !! '' - -
Originally posted by Eurisko2012
reply to post by ChemBreather
I visited the Pearl Harbor Arizona memorial when i was in the navy.
They show you a film first. Then you ride a boat over to the Arizona.
There is a marble wall there with all the names of the sailors killed
on the ship. When you arrive back there is usually a salty veteran
standing there talking to the tourists. The tourists told him "We
knew they were going to attack." The veteran just nodded his
head and said "Yes". I knew the answer before he said it.
We needed the war to end the great depression.
As soon as the war started, everybody had a job!
That temptation evaporates when one discovers that such rumors started almost immediately after the bombing itself. In fact, Thomas Dewey (Republican candidate for President in 1944) tried to turn it into a campaign issue; he and several Republican senators claimed that "certain Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor" had been cracked, and that FDR "knew what was happening before Pearl Harbor, and instead of being re-elected he ought to be impeached." In the end, Dewey dropped the issue; partially because Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall provided evidence to the contrary, and partially because Dewey knew if he were to make such accusations in public, the Japanese government would realize that their codes had been compromised, which would prompt them to change their codes and cause serious hardship to future American operations. On the face of it, there's a ring of truth to the rumor. The American military had broken some Japanese codes, and had received prior warning of an attack, both from notes they intercepted as well as notes the British cracked and passed on. Given that Marshall warned Pacific army commanders "the United States desires that Japan commits the first overt act," how hard is it to believe that Roosevelt allowed the surprise attack to occur in order to bring a vocally isolationist Congress and public into supporting war with Japan? But let's look at each of these allegations in detail--you may note some flaws.
The American military had broken Japanese codes. Yes. However, what they had broken were diplomatic codes. During the pre-war negotiations with Japan, Roosevelt often knew what the Japanese were prepared to offer and willing to settle for. The messages sent on December 6th made it perfectly clear to Roosevelt that the Japanese government was planning to declare war upon the United States.
So the American government knew an attack on Pearl Harbor was coming. No. The Japanese government was not in the habit of informing its diplomats of planned military strikes in detail. So while the Americans knew that Japanese diplomats had been instructed to deliver a certain message to the U.S. government at 1 p.m. on December 7 and then destroy their cipher machine and secret documents, and from this deduced that something big was about to happen, they did not know where to expect the initial attack. The Pacific Ocean's a big place, and there were lots of targets available to the Japanese--the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Singapore, etc. Admiral Stark recognized that the Japanese were planning to attack somewhere, but told his subordinates it would be "against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo." As is well known, the American military failed to take advantage of what little warning it did have through bad luck and incompetence. But the carriers were out to sea on maneuvers, leaving behind several outdated battleships. So the Pearl Harbor attack wasn't nearly as successful as it could have been. Doesn't that mean that someone had ordered them to take precautions by sending out the carriers? Try telling Roosevelt's staff and the navy that the Pearl Harbor attack wasn't nearly as successful as it could have been. Most of them believed that the Pearl Harbor attack had completely obliterated American strength in the Pacific. As for the carriers, it would be another six months before their importance would be proven beyond a doubt, at the battle of Midway. At the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, nearly all naval leaders--including the Japanese--considered carriers and their aircraft best suited to reconnaissance. The real fighting would be left to the battleships, many of which were sunk or badly damaged after Pearl Harbor. While the Americans knew some attack was coming, they did not know what type of attack. Had the air raid been followed up with an invasion, Pearl Harbor could not have held out for long, and the United States would have been without one of its major bases in the Pacific, in addition to having lost the fleet.
Even so, without the Japanese attack, America would never have declared war upon Japan. Not true. Most people point to the August 1941 resolution to keep draftees on duty for more than twelve months, a measure that passed by the narrowest of margins, 203-202. But antiwar sentiment was waning quickly, especially in the wake of German U-boat attacks upon American vessels. In September, a poll showed 67 percent of the American public felt the United States should risk war rather than allow Japan to grow more powerful; 70 percent felt the United States should risk war with Germany. Many in Roosevelt's cabinet and the press felt that the President would have no difficulty in getting a declaration of war against Japan following the breakdown in peace negotiations in late November. But it was Roosevelt who refused to push the issue, instead waiting for Japan to make the first move. In order to believe that Roosevelt knew about the coming Pearl Harbor attack but kept mum, you have to believe he had better information than any of his subordinates in the government or the military--information that since has been destroyed, since no one has been able to find it. Moreover, you have to believe that Roosevelt was willing to sacrifice most of the Pacific fleet, and possibly one of the most important American naval bases in the Pacific, probably crippling American operations against Japan for the next two years (by which time the Japanese would likely have taken over the Pacific and begun operations against the American West Coast) in order to gain public support for a measure the public already supported by a two-to-one margin. You also have to believe that Roosevelt--who had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who always claimed that if he hadn't gotten into politics he would have liked to have been an admiral, whose first campaign song for President was "Anchors Aweigh" (before being replaced by the more appropriate and upbeat "Happy Days Are Here Again")--would countenance the deaths of thousands of U.S. sailors for a few extra votes in Congress--again, for a measure that many observers felt would pass easily.
1904 - The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in undeclared war. 1932 - In the Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercises, 152 aircraft carrier planes caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday. 1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise. 1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.
Japan's undeclared war on China 1937-1945 In July 1937, tensions between Chinese troops and Japanese troops engaged in military exercises on occupied Chinese territory produced an exchange of firing near Peking (now Beijing). The Japanese used this incident as an excuse to wage all out war against China. Japanese armies invaded China's northern provinces and quickly captured the former Chinese capital Peking. Although poorly trained and equipped, the Chinese army and communist irregulars put up strong resistance to Japan's armies which enjoyed overwhelming superiority in numbers and weapons. The Japanese encountered particularly strong resistance in the north-western Shansi and Shensi provinces where the Chinese communists had established strongholds, and were able to employ guerrilla tactics successfully against the invaders of their country. At the end of 1941, the Japanese had still made no head-way at all in north-western China against the Chinese communist armies which were able to tie down large numbers of Japanese troops. While fighting was continuing in northern China, the Japanese launched a second front at the city of Shanghai on the eastern coast of China. Despite determined resistance by Chinese nationalist troops, the Japanese captured Shanghai in November, 1937. The Japanese were then able to move up the Yangtse River and lay siege to the Nationalist capital Nanking (now Nanjing).
Several facts should be pointed out. The details of General Short's three possible alerts were a matter of record in Washington. So Short's response specifying the sabotage alert was informing Marshall that he had bunched his planes and placed his ammunition where it was relatively inaccessible. Secretary Stimson, who was responsible'for sending the November 27th messages over Marshall's signature, saw Short's answer and did nothing about it. The truth would seem to be that the attention of all these Washington officials was concentrated on the Far East and the Philippines. They actually gave little thought to Pearl Harbor.
1. denying intelligence to Hawaii (HI) 2. on November 27 and later, misleading the commanders into thinking negotiations with Japan were continuing to prevent them from realizing the war was on 3. having false information sent to HI about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet.
Traditionalists believe that history has correctly recorded that the attack on Pearl Harbor happened because we were not properly prepared, ignored significant intelligence, misread other clues and, perhaps most of all, Americans couldn't really believe the Japanese would be so bold as to cross the Pacific and attack in Hawaii. The most convincing traditionalist interpretation of the attack are the two works of Gordon Prange: "At Dawn We Slept" (ISBN: 0140157344) and "December 7, 1941" (ISBN: 0446389978). Both are based on decades of extensive research Prange, and paint a picture that places the blame for the attack primarily upon the commanders in Hawaii.
Were Kimmel and Short actually unable to make any effective reconnaissance by air? Certainly they could have benefited from more—and more modern—planes. Yet Gordon Prange, in At Dawn We Slept, cited several occasions during war crises earlier in 1941, when both services instituted more extensive surveillance. He concluded, “Obviously, Kimmel and Short could go all out when they believed the situation justified; therefore, it is difficult to understand why they did not take similar action upon receipt of the war warning [of November 27, 1941].” Above all, Prange chided the commanders for failing to make any attempt to cover the northwest sector of the approach to Hawaii. He quoted the judgement of Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger that this area “was considered the most vital…because the prevailing winds were from the northeast, and enemy carriers could thus recover their planes while retiring from the Oahu area.” The northwest sector was also the most empty approach to Hawaii—and thus the one through which any attacking force would have the best chance to surprise the base.
Over the years, there has developed a "revisionist" group of historians who claimed FDR Knew in advance about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor and he did nothing to stop it. In this excellent book by Gordon Prange, this somewhat questionable viewpoint is thoroughly destroyed. One of the revisionists' claims is that the radio stations on the West Coast were able to track the Japanese fleet due to their radio signals. This is impossible, since the Japanese fleet NEVER broke radio silence, and, in fact, had their transmitters removed from thier radios all together. Mitsuo Fuchida, the pilot who led the attack, also said that "the force maintained the strictest radio silence throughout the cruise". Revisionists also believed, according to Prange, that if the Japanese task force would have been discovered, it would have turned back. Again, this is not true. The Japanese hoped to attain surprise, but if they were to have been discovered, they were prepared to fight all the way to Pearl Harbor to deliver their attack. What Prange attempts to achieve in this excellent book is who really was to blame? In this aspect, the War Department and the commanders, Kimmel and Short, are held responsible. Prange comes down hard on the War Department for failing to notify the commanders of the intercepted "bomb plot" message. This message, intercepted by "Magic", was transmitted to Japan by a Japanese spy. It broke Pearl Harbor into several sections, which, in effect, could be interpreted as a bombing grid. This information was not transmitted to Kimmel and Short, and could have proven invaluable. But the bulk of the blame appears to fall on Kimmel, Short, and the subordinate commanders. Kimmel and Short both grossly misinterpreted the "War Warning" message dated November 27, 1941, and sent to them by Washington. Short only alerted his troops against possible sabotage and maintained his training schedule. The War Department is also to blame here, because they failed to follow up to make sure Short understood the meaning of the message. Kimmel also failed to grasp the meaning of this message, and, unfortunately, communication between the army and navy was poor at best, so very little information was shared between the commands. One must also realize, and Prange makes excellent reference to this in the book, is that the Japanese placed tremendous amounts of time, thought, and training into this mission, and they must be credited with the success of the attack. America's belief of their huge superiority in both ships and personnel was totally destroyed. Prange also covers each of the resulting investigations fully and includes excellent testimony throughout the book. In summary, this is an excellent book about the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and does a good job of refuting the revisionists and acurately placing blame.
A second reaction, suppressed during the early part of the war but open and bitter after 1944, was to see criminal negligence and even treacherous conspiracy within the American Government. Strange bedfellows, united principally by hatred for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, advanced the proposition that the President had used American ships and lives as bait to tempt the Japanese into a war he wished to wage for a variety of nefarious reasons. Roosevelt allegedly knew the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor and when, and withheld this information from the local commanders in Hawaii in order to insure Japanese success. The conspiracy theorists included naval officers seeking to protect the reputation of their service and of their colleague Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, Commander of the United States Pacific Fleet; isolationists who believed the United States had no business fighting in Asia or Europe; haters of the British Empire, which was supposed to have benefited from Roosevelt's plot; and radical anti-Communists who saw Roosevelt bent on advancing the cause of world Communism. (How else explain his antipathy to such a staunch anti-Communist nation as Japan?)
A counterwave of historians in the early 1950's attacked the conspiracy theory as nonsense. Roosevelt, they said, did make mistakes, but he and his advisers were grappling in good faith with forces beyond American control. The defense of Roosevelt was implicitly an argument that, in a permanently dangerous world, the nation's security required that the President be trusted by a sophisticated public on guard against simplistic theories, especially those which claimed that our problems were caused by traitors within. As political passions that once flared around the name Roosevelt cooled after 1960, commentators on Pearl Harbor looked to the future. Roberta Wohlstetter's classic ''Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision'' (1962) explained how the American intelligence community, even though it was reading Japan's secret diplomatic radio traffic, was overwhelmed by too much data and lacked the manpower to separate real signals about Japan's intentions from irrelevant ''noise.'' Her purpose was to improve strategic intelligence.
• Although the United States had cracked top-secret Japanese codes several years earlier, "the fact is that code-breaking intelligence did not prevent and could not have prevented Pearl Harbor, because Japan never sent any messages to anybody saying anything like ‘We shall attack Pearl Harbor,’" writes military historian David Kahn in the autumn 1991 issue of Military History Quarterly. • "The [Japanese] Ambassador in Washington was never told of the plan," Kahn says, "Nor were other Japanese diplomats or consular officials. The ship of the strike force were never radioed any message mentioning Pearl Harbor. It was therefore impossible for cryptoanalysts to have discovered the plan. Despite the American code breakers, Japan kept her secret." • Actually, Washington had issued a warning to commanders at Pearl Harbor a few weeks earlier. On November 27, 1941, General George Marshall sent the following message: "Hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat CANNOT, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first over act. This policy should not, repeat NOT, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense." • But the commanders at Pearl Harbor were apparently negligent. The base should have at least been on alert, but the antiaircraft guns were unmanned and most people on the base were asleep when the attack came.