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Well of course current efforts to combat piracy off Somali have failed because the wrong approach is being taken. The right approach would be to implement a convoy with adequate air cover and escorts. Clearly who ever dreamed up the current strategy either never read about or understood the Battle of the Atlantic. I would have thought that the Battle of the Atlantic would have been compulsory reading for any future naval leaders.
As I have stated in the past I expect that the US and some of its allies will take a greater foothold in Africa with Somali or Sudan being the likely places. Although with the moronic left wing opposition to the War in Afghanistan which includes PRT teams the very thing you are talking about I don't see how a US return to Africa is politically viable any time soon.
So the convoy system remains the best option once the pirates cant hijack ships they will have to find other things to do on the shore. We all going to pay the price literally for Clinton being too chicken to get the job done in Somali.
LATE IN THE AFTERNOON of Sunday, Oct. 3, 1993, attack helicopters dropped about 120 elite American soldiers into a busy neighborhood in the heart of Mogadishu, Somalia. Their mission was to abduct several top lieutenants of Somalian warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid and return to base. It was supposed to take about an hour.
Instead, two of their high-tech UH-60 Blackhawk attack helicopters were shot down. The men were pinned down through a long and terrible night in a hostile city, fighting for their lives. When they emerged the following morning, 18 Americans were dead and 73 were wounded. One, helicopter pilot Michael Durant, had been carried off by an angry mob. He was still alive, held captive somewhere in the city.
The Somalian toll was far worse. Reliable witnesses in the U.S. military and in Mogadishu now place the count at nearly 500 dead - scores more than was estimated at the time - among more than a thousand casualties. Many were women and children. This was hardly what U.S. and United Nations officials envisioned when they intervened in Somalia in December 1992 to help avert widespread starvation.
Why fork out for mercenary's when the worlds navies and air forces can provide better protection at the expense of the tax payer?
Luckner, Müller and Co gained everybody respect because of there brilliant seamanship, tactical minds and there treatment of captured crews and there efforts to keep causalities to a minimal level. The pirates who hijack ships for ransom will never gain such respect.
The American public is rarely exposed to the realities of warfare. The Pentagon does not allow reporters to accompany soldiers directly into battle, a journalistic tradition that ended after Vietnam. What results is a sanitized picture of combat. The public knows only what the military chooses to portray, or what cameras are able to see from afar. Americans have little understanding of what awaits frightened young soldiers, or of their heroic and sometimes savage attempts to save themselves and their fellow soldiers.
Americans recoiled at the images of soldiers' corpses being dragged through the streets, but they had no inkling of the searing 15-hour battle that produced their deaths. There has never been a detailed public accounting. Most of the Pentagon records documenting the firefight remain classified, and most of the soldiers who fought are in special forces, generally off-limits to reporters.
The assault was launched into the most dangerous part of Mogadishu in daylight, even though the Ranger and Delta forces were trained and equipped primarily to work in darkness - where their night-vision devices can afford a decisive advantage. Commanders who thought it unlikely that Somalis could shoot down helicopters saw five shot down (three limped back to base before crash-landing). Ground rescue convoys were blocked for hours by barricades and ambushes - leaving at least five U.S. soldiers to die awaiting rescue, including two Delta sergeants who were posthumously awarded Medals of Honor.
The American soldiers were so confident of a quick victory that they neglected to take night-vision devices and water, both sorely needed later. Carefully defined rules of engagement, calling for soldiers to fire only on Somalis who aimed weapons at them, were quickly discarded in the heat of the fight. Most soldiers interviewed said that through most of the fight they fired on crowds and eventually at anyone and anything they saw.
Animosity between the elite Delta units and the Ranger infantry forces effectively created two separate ground-force commanders, who for at least part of the battle were no longer speaking to each other. Delta commandos took accidental fire on several occasions from the younger Rangers. Poor coordination between commanders in the air and a ground convoy sent vehicles meandering through a maelstrom of fire, resulting in the deaths of five soldiers and one Somalian prisoner.
In strictly military terms, Mogadishu was a success. The targets of that day's raid - two obscure clan leaders named Omar Salad and Mohamed Hassan Awale - were apprehended.
But the awful price of those arrests came as a shock to a young president, who felt as misled as John F. Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs. It led to the resignation of Defense Secretary Les Aspin and destroyed the career of Gen. Garrison, who in a handwritten letter to Clinton accepted full responsibility. It aborted a hopeful and unprecedented United Nations effort to salvage an impoverished and hungry nation lost in anarchy and civil war.
Soldiers cannot concern themselves with the decisions that bring them to a fight. They trust their leaders not to risk their lives for too little. Once the battle is joined, they fight to survive, to kill before they are killed. The story of a battle is timeless. It is about the same things whether in Troy or Gettysburg, Normandy or the Ia Drang. It is about soldiers, most of them young, trapped in a fight to the death. The extreme and terrible nature of war touches something essential about being human, and soldiers do not always like what they learn.
For those who survive, the battle lives on in their memories and nightmares and in the dull ache of old wounds long after the reasons for it have been forgotten. Yet what happened to these men in Mogadishu comes alive every time the United States considers sending young soldiers to serve American policy in remote and dangerous corners of the world. By Mark Bowden, November 16, 1997
Originally posted by donwhite
When the only tool in your box is a hammer, you tend to think everything you see is a nail.
It is not an impossible feat to accomplish. Certainly there is inherent risk, however I have full confidence in our SOF. More importantly I don't prescribe to the school of though that would compel some to try and negotiate their way out of a disease.
Will he nip it in the bud and go after those responsible with no mercy or will he cower and bow just because he does not want to offend anyone?
People can say what they can say what they want about Palin but something tells me she would livid over this incident and react accordingly.
Originally posted by The Godfather of Conspira
The US doesn't want to touch Somalia with a 10ft pole.
Top military brass do no want a repeat of Operation Gothic Serpent in 1993.
Somalia is going to remain a security problem in the region a convoy system reduces the problem somewhat. Critics bemoan the lack of control the Afghan government has over Afghanistan well the situation in Somalia is worse and there is no chance of it getting any better.
Luckner and Muller were German commerce raider captains during WW1 . If you want an honest look at the US military and the Vietnam war in particular then read David Hackworth About Face it is the sort of thing that should be required reading at military academy's.