Turkish plane crashes at Amsterdam airport (25/02/09 ,at least 9 people killed )

reply to post by Harlequin


Interesting find, Harlequin.

However (and this should not be revealing any secrets) once normal electrical power is lost, and I think two engines in a heap on the ground amount to no electricity, the solenoid in the door latch relaxes.

Given the likely force of the impact, and the apparent compromise of the Flight Deck portion of the fuselage, one might assume that the FD Door might have jammed, in any case. Pure supposition, of course.

Questions to be raised, and they WILL be interesting answers, is why did they get too slow? With another pair of eyes on the JS??

Some have suggested they may have been training....this is normal, after fully completing the Ground School and Simulator training, the next step is known as IOE, or 'Initial Operating Experience'. This is conducted on 'live' regularly scheduled flights, by Captains specially trained as a 'Check Airman'.

The JS rider may have been another trainee, or a more senior Check Airman observing the 'other' Check Airman's performance. (Or, a pilot just 'hitching' a ride.)

Either way, whenever I had a JS rider, they were welcomed as a fellow pilot, and, as I said, another pair of eyes....and encouraged to speak up if they something not quite right.

reply to post by solidshot

Wondering what happened to the pilots that were killed? the area of the cockpit that they were sat in looked fairly intact and yet they were killed

One early report was that the overhead systems panel detached and killed two instantly from head injuries. One was still alive for 40 minutes but trapped inside the cockpit until he succumbed.

Another claim is that the nose gear was driven up through the cockpit floor. The aircraft hit the ground at about stall speed tail down and after the tail connected the nose whiplashed downwards

Fuel exhaustion makes no sense because no fuel emergency was declaredand in most fuel exhaustion situations one engine dies before the other. It was a normal approach and pilots were not alarmed. What overcame them was sudden.

Wake turbulence from a Northwest 757 which landed just before hand had nothing to do with it because wake turbulence does not explain why the engines stopped before impact.

My belief is that it was a fail soft electrical problem which cut thrust to engines.

reply to post by sy.gunson


sy, I'm still trying to wrap my head around your theory.

In the landing config, on the ILS.....they're still going to be at about 60-70% N1.

AND, if the AD I mentioned pages ago is still in effect, there was still the 1,000 lbs or so in the center tank, could have been used in an emergency.

You know as well as I do, if you have an intact turning engine, fuel/air and ignition/heat, you have thrust!!

Suck, Squeeze, Burn, Blow.

Works for jet engines, works for any internal combustion engine, for that matter....

EDIT....oh, sy....yeah, fuel exhaustion not likely. Agree. Something else, and that is why it's so puzzling.....a modern airplane, best equipment, six eyes in the cockpit (Flight Deck) and we get a CFIT accident????
While ON the ILS, in the landing config???

(shaking head, muttering to myself...)

AND, the possible stall??? Was there stick-shaker activation? Was FMS mis-management the reason? (seems unlikely, given the expertise that must have included all three pilots...)

Truly puzzling.......










[edit on 3/1/0909 by weedwhacker]

EDIT....oh, sy....yeah, fuel exhaustion not likely. Agree. Something else, and that is why it's so puzzling.....a modern airplane, best equipment, six eyes in the cockpit (Flight Deck) and we get a CFIT accident????
While ON the ILS, in the landing config???

Mutter all you like, there was fuel in the tanks and you can't explain why engines spooled down.

You have nothing constructive to add... Just your usual negativity

POST SCRIPT:

By the way, what ILS ?
It was a visual landing. Might pay to get your facts right aswell.



[edit on 1-3-2009 by sy.gunson]

reply to post by sy.gunson


sy, I was agreeing with you!!! Why so disagreeable?

I had heard conflicting reports about the weather....thought I'd heard visibility was low....but, regardless, if you're vectored for an approach, you still tune the ILS, even if it's CAVU! At least, if there's an ILS, you use it, regardless....you're on an INSTRUMENT FLIGHT PLAN!

Perhaps my mistake is in applying US Airman Standards....but, ANY ICAO Standard at least meets US Standards, right?

EDIT....and, sy....my ("Usual negativity"???) That one hurt....deeply.

I would think anyone of reasonable mind would be able to read my post and see how troubled I am, because I cannot come up with a reasonable explanation, based on what we know so far. AND, I would care not to speculate further. We wait for the results of the investigation.....







[edit on 3/1/0909 by weedwhacker]

Originally posted by C0bzz
reply to post by solidshot

 

Usually we must lose a few hundred lives before the faa starts to consider tougher regulations. Thats quite unfortunate!

Provide examples. Modern ones. Also, provide examples of how in the best of times, pilot training is poor as is maintainence.

You want me to recite every accident over the past 50 years and why each happened? Give me a break.....

Perhaps a fuel guage malfunctioned giving the pilots a bad reading?

Pilots should get a load sheet at the start of every flight, so they know how much fuel has been loaded. If there was a malfuction there would be a mismatch.


Sometimes a guage(s) malfunction long after a plane takes off.

Any captain that let his/hers company push them to upload less than a safe amount of fuel for a given trip is in error, and probably shouldn't be on the flightdeck of any commercial airliner at all.

MORE than that, any suggestion that airline policy is to upload less than safe amount of fuel is ignorant, at best.

What constitutes a safe amount of fuel can be interpretated a bit differently by each airline.

stronger seats with deployable airbags for each and every passenger;

In the brace position, airbags are not going to do a whole lot. (Except for kil the passenger).

If the airbags deploy, passengers would not brace. Any other silly questions you want me to answer?

[edit on 3-3-2009 by EarthCitizen07]

Don't have a link yet but the BBC has just started to flash up that an altimeter is thought to have been partly responsible for the crash (will add a link when it becomes available)

link from sky news here SKY NEWS

A Turkish Airlines crash that killed nine people was caused in part by a faulty altimeter, investigators have said.

[edit on 4-3-2009 by solidshot]

Originally posted by solidshot
Don't have a link yet but the BBC has just started to flash up that an altimeter is thought to have been partly responsible for the crash (will add a link when it becomes available)

Yes the Dutch newspapers speak of a broken altimeter on the left panel. The plane was on autopilot during the landing and because the left altimeter displayed -8 feet the plane automaticly cut off the engines. The pilots responded after 6 seconds but that was to late to save the airplane.

reply to post by Fastwalker81


OK, let's be sure, firstly we understand the difference between the AutoPilot and the AutoThrottles. Each system can be operated independently of the other, although A/T only is not recommended.

Secondly, the A/T will only (or, SHOULD only) enter the 'retard' mode IF the pilots had previously programmed the AutoFlight system to the 'AutoLand' mode. In the US we call that 'Category 3', or CATIII

AutoLand procedures are very regimented, therefore they are sometimes practiced so that all of the procedure and call-outs remain fresh in pilots' minds.

It is incredibly difficult for me to imagine how three experienced pilots would NOT have noticed the A/T retarding to flight idle, and reacting faster. The flying pilot's hand should ALWAYS be 'guarding' the throttles on an approach....if they suddenly do something you don't expect, you turn 'em off (button right under your thumb).

Finally, IF there had been a problem with the RA, then they should not have engaged the AutoLand....or, at least, should have discontinued at the first indication of an instrument anomaly.

www.flightglobal.com...

Investigators of the Turkish Boeing 737-800 approach crash at Amsterdam have found that a sudden reduction in engine thrust coincided with a step-change in the reading from one of the aircraft's two radio altimeters.

The Dutch Safety Board, in preliminary findings released today, adds that a similar problem had occurred twice during landing in the course of eight previous flights contained on the 737's flight recorders.

and boeing allready jumping to deflect blame on faulty parts:

Boeing has highlighted to 737 operators the symptoms of a malfunctioning radio altimeter, after investigations into the Turkish Airlines approach crash at Amsterdam found evidence that a faulty altimeter prompted the autothrottle to reduce thrust.

The airframer points out that such symptoms might warrant crew intervention and it is reiterating the importance of monitoring flight instruments

Originally posted by EarthCitizen07

stronger seats with deployable airbags for each and every passenger;

In the brace position, airbags are not going to do a whole lot. (Except for kil the passenger).

If the airbags deploy, passengers would not brace. Any other silly questions you want me to answer?

Airbags are used in cars to slow a passenger safely where the deceleration is mostly instantaneous. Such deceleration in an air crash is likely to be fatal regardless of whether there are airbags or not. The brace position seems (to me, at least, I think I'm right in interpreting it like this) to be a position to withstand longer lasting acceleration rather than a high but brief one, which is the type you get in survivable air accidents.

Oh, and the airbag works entirely from the front. Air accidents are more interesting, there are 3 dimensions of motion at work, rather than 1 or 2.

Originally posted by weedwhacker
It is incredibly difficult for me to imagine how three experienced pilots would NOT have noticed the A/T retarding to flight idle, and reacting faster. The flying pilot's hand should ALWAYS be 'guarding' the throttles on an approach....if they suddenly do something you don't expect, you turn 'em off (button right under your thumb).

The Dutch newspaper now states the pilots reacted after 100 seconds. They also state the inexperienced co-pilot who was recieving training on this aircraft type was at the controls until moments before the crash when the captain took over.

BBC says the following.

Dutch Safety Board chairman Pieter van Vollenhoven said the plane was landing on automatic pilot and the problem with the altimeter led to a loss of speed. He said the aeroplane had twice before reported problems with its altimeter.

The plane was on autopilot and its systems believed the plane was already touching down, he said. The automatic throttle controlling the two engines was closed and they powered down. This led to the plane losing speed, and stalling.

Mr Van Vollenhoven said that a conversation recorded between the captain and two first officers in the cockpit showed they had noticed the faulty altimeter but did not consider it to be a problem, the Associated Press reported.

"The crew initially did not react to these events, he said, but when a warning system sounded, they tried to restart the engines.

"But the plane was too low at 150m. As a consequence the plane crashed 1km before the runway," said Mr Van Vollenhoven.

news.bbc.co.uk...

So it appearst the pilots reacted to late and the plane stalled and fell out of the air. Futher investigation into this will hopefully clear more things up.

reply to post by Fastwalker81


yes, Fastwalker....

When conducting CATIII approaches, whether real or practice, the F/O flies the approach, while the Captain monitors.

To conduct an AutoLand, the second A/P has to be engaged, BY the pilots, but only after the LOC and GS have captured, and within between 2500 and 3000 feet RA. (My memory may be vague, but procedurally that is how we were trained.)

For simplicity's sake, the Airport Elevation is very near Sea Level, in Amsterdam....but we're not discussing the barometric Altimeters, we're discussing the RA...especially, the Captain's RA.

There is a 'status' indicator, on each pilots's instrument panel, to indicate exactly what 'status' the AutoFlight System is in.

WHEN we conduct an ILS, whether CATI, CATII or CATIII (a/b) we set altimeter 'bugs' as reminders of critical 'points'in the approach.

WHEN in the 'AUTOLAND' mode, there are verbal announcements....unless that may vary by company and owner....when the RA reads 100, it says 'One hundred'....and fifty, thity, twenty, ten as appropriate.

In Airbus models, is also annouces 'retard, retard' is a slight french accent.

In Boeings, a light annunciates to denote the 'retarding' of the throttles during an AutoLand.

Procedurally, in CATII and CATIII approaches, the F/O flies, the Captain is responsible for assuming authority at a certain point. CATII, you are usually allowed to 100 feet RA....AND, if the Captain has NOT assumed authority by stating 'I HAVE THE AIRCRAFT' because he has seen ample visual indications to proceed, then the F/O initiates the go-around...

IF, once the Captain has assumed control from the F/O, and and he loses sight of the approach lights, or runway lights, then HE iniaties the go-around.....

In CATIII....approaching 100 feet RA....the Captain ALWAYS takes responsiblility...."I HAVE THE AIRCRAFT"....and decides whether to continue below 50 feet, or go-around.

BOTH pilots are expected to moniter the instruments, and call out immediately if there's a problem, which is an immediate missed-approach.

UNLESS....you can see the Runway.....because CATII infers visibilties of about 1200 feet forward.....CATIII is infering, well....300 feet vis, or less, depends on the Airport, and the Runway..... Essentially, if you can see tthe approach lights, the Runway lights and the centerline lights, you can AutoLand. ANY of those factors not visible, or you feel unsafe, then you go-around...you miss the approach.

Because, altitude is your friend....the ground is the enemy!

NOW....with that said.....the Captains's RA is the primary source for the AutoFlight System to refer to when in the AutoLand Mode.

IF the airplane's AutoFlight system thought it was about to touchdown, based on the Captain's RA.....then the A/T would retard to flight idle (the rear-most stops) and the A/P would pitch up a bit....except!!!!

The RA should compute the descent....it MUST reach 100, then 50, then 30, then 20....at which point the pitch would begin...then 10, more pitch up, the A/T would begin to retard.....at touchdown, the spoilers deploy (because they have been 'armed' by the pilots) and also, the AutoBrakes engage (because they have been selected by the Pilots...)

Regardless!!! At ANY point in this scenario, the pilots could disengage all automation and fly the airplane!!! AND successfully land!

Something else was distracting.......


Of course, the Captains hand is there, as he has to either reject the landing, or let it happen...and then deploy the thrust reversers.....

You want me to recite every accident over the past 50 years and why each happened? Give me a break.....

No - that's like saying every car crash in the past 50 years is based on poor design and poor training. That doesn't hold true - even if we increased driver training intensity accidents and force everyone to drive Volvo's, there will still be crashes, and deaths. And yes, new safety measures are implemented after crashes, often in the form of airworthiness directives - however, the problem is that the problems prior to the accident are not found. An example is the Boeing 737 PTU unit. Admittedly, this does not hold true in all circumstances, such as Alaska 262...

Hopefully in new aircraft, if there is ANY mismatch between instruments, the master caution lights up and the "XXXX MISMATCH" is displayed on the ECAM / EICAS. I think the best way to increase airliner safety is through things that are already happening; new hydraulic technology, new electric technology, new avionic technology; and all of this is designed to be far more reliable than any previous system is.

Sometimes a guage(s) malfunction long after a plane takes off.

Yep. Gauges should be monitored long after take off too.

What constitutes a safe amount of fuel can be interpretated a bit differently by each airline.

In terms of airline fuel, a 'safe' amount of fuel is non-negotiable.

www.casa.gov.au...

It's really clear.

The Flight Management Computer constantly computes the amount of fuel at each waypoint, and at the destination airport. If that changes drastically for no reason, then there is a problem. Additionally, the pilots usually manually enter in the amount of fuel in the tanks; thus any gauge indication is pretty much redundant.

If the airbags deploy, passengers would not brace.

If the passengers adopt the brace position there is no need for airbags to stop life threatening whip-lash. The amount of accidents where passengers for whatever reason don't adopt this are very small.

[edit on 5/3/2009 by C0bzz]

reply to post by C0bzz


C0bzz....why bother, really?

Airbags in the seat-backs...added weight. 'Dropping' an engine just because it may fail, on over-water flights? Well....may sound good AT FIRST!!!! But is shiite in actual practice....CG changes, the cost of the engine replacement....not to mention that ONE dead engine is not such an impediment to continued safe flight!!!!

Besides.....there are certain criteria for twin-engined long haul flights, and more than two engined long-haul flights.

Twin jets, such as the A-330, B-757, B-767, B-787 (not yet in production) or even certain B-737-800 that are certified.....as ETOPS....which is, Extended Two-engine Over-Water OPerations...."ETOPS".

From Istanbul to Amsterdam, 'ETOPS' is not applicicible.....I just wanted to suggest that MAYBE the Turkish pilots, who only flew within the confines of Europe, were not as well trained as others who were more familiar with broader realms.....

AND....hate to contemplate this.....the Automation of their Airplane was not thoroughly understood.

Too soon to tell....but....insufficient knowledge, and understanding of the systems COULD have contributed.

Also, fatigue. History of each pilots' past prior to this flight will out 'fatigue'....

EDIT....just looked it up....time from Istanbul to AMS is about 3+45

This is the same as from Chicago to LAX, with headwinds.

Easy for a B737-800

Based on time of day, I would factor out fatigue....since it was a Turkish Airline, and it originated in Istanbul....I'd assume that either the pilots lived there, or drove in before the the flight....well, fatigue is now a possible factor....waiting for the toxicology reports, if any...

We don't yet know if they started that day....or days prior....and just transited Istanbul in the midst of a trip, after possibly being sleep deprived two days prior....these facts will come out.

Just because your flight comes out of a 'Hub'....you can't infer that they were well-rested.

So, fatigue is back in play.....because, the only other explanatiions would be, "poor training"....and I think the Turkish Pilot's Union would balk at that....or....and this is the kicker....that 'chain of events' that sometimes bites pilots in the butt....except, to bite all THREE pilots's butts......????



[edit on 3/5/0909 by weedwhacker]