General Welch. We have specific recommendations for
addressing each of those three and I'll be pleased to address
those during questions. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
There are only a few of us here, so we should have some
time. Let's try 6 minutes so we make sure we get in at least
one round before the first vote occurs in the Senate.
General, I'm a little taken aback by your statement that
there was never a safety issue and they were always under the
control of American pilots. Did the pilots know they had
nuclear weapons on board?
General Darnell. Sir, they did not.
Chairman Levin. So, when you say they were under the
control of the pilots, not knowing that you have nuclear
weapons on board makes a difference, doesn't it?
General Darnell. Yes, sir, it does. The intent behind that
statement is to make it clear that they never migrated off the
aircraft anywhere else.
Chairman Levin. In terms of safety, when nuclear weapons
are on a plane and those planes are on a flight line, are there
special precautions taken?
General Darnell. Yes, sir, it's increased security on the
flight line with security forces.
Chairman Levin. Was that increased security present here?
General Darnell. At Minot it was not, sir.
Chairman Levin. It was not. Why do we have increased
security when we have nuclear weapons on a plane on a flight
line? Why do we provide that additional security?
General Darnell. To ensure security of the weapon itself,
because of the gravity of, obviously, anyone taking control of
the weapon that should not have it.
Chairman Levin. The absence of that security at Minot
represents a significant shortfall, does it not?
General Darnell. It did in this case, sir, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, in terms of what happened here and the
failures that occurred, let's go through very quickly what
happened here: and stop me at any point here if what I'm saying
is not accurate. The mistake was putting a pylon, which has six
cruise missiles on it--and these cruise missiles were not
supposed to have nuclear weapons loaded in them; they were
supposed to have dummies, is that correct?
General Darnell. That's correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. So the pylon that was loaded in error had
nuclear weapons on it and these were the checks that failed us,
these were the actions that were supposed to be taken that
weren't taken. First, at Minot the payload checks were not
performed by the handling team. Second, there was a deputy
maintenance chief at Minot who noted the discrepancy and he
never reported back to his supervisor that discrepancy between
the pylon that was supposed to be on and the number of that
pylon and the one that was on there. So the second failure was
the deputy who noted the discrepancy not reporting it back to
his supervisor.
Then the deputy did not request verification of the
payload. The tow driver at Minot, who's supposed to perform
payload checks, did not do so. The munitions scheduling officer
or office at Minot failed to verify the status of the pylon as
required prior to giving permission to move the pylon. The air
crew is supposed to verify the missile status and the payload
on all missiles, and they did not do so. The aircraft commander
did not verify that each of the missiles had been checked and
did not, as required, make an entry in his pre-flight log.
Now, so far am I on target?
General Darnell. Senator Levin, I think that's pretty
accurate.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, that's a lot of mistakes, a lot
of checks and balances here that are supposed to work. None of
those worked in this case. I think you folks in the Air Force
would be the first to acknowledge the severity of not knowing
that you're dealing with nuclear weapons and not taking the
appropriate steps to secure them.

Originally posted by MischeviousElf
reply to post by Nichiren

---

Would you ask who could put out the fire on your scroll?

YOU know what I mean, or who orders, creates and moves the scroll?

It is no good Knowing where a Diamond comes from unless you know who dug it up, to wear a diamond ring is not the same as the asking the jeweller what its like to make it?

Everyone else will probably be a bit lost about this, don't know poster, just using analogies I am sure he can understand, unless its just something he heard and took on as his own.

To the person you ask the question to, they state they are a fireman, have very few posts since joining in march... Firemen never touch these devices, handle them or sign them of in any way shape or form, unless of course something goes wrong, but then they would pull out till Nest got there.

Kind Regards,

Elf.

Originally posted by lingk007
reply to post by bpg131313

---

I find it kind of scary that you would in fact brush away all these deaths as "coincidental". That in my opinion borders on denial. I mean, what are the odds of all these guys who just happened to be involved in these nuclear incidents turning up dead suddenly ?? Sure, you can make an excuse for each of thier deaths, but come on...........it's a well known fact that governments are experts in the field of "accidental deaths". These deaths are about as "coincidental" as the United States having a "drill" of terrorists attacking us in airplanes on the EXACT same day that the terrorists decided to do JUST THAT !! Time to wake-up and smell the coffee my friends.

Chairman Levin. So the pylon that was loaded in error had
nuclear weapons on it and these were the checks that failed us,
these were the actions that were supposed to be taken that
weren't taken. First, at Minot the payload checks were not
performed by the handling team. Second, there was a deputy
maintenance chief at Minot who noted the discrepancy and he
never reported back to his supervisor that discrepancy between
the pylon that was supposed to be on and the number of that
pylon and the one that was on there. So the second failure was
the deputy who noted the discrepancy not reporting it back to
his supervisor.
Then the deputy did not request verification of the
payload. The tow driver at Minot, who's supposed to perform
payload checks, did not do so. The munitions scheduling officer
or office at Minot failed to verify the status of the pylon as
required prior to giving permission to move the pylon. The air
crew is supposed to verify the missile status and the payload
on all missiles, and they did not do so. The aircraft commander
did not verify that each of the missiles had been checked and
did not, as required, make an entry in his pre-flight log.
Now, so far am I on target?
General Darnell. Senator Levin, I think that's pretty
accurate.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, that's a lot of mistakes, a lot
of checks and balances here that are supposed to work. None of
those worked in this case. I think you folks in the Air Force
would be the first to acknowledge the severity of not knowing
that you're dealing with nuclear weapons and not taking the
appropriate steps to secure them.