reply to post by KilgoreTrout
Excellent post carslake, you spoil us! My knowledge of Barbarossa is more in terms of secret diplomacy and the various intelligence operations, you
seem to have a very good grasp of the tactics involved, can I pick your brains a little?
Given the fact that prior to the commencement of Barbarossa Stalin was happily supplying Germany with all the oil that she needed, how critical were
those supplies to the German war effort, let alone the Soviets?
thanks KT.
My understanding is sketchy, once Romania was secured as a member of the Axis then the Soviet oil was in my opinion not critical to the German war
economy, as the fighting intensified during the war the industrial output could never be increased to meet the demand without the possession of major
oilfields, if you look at German military strategy in 1942 it shifted from the military and political and it was on the whole concerned with the
economic situation.
Successful operations in North Africa and the Trans-Caucus became imperative. The Soviet war economy would have crashed eventually without the Baku
oilfield. It shows in that the capacity for German industrial output was always greater than the Soviet Union, the constant struggle for material
resources prevented Germany from out producing the Allies.
I have studied Barbarrossa to some extent, and strategically I can’t find a legitimate reason why it failed, up until the point that it did. Hitler
seemingly did know what he was doing and seemed, contrary to popular opinion, in the early days at least, attuned to his Generals. Where was the
critical error, in your opinion? Did von Mannstein’s relief operation ever have any chance at success?
Where to begin, in one sentence inefficient command and decision making body leading to lack of feasibility, contingency, dynamism, realism, vision,
planning...... competing objectives with no singular strategy(ies) on how to defeat the Soviet Union.
The same errors all the way down the line from the onset of Barbarrosa to operations Fall Blau and Edelweiss, culminating in Zitadelle.
The schism began before Operation Typhoon when leading Generals and Hitler reached an impasse over what to do after the encirclement of Budenny at
Kiev, there was no depth of planning no clearly defined strategy on how to defeat the Soviet Union it was a death ride they just crashed headlong into
Russia.
I don't think Mannstein cared about getting shot for disobeying an order and his decision making on the tactical and the local strategic level was
amongst the best.
Well after Stalingrad he made an attempt to ingratiate himself with Mannstein and Guderian, they conveyed to Hitler the situation and what should be
done to reverse the recent disasters for the Axis. From what I can make out Guderian was made Inspector General of Armoured Forces and von Mannstein
became the effective commander of the Army groups in southern Russia. It ended up, too little too late for the the Axis, Guderian retired in disgust
being unable to make effective progress and von Mannstein struggled on under resourced for what was asked of him.
The relief operation Operation Wintergewitter was feasible and should have been successful, however the default unit with the strength to mount the
relief operation the 1st Panzer Army which was still in the Caucus. The 4th Panzer Army a closer with nearly equal combat efficiency despite losses
was holding open the gap at Rostov for the German forces in the Caucus. The relief operation was delayed for 2 weeks it should have gone in at the
beginning of December however it started on the 19th, I wish I had the time to go into the myriad of failures and opportunities lost that led to it
been unsuccessful.
Do you know if the Soviets were supplying Germany with those minerals as well as oil prior to the invasion? If so, the Germans really were shooting
themselves in the foot weren’t they?
Yes they were supplying them I have no information on the actual quantity I know they were stockpiling the exports from the Soviets, they were
desperate to get possession of economic targets in the east Ukraine(hard metals).
In the long term it was inevitable for Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union to go to war. The Soviets had the raw materials and manpower and a long term
plan to spread their control by any means into the neighbouring countries.
My date for World War 2 breaking out is the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict May '39 Khalkhyn Gol, Mongolia. It can always be said that Nazi Germany
was born out of a reaction to the Soviet Union, the leadership of both countries recognised the need for war.
My opinion is the Soviets laid the ground by demonstrating their intent of forcing new order on the west by overt or covert means, the comintern was a
declaration of war and it was received as such.
As I recall, the Soviets main strategy involved a almost incessant supply of cannon fodder, they didn’t have any great technical advantage, just a
‘disposable force’ of seemingly unending supply.
It was a battle of attrition on the whole the Axis never had the manpower to get involved in prolonged struggle with the Soviet Union both sides knew
the longer the war went on the probability of a Soviet victory increased.
More often than not the Soviets attacked on poor terrain using the same frontal tactics with composition and strength given away by signals intercept.
The FHO never had to break Soviet battle field cyphers they just analysed the growth in signals traffic as the forces mustered behind the lines
preparing for the impending attack.
When they made operational errors they failed to learn from those mistakes and this shows all the way through the command structure, the pre-war purge
of the Red Army officer corps and the ensuing lack of talent and experience crippled their efficiency. Gripped by fear they had no flexibility to
overcome tactical problems that confronted them.
I can't be bothered to look up the exact figure but off the top of my head 18 million combat casualties for both combatants is staggering,
fascinating and also sickening at the same time.
