posted on Sep, 21 2008 @ 07:31 PM
reply to post by infinityoreilly
Hamza al-Ghamdi [another hijacker) purchased Ahmed's ticket online for United Airlines Flight 175 on August 29 or August 30, after buying his own. He
listed a Mail Boxes Etc. address for Ahmed.
Hamza and Ahmed al-Ghamdi stayed at the Charles Hotel in Cambridge, Massachusetts.( i knew the General Manager there at the time) On September 8th
they checked out of the hotel, and moved into the Days Hotel on Soldiers Field Road in Brighton, Mass. where they remained up until the attacks.
Al-Ghamdi showed his Virginia ID Card as identification, and boarded Flight 175 where he sat the furthest back of the hijackers, in seat 9D, helped to
Here is more information, sort of a time line:
2nd August 2001: ID cards
* al-Ghamdi obtains Virginia ID card #A69600380. (the same one used at check in prior to boarding flight 175)
4th September 2001: Buys tickets for travel to Boston
* Hamza al-Ghamdi purchased one-way tickets at Liberty Travel in cash ($192) on AirTran flt 188/284 from Ft. Lauderdale to Boston on 9/7/01 for
himself and Ahmed al-Ghamdi.
11th September 2001: Boarding United Airlines Flight 175
* An individual in room 241 at the Days Hotel called the front desk to request a taxi to Logan Intl Airport. Hamza al-Ghamdi then checked out at
5:52, taking a taxi to the airport at 6:25. They reached the UAL terminal at 6:45.
* Hamza and Ahmed al-Ghamdi checked in for UAL Flight 175 at Logan Intl Airport.
See UAL letter,“Flight 175—11Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History,” July 11, 2002. Customer service representative Gail Jawahir recalled
that her encounter with the Ghamdis occurred at “shortly before 7 A.M.,” and when shown photos of the hijackers, she indicated that Mohand al
Shehri resembled one of the two she checked in (suggesting they were Banihammad and Shehri). However, she also recalled that the men had the same last
name and had assigned seats on row 9 (i.e., the Ghamdis), and that account has been adopted here. In either case, she almost certainly was dealing
with one set of the Flight 175 hijackers. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Gail Jawahir, Sept. 21, 2001; Sept. 28, 2001. Even had the
hijackers been unable to understand and answer the two standard security questions,the only consequence would have been the screening of their
carry-on and checked bags for explosives. See FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001, p. 76.
Footnote 5 to Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report