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posted on Dec, 28 2002 @ 07:24 PM
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When Big Brother turns us into mindless zombies in 2004,will you wear an aluminum helmet(to stop mind control)?I'm dead serious.




posted on Dec, 28 2002 @ 08:13 PM
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If it's the latest fashion trend...Of course I will


Why 2004 though? I didn't know about any set date's... Hell I don't even know much about NWO



posted on Dec, 28 2002 @ 08:32 PM
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I know,I know.I'm a geek...



posted on Jan, 6 2003 @ 06:17 PM
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if the mind control makes me act better with girls maybe i settle. But aluminum??
come on, if they do mind control you think they do it simple as that. It would be huge areas where they can't "control" people then. Why not use a chip in their head. Insertion on the birth that controls on it's own. Perhaps looking for updates when it can connect. But lol.. some of you are crasy.



posted on Jan, 21 2003 @ 11:01 AM
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I just thought of something.What if the government put nanobots in the immunizations?



posted on Feb, 7 2003 @ 01:38 PM
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U.S.DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FRUS, Special Volume,
Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,
1945-1950
Office of the Historian


Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State


Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment


(This is not an official statement of policy by the Department of State;
it is intended only as a guide to the contents of the volume.)

Since 1861, the Department of State's documentary series Foreign
Relations of the United States has constituted the official record of
the foreign policy and diplomacy of the United States. Historians in
the Office of the Historian collect, arrange, and annotate the principal
documents comprising the record of American foreign policy. The
standards for the preparation of the series and the general deadlines
for its publication are established by the Foreign Relations of the
United States statute of October 28, 1991. (22 USC 4351, et seq.)
Volumes in the Foreign Relations series are published when all the
necessary editing, declassification, and printing steps have been
completed.


In preparing this volume, the editors collected documents that were
rather unique by Foreign Relations standards. Instead of diplomatic
correspondence documenting the formulation and implementation of foreign
policy issues, they searched for documents on high-level governmental
plans, discussions, administrative decisions, and managerial actions
that established the institutions and procedures for the coordination of
intelligence collection and analysis and covert action. During their
search the editors consulted research in a wide variety of archives.
The largest group of records came from the Central Intelligence Agency.
Many documents are also drawn from the Department of State's centralized
indexed files and lot (office) files. In addition, the editors made
extensive use of the Presidential and other papers at the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, and the Harry S. Truman
Library in Independence, Missouri. Finally, they conducted research in
the records of the Bureau of the Budget, Department of War, Department
of the Navy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council.


Most of the documents were originally classified. The Historical
Documents Review Division of the Department of State, in concert with
the appropriate offices of other agencies and foreign governments,
carried out their declassification.

The following is a summary of discussions and decisions documented in
the volume. Parenthetical citations are to numbered documents in the text.


SUMMARY

Introduction and Overview

At the close of World War II, U.S. policymakers began to explore the
option of developing a permanent foreign intelligence system in
peacetime that would continue the intelligence functions performed by
the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the armed forces, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). After some legislation, much
bureaucratic wrangling, and awkward administrative arrangements, the
creation of the Central Intelligence Agency was the ultimate result.

In addition to an extensive documentary history of the early CIA, this
volume presents a full record of its immediate predecessor, the Central
Intelligence Group (CIG), and the other government departments and
agencies that were active in the creation of the new intelligence
program during the Truman administration. The 435 documents in the
printed volume and the approximately 460 documents in the microfiche
supplement complement the recent CIA documentary publication, CIA Cold
War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman (1994). Emergence of the
Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, makes available a much larger
collection of documents, including many more CIA records. The CIA
History Staff provided essential assistance to this project. Documents
were also obtained from the retired records of various governmental
departments at the National Archives and Records Administration as well
as the collections at the Department of State, the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, and the Harry S. Truman Library.

The documents in Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment are
arranged topically in nine chapters. Among the early developments
recorded in the volume are: 1) the dissolution of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), 2) conflicts between the Bureau of the Budget
(BOB), the Department of State, the FBI, and the military concerning
postwar intelligence, 3) the emergence of the armed forces' leadership
on the issue, 4) the dispute between the Department of State and the
military services, and 5) the end of the impasse culminating in Truman's
establishment of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and the
successor CIG.

Documents, including internal CIA materials not previously open to the
public, also cover the proposals and actions of the early Directors of
Central Intelligence. Further, issues such as the Department of State's
efforts to create a national intelligence organization, the transition
of the War Department's Strategic Services Unit, which had sought to
preserve the OSS's clandestine role, to the Office of Special Operations
of the CIG, the passage of the National Security Act, which established
the CIA, the uses and purposes of psychological warfare, and the role of
the National Security Council in intelligence policy are all addressed
in this volume.

The emphasis throughout the collection is on the institutional growth of
the national intelligence system and the development of the broad lines
of national intelligence policy. The selected documents therefore are
not country-specific and do not attempt to supplement earlier regional
documentation in the Foreign Relations series. They also do not focus
on covert operations, intelligence sources or methods, or "raw" and
finished intelligence papers.

Initial Planning

A crucial early development leading to the CIA's creation was the 1944
proposal which Major General William J. Donovan of the OSS drafted at
President Roosevelt's request. The "Donovan Plan" was the first proposal
for a peacetime intelligence organization--one directly accountable to
the President rather than another agency. Donovan called for this
independent agency to have its own budget and a solely consultative
function.

Subsequent proposals for the intelligence program included an
organization divided between military and civilian direction, with the
Departments of State, War, Army, and the Navy all sharing portions of
the agency's leadership. Further recommendations from the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) involved
separate intelligence advisory groups to assist intelligence
organization and policy planning.

When newspapers published the Donovan Plan and the JIC proposal, a
significant public controversy ensued over the propriety of a permanent
intelligence system. Perhaps because of this bad publicity, in the
following months Roosevelt took no action on any of the proposals, and
upon his death Truman, who lacked experience in intelligence affairs,
inherited the problem.

Postwar Transition

As the war ended, Truman immediately initiated measures to liquidate the
entire war apparatus, and intelligence seemed to be included. Concerned
about a possible dismantlement of the intelligence structure, General
Donovan wrote letters to President Truman and Director of the Bureau of
the Budget Harold Smith urging creation of a successor to OSS. (Document
4) At the same time, the Joint Chiefs renamed and revived the JIC
proposal with minimal changes.

Meanwhile, the Bureau of the Budget, which had its own agenda regarding
the intelligence structure, emphasized the Department of State's role in
intelligence. In the fall of 1945, Harold Smith presented Truman with
two documents on intelligence, both of which he signed immediately. The
first document, Executive Order 9621, disbanded OSS and immediately
divided its functions and operations between the Departments of War and
State. (Document 14) The second was a September 20 letter charging
Secretary of State James Byrnes with coordination of an
interdepartmental panel to develop "a comprehensive and coordinated
foreign intelligence program." (Document 15) The Budget Bureau also
delivered to Truman a study that offered guidelines on planning the
intelligence structure and again emphasized the paramount role of the
Department of State in the fledgling intelligence community (although it
subsequently became clear that key officials in the State Department
were not happy with this notion). (Document 38)

The parts of the former OSS which the War Department inherited became
the transitional Strategic Services Unit (SSU). This unit was directed
by Brigadier General John Magruder, who was instructed to "insure the
facilities and assets of OSS are preserved." (Document 95) Some in the
military envisioned the SSU to be the nucleus for future U.S.
intelligence operations, but its functions were limited and involved no
covert intelligence activity.

Disagreement at the Department of State

Growing controversy within the Department of State over the new
intelligence structure surfaced at this time. At issue was whether the
State Department should have its own intelligence organization and, if
so, its nature. The Department had previously developed rudimentary
intelligence capabilities during the war. Secretary of State Edward R.
Stettinius (19441945) appeared to show interest in an internal
intelligence organization, but his short tenure precluded any progress
on the matter.

A study by the Bureau of the Budget recommended unifying the existing
fragments of intelligence work in the Department of State. The proposed
Office of Intelligence and Research would coordinate foreign
intelligence and information analysis for the Department. The break-up
of the OSS and the resulting mandate to integrate some former OSS
operations into the Department of State added to the immediacy of its
internal intelligence debate. Many assumed Truman's September 20 letter
directing the Secretary of State to take the lead in coordinating
intelligence planning signaled a predominant role for the Department in
postwar intelligence.

Colonel Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Research and Intelligence, took on the dual task of reassembling the
OSS programs as Department of State entities and of providing advice on
the interagency intelligence planning mandated by the President.
McCormack sought to settle intelligence matters within the Department
before dealing with the interagency plans (Document 39), but outspoken
dissent and undermining efforts by others in the Department, in
particular Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Donald S.
Russell, complicated his tasks. Russell and the heads of the geographic
bureaus, arguing that "intelligence is only as good as it is translated
into action" by the geographic units, lobbied for a decentralized
structure under their control (Documents 81 and 82), while McCormack
favored a more centralized organization in the Department that would be
"free of operations or policy involvements" and could serve other units
of the Department as well as the geographic bureaus. (Document 83)
Because it soon appeared that the whole Department was deadlocked on the
intelligence issue, the military increasingly decided to take the lead
on the issue.

FBI and Military Proposals

Meanwhile FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had his own ideas on postwar
intelligence. Since 1941, on the President's direction, the FBI had been
conducting intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere. Hoover
proposed in December 1944 that after the war the FBI should run a
"world-wide intelligence system" following the pattern established in
the Western Hemisphere.

However, neither Truman nor the influential Harold Smith was pleased
with the FBI approach, and Truman even suggested in September 1945 that
the FBI budget should be reduced "as soon as possible to at least the
prewar level." (Microfiche Supplement, September 5, 1945) Although
Hoover continued to advocate that his agency assume responsibility for
the new intelligence program (Supplement, September 21, 1945), Truman
seems never to have seriously considered it. Later Hoover would reverse
his position and argue that if he could not have his way, he would not
be "seeking for the Federal Bureau of Investigation the responsibility
for a world-wide intelligence system." (Document 5)

Leaders of the armed forces also continued their efforts to advance
proposals that conferred major responsibilities for foreign intelligence
on their own departments. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal actively
advocated a national intelligence structure along the lines of what the
Joint Chiefs had proposed. Forrestal was eager to set up meetings
between the heads of the concerned agencies to make progress towards a
consensus. (Documents 26 and 27) Secretary of War Robert B. Patterson
also commissioned a study on the matter (Document 32), and the resulting
Lovett report (Document 42) further supported the basic premises of the
earlier JCS proposal, which had failed to reach the President before he
approved the BOB recommendations.

President Truman grew dissatisfied with the pace of the planning and
eventually ordered the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to prepare
plans jointly. (Document 44) But they found no consensus and the debate
continued to languish over the same issues as before. The Department of
State (with mixed dissent) and Budget Bureau proposals tended to
emphasize a decentralized, Department of State-based organization, while
military-backed plans stressed independence and centralization as key
features. This disagreement again stalled the planning process.
(Document 46; Supplement, November 19, 1945, November 28, 1945, December
1945, and December 27, 1945) Truman then consulted Rear Admiral Sydney
Souers, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence and future Director of
Central Intelligence, who, not surprisingly, endorsed the JCS plan while
criticizing the State Department's McCormack plan. (Document 64)

When Secretary of State Byrnes failed to decide between the competing
ideas of his own staff, in early January 1946 military leaders submitted
their own plan. Byrnes reviewed this JCS plan, which he approved with
very minor changes. (Documents 66, 68;

Supplement, January 12, 1946, and January 18, 1946)

Truman and his advisers were receptive to the military proposal, since
it coincided closely with Truman's own ideas on intelligence. Thus, over
the objections of Harold Smith, the President issued a directive asking
the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy to create an independent
Central Intelligence Group whose Director would be appointed by the
President. (Document 71)

The New Intelligence Program

Rear Admiral Sydney W. Souers became the first Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) the day after Truman issued the directive. Once
created, the CIG had an imposing agenda before it, which included
integrating the transitional intelligence programs into permanent
operations. General Magruder offered all needed assistance to transfer
SSU to the CIG. A committee chaired by Colonel Louis J. Fortier was
appointed by Souers to study this option; the Fortier Committee quickly
recommended accepting Magruder's offer. (Document 105) The National
Intelligence Authority shortly issued a directive to implement this
transfer. (Document 106)

Essentially an interim director, Souers was replaced in June 1946 by
General Hoyt Vandenberg. Vandenberg proved a more aggressive DCI who
sought to extend the power of his office and his agency. One of his
first tasks was to manage the CIG's intense rivalry with the FBI.

The CIG under Vandenberg faced the task of taking over all FBI foreign
operations, which meant Central and South America. The challenge was
even greater because of J. Edgar Hoover's lack of cooperation with and
general hostility towards the new agency. Even before discussing the
matter with the CIG, Hoover was setting the maximum time he wanted to
continue FBI operations in Latin America when it became clear that his
agency would be supplanted in those areas. The FBI Director said, "The
most I will agree to now is to stay in the Western Hem. for 1 year. I am
more and more certain that this is a project we must get out of."
(Document 111) Naturally it was in the national interest to ensure a
smooth transition on foreign intelligence, but Vandenberg, whose agency
was hardly ready to assume FBI operations, found it difficult to convey
this to the FBI's director. (Document 113) Hoover made an effort to
inform not only Vandenberg, but also many others that he intended to
cease FBI Latin American operations shortly. (Document 116; Supplement,
July 22, 1946)

Others in the administration became involved in settling the dispute.
Hoover had written Attorney General Tom Clark on this issue, and the NIA
soon asked Clark to order the FBI to maintain its operations until
relieved by the CIG. (Documents 118 and 120) Admiral William D. Leahy,
who had been active in the intelligence program, became an unofficial
negotiator and informed Vandenberg that the President and the Attorney
General wanted to expedite the transition. (Documents 124 and 125) The
pressures on both sides seemed to resolve the issue, and in a matter of
months the CIG had effectively taken over FBI international intelligence
operations.

Creation of the Intelligence Agency

During his tenure, Vandenberg also initiated policy changes to
strengthen the role of the DCI in the intelligence structure. While
Souers had been more consultative, Vandenberg sought to be more
assertive. (Document 160) Though his efforts produced some results,
Vandenberg was never fully satisfied with the level of autonomy in his
office. Indeed, he faced formidable opposition to increasing the powers
of his office from Admiral Thomas B. Inglis of the Intelligence Advisory
Board. (Document 189) During Vandenberg's brief tenure, the powers of
his office were never fully clarified.

Vandenberg nonetheless had a profound influence on the CIG and its
organization. One of his key struggles was obtaining a statutory basis
for the CIG. At that point, the CIG was an interdepartmental group
rather than an autonomous agency, and its authority derived from
Presidential directive rather than legislation. Without a statutory
basis, the CIG lacked its own budget and the ability to develop longer
term goals. Very high on Vandenberg's agenda was obtaining this
legislative mandate. (Documents 198 and 201) Although enactment of the
National Security Act of 1947, which created an independent Central
Intelligence Agency to succeed the CIG, did not occur until after
Vandenberg's resignation, his efforts were instrumental in achieving
this key legislation.

The third Director of Central Intelligence was Rear Admiral Roscoe H.
Hillenkoetter. Replacing Vandenberg in May 1947, Hillenkoetter took
office just as the national security bill was in Congress. On its
passage, Hillenkoetter assumed the responsibility of reorganizing the
CIG as needed. Hillenkoetter also made recommendations regarding the
transition from the National Intelligence Authority to the National
Security Council (NSC), which the National Security Act also
established, and other changes in the intelligence advisory structure.
The development of the NSC and its functions became a major issue in
Hillenkoetter's tenure. (Documents 220, 225, 331, 335, and 336) A more
troubling issue Hillenkoetter faced was the allegations of "intelligence
failures" in which the CIA did not warn of impending major developments,
particularly in the Bogota riots of 1948. These allegations brought the
agency and Hillenkoetter himself under the scrutiny of the NSC,
Congress, and the nation.

Political and Psychological Warfare

Another dimension to the emerging national intelligence structure was
the role of covert operations. When the War Department took over OSS
"special operations," it tried to preserve its capabilities until a
decision could be made about a successor group, but beyond some interest
in clandestine intelligence gathering nothing was done in the area of
covert activities until the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Even then, legal questions arose as to whether Congress intended the new
agency to engage in covert operations. (Document 241) Ultimately, it
was the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), the
peacetime successor to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC), that laid the groundwork for covert action programs as a result
of its continuing interest in "psychological warfare." In November 1947
SANACC agreed on "black" (covert) and "white" (overt) information
programs, the former to be run by the Department of State, with the
advice of the DCI and a military representative. (Document 249)

But Secretary of State George C. Marshall and the service Secretaries
objected to this plan (Document 250), and principals in the Department
of State did not want to allow the new Central Intelligence Agency into
the covert action area without outside monitoring or control. When the
CIA insisted that "whatever agency is chosen to indicate the type of
Black operations to be conducted, or the material and/or propaganda to
be disseminated--the Central Intelligence Agency must alone be the
Agency to determine how the material is disseminated" (Document 251),
the National Security Council tried to resolve the issue by approving
NSC 4-A, which authorized the DCI to conduct covert psychological
operations that were "consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt
foreign information activities." (Document 257)

Bureaucratic dissension nonetheless continued. (Documents 266 and 267)
The Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, which was proposing
political warfare initiatives in support of indigenous anti-Communist
elements in the free world, became increasingly disenchanted with the
CIA's performance under NSC 4-A, and proposed the creation of a separate
organization directly under the NSC and headed by a Director of Special
Studies. (Documents 269 and 276) Ultimately, after much further
wrangling and indecision, the NSC approved NSC 10/2 in June 1948,
establishing an Office of Special Projects (soon renamed Office of
Policy Coordination) within CIA. Headed by "a highly qualified person"
nominated by the Secretary of State and acceptable to the Director of
Central Intelligence, the office would conduct covert operations, "to
the maximum degree consistent with efficiency," independently of the
other components of the Agency. The DCI, in cooperation with State and
Defense representatives, would continue to ensure that covert operations
were consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies, and
disagreements would be referred to the NSC. (Document 292) This
complicated arrangement did not really satisfy the CIA, however, and the
controversy continued beyond the period covered in this volume.

The CIA Under Scrutiny

The final issue of this period was the culmination of growing concerns
about the role and early performance of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Allen Dulles chaired a survey group, which reviewed intelligence
organization and operation. When the executive secretary of the group
complained at the outset that the CIA's mission and actual operations
were uncertain, undefined and subject to much controversy and
bitterness, he reflected general dissatisfaction with the agency's
activities. (Document 344) The subsequent Dulles Report (January 1949)
was harsh in many of its judgments and made several recommendations to
institute substantial changes in the intelligence structure. The basic
premise of the report was that intelligence operations had to be more
coordinated. It cited poor planning and management as the root of
intelligence failures. At the same time, the role of the NSC as a
proper supervisory panel was reaffirmed. Moreover, there were many
specific recommendations concerning the DCI, including one that argued
that the position should be filled by a civilian. (Document 358) Some of
the criticisms in the report seemed to apply directly to Hillenkoetter,
and following the report seemed to apply directly to Hillenkoetter, and
following the report his leadership in the agency declined, although he
remained in office for nearly 2 years afterward.

This volume closes with the discussion and implementation of the Dulles
recommendations. The NSC remanded the report to the Secretaries of
State and Defense for a more concise list of recommendations for NSC
decision. The NSC considered the resulting McNarney report (named after
General Joseph T. McNarney, the Department of Defense representative) in
July 1949. While reaffirming the Dulles report in some areas, such as
the criticisms of the deficiencies in national intelligence, the
McNarney report endorsed only in part other portions, such as the
presence of military officers in key CIA positions. It also labeled the
attack on the CIA's leadership as "too sweeping" and emphasized that the
"shortness of time" and "lack of common understanding" were more
fundamental sources of the problem. It further proposed that the CIA
"should interpret and follow the NSC Intelligence Directives so as to
refrain as far as possible from competitive intelligence activities in
the production of research intelligence estimates." As approved by the
NSC, the McNarney report became NSC50. (Document 384)

The volume concludes with the publication of National Security Council
Directives 1-14. (Documents 422-435) Extensive additional documents
concerning all the topics presented in the printed volume are reproduced
in the microfiche supplement.


July 1996 (###)



posted on Feb, 8 2003 @ 10:20 AM
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Originally posted by LaChicaParanoica
When Big Brother turns us into mindless zombies in 2004,will you wear an aluminum helmet(to stop mind control)?I'm dead serious.



Will common supermarket food foil work ok? Just curiouse.





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