FOIA: Strategic Defense Initiative Technology Survivability and Software Report

SDI_Technology.pdf
Strategic Defense Initiative Technology Survivability and Software
Good Quality scans of Report of SDI Computer Technology Survivability and Software in reference to it use with Ballistic Missile Defense systems.
Document date: 1988-05-01
Department: Office of Technology Assessment
Author: Lionel S. Johns, Peter Sharfman, Thomas H. Karas, Anthony Fainberg, C. E. "Sandy" Thomas, David Weis
Document type: Report
pages: 291


Archivist's Notes: Report of SDI Computer Technology Survivability and Software which discusses systems and technology components, producing dependable software for space based BMD systems and discusses known and unknown threats and various enemy attacks.

This document deals with the so called SDI or known as Star Defense Initiative.

The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) currently advocates planning for a three-part “phased deployment” of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, with each phase providing an increment of strategic benefits while preparing the way for the next phase. The first phase would be intended to compel Soviet operational adjustments and compromises by reducing the confidence of Soviet planners in predicting the outcome of a ballistic missile attack. The second phase would be intended to negate Soviet abilities to destroy many strategic targets, and the third to “eliminate the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles.” The exact composition and timing of each phase are still under study, but some tentative system “architectures” have undergone preliminary analysis.

The findings of this study report were as followed:

1. After 30 years of BMD research, including the first few years of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), defense scientists and engineers have produced impressive technical achievements, but questions remain about the feasibility of meeting the goals of the SDI. The SDIO has identified most of the gaps between today’s technology and that needed for highly effective ballistic missile defenses; it has initiated programs to address those gaps. It should surprise no one that many technical issues remain unresolved, especially when one considers that the SD I has so far had time and authorization to spend only a fraction of the money that the Fletcher Commission estimated would be necessary to assess BMD feasibility. The SDIO argues that application of sufficient resources will resolve the outstanding issues.

2. Given optimistic assumptions (e.g., extraordinarily fast rates of research, development, and production), the kind of first phase system that SDIO is considering might be technically deployable in the 1995-2000 period. Such a system might include: l space-based hit-to-kill vehicles for attacking missile boosters and post-boost vehicles (PBVs) and l ground-based rockets for attacking warheads before reentry into the atmosphere....

3. A rational commitment to a “phaseone” development and deployment of BMDbefore the second and third phases had been proven feasible,affordable, and survivable would imply: a) belief that the outstanding technical issues will be favorably resolved later; b) willingness to settle for interim BMD capabilities that would decline as Soviet offenses improved; or, c) belief that U.S. efforts will persuade the Soviets to join in reducing offensive forces and moving toward a defensedominated world.

4. The precise degree of BMD system survivability is hard to anticipate, because it would depend on the details of measures for offensive attack on the BMD system and defensive countermeasures, on the tactics employed by each side, and on the inevitable uncertainties of battle. It appears that direct-ascent nuclear anti-satellite weapons (DANASAT) would pose a significant threat to all three defense system phases, but particularly to the first two.

5. There has been little analysis of any kind of space-based threats to BMD system survivability. SDIO analyses assume that U.S. BMD technologies will remain superior to Soviet technologies (although such superiority would not necessarily guarantee U.S. BMD system survivability). In particular, SDIO and its contractors have conducted no serious study of the situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union both occupy space with comparable BMD systems. Such a situation could place a high premium on striking first at the other side’s defenses. The technical (as well as political) feasibility of an armscontrol agreement to avoid such mutual vulnerability remains uncertain.

6. The survivability of BMD systems now under consideration implies unilateral U.S. control of certain sectors of space. Such control would be necessary to enforce “keep-out” zones against Soviet anti-satellite weapons or space mines during and after U.S. BMD deployment. Most BMD weapon technologies would be useful in an anti-satellite role before they reached the levels of power and precision needed for BMD. Thus, the Soviets would not need to achieve BMD capabilities to begin to challenge U.S. control of, or even access to, space.

7. The nature of software and experience with large, complex software systems indicate that there may always be irresolvable questions about how dependable BMD software would be and about the confidence the United States could place in dependability estimates. Existing large software systems, such as the long-distance telephone system, have become highly dependable only after extensive operational use and modification...

8. No adequate models for the development, production, test, and maintenance of software for full-scale BMD systems exist. Systems such as long-distance telephone networks, early missile defense systems such as SAFEGUARD, the AEGIS ship defense system, and air traffic control all differ significantly from full-scale BMD...

9. There is broad agreement in the technical community that significant parts of the research being carried out under the SDI are in the national interest. There is disagreement about whether or not this research is best carried out within a program that is strongly oriented toward supporting an early 1990s BMD deployment decision, and that includes system development as well as research elements. This question was outside the scope of OTA’s mandate and is not addressed in this report.


This are the main issues that the study deals with. There are also grafics, pic and schematics that illustrate the whole project.

[edit on 28-2-2008 by Telos]

Is important to mention the goals of SDI.

According to the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization in 1986:

The goal of the SDI is to conduct a program of vigorous research and technology development that may lead to strategic defense options that would eliminate the threat posed by ballistic missiles, and thereby:l support a better basis for deterring aggression, l strengthen strategic stability, and . increase the security of the United States and its Allies. The SDI seeks, therefore, to provide the technical knowledge required to support an informed decision in the early 1990s on whether or not to develop and deploy a defense of the U.S. and its Allies against ballistic missiles.’ What does the phrase, “eliminate the threat posed by ballistic missiles, ” mean, and how might doing so enhance deterrence, stability, and security? Proponents of BMD have argued that increasing levels of defense could offer increasing benefits. Fairly modest levels of BMD, they say, might improve deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack by increasing Soviet military planners’ uncertainty about the effectiveness of such an attack. Higher levels of defense capability might actually deny the Soviets even the possibility of achieving whatever military goals they might have for attack. Finally, extremely good defenses against all types of nuclear attack–including attacks by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, bombers, and other means of delivery-might essentially assure the survival of the U.S. population and society no matter what the Soviets tried to do. Then U.S. security would no longer rely on the threat of retaliation to deter a nuclear attack.

[edit on 28-2-2008 by Telos]

The same study has been reviewed later on, beginning of 90's and mid 90's by INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WASHINGTON, D.C. There is a very interesting read here: www.fas.org...

The above document is very technical and the information can be extracted by the parts I've taken from the report. Unlikely the first report, the second one is more easy to deal with and less technical in terms of understanding. Here is an excerpt:

The Strategic Defense System is being designed to destroy thousands of incoming ballistic missiles and warheads. This will require detecting the missiles and warheads, discriminating them from hundreds of thousands of decoys, precisely tracking the missiles and warheads, and then destroying them,all within about 35 minutes or less, and despite the enemy's concerted effort to defeat the system. The Strategic Defense System is, by far, the most complex, technologically challenging system ever attempted. As currently envisioned, a sophisticated communications system will link together hundreds, or possibly thousands, of computer-operated components in space and on the ground. The system will consist of several subsystems (elements), which include surveillance satellites, space- and ground-based weapons, and ground-based subsystems to command and control the satellites and weapons.