This 141 page document gives a clear view of Thailand’s political, economic and social background in the late 1960’s.

This study responds to a request made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and the Institute for Defense Analyses to undertake a study of counterinsurgency in Thailand.

The purpose of this document was to determine what US military commitment to counter the insurgency in Thailand may have to be considered, in view of the effectiveness of an indigenous Thai counterinsurgency.

The main objective of the study is to "provide data and a rationale to affect the recurrent policy decision on ways to counter the insurgency in Thailand while avoiding or minimizing US military involvement."

The study bases are extensive examinations of written material on Thailand and interviews with US officials in the US and Thailand, plus extensive examinations of the past insurgencies in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Algeria, also including case study of the insurgencies in Viet Nam, Cuba, Kenya and Greece.

The main objective of the study is to "provide data and a rationale to affect the recurrent policy decision on ways to counter the insurgency in Thailand while avoiding or minimizing US military involvement." In general, the study request requires an assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the Thai political, economic, social, paramilitary, and military institutions and programs for coping with the insurgency, and a determination of the degree of US support, if any, required to assist the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in countering the threat.

Principal Findings

The Communist insurgency in the Northeast suffers under the following handicaps:

• Friction among the top leaders in the Communist Party of Thailand.

• Quantitative and qualitative deficiencies among the leadership which inhibit the ability to direct and coordinate insurgent activities effectively.


• A weak and unreliable village infrastructure based upon recruitment by intimidation rather than dedication to the goals of the revolution.

• A guerilla force which lacks sufficient strength to take the offensive.

• An inadequate logistics support system.



The Conclusion:

Thailand has the political stability, economic resources, and military capability to defeat the Communist insurgency.

No US commitment of military force will be required provided US economic and military assistance continue at the currently projected levels.

If the insurgent movements in Thailand expand it is probable that the Royal Thai Government will still be able to cope with the threat without direct US military involvement.

In such a case, however, the Thai would require additional US military and economic assistance in addition to raising their own current force level.