Page 1: Report on the Plan for Transformation of the National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons Complex.
*USDOE*
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364)("the Act") directs the Secretary of Energy to develop a plan, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council, for transformation of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear weapons complex to achieve a responsive infrastructure by 2030. The Act further directs the Secretary of Energy to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the transformation plan. The NNSA, a semi-autonomous agency within Department of Energy, articulated its proposed strategy for achieving a more responsive infrastructure in Complex 2030: An Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons Complex Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century. This report summarizes the proposed strategy.

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Page 3: Section 3111 of the John Waner Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directs the Secretary of Energy to develop a plan, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

The Complex 2030 is a plan to replace warheads. The new warheads would be designed for long-term confidence in reliability, greater security, and ease of production and maintenance. The Council determined the DOE and DOD will conduct a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, pending congressional approval. For national security, the RRW will provide a safe, secure, reliable, and sustainable nuclear weapons deterrent and reduce reliance of outdated reserve weapons.

Page 4: The Complex 2030 strategy would maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile during the transformation. RRW will (over time) work to replace existing programs in regarding the upkeep of nuclear weapons.

As long as the United States relies on a nuclear deterrent to ensure security of itself and it's allies, there are certain capabilities that must be maintained to ensure that nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and reliable. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) must maintain a range of capabilities to have an agile and responsive infrastructure. Some specifics of capability change: elmination of conventional high explosive operations, beryllium processing, wrought processing of special nuclear materials, certain specialty material recycling and processing, and elimination of special nuclear materials in flight tests.

The Complex has existed sine the Manhattan Project in the 1940s. Some NNSA production facilities date from that time. The Y-12 and Kansas City Plant would be the first to be consolidated and modernized in Complex 2030 planning. There are several thousand buidlings in the Complex today, representing over 35 million sq ft of floor space at 8 sites.

Page 5: In 2005, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure recommended that NNSA pursue a single facility for all research, development, and production activities relating to nuclear weapons that involve significant quantities of special nuclear material. This goal as envisioned by the Task Force is dubbed The Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC).

In terms of Complex 2030 staffing, the NNSA estimates that consolidation and increased efficiency will enable staff to be reduced by 25-33%. NNSA considers this planning scenario to not only increase security, safety, and efficiency, but also achieve long-term cost savings.

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Page 7: Has a Table of Contents & Table and Figures

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Page 9: Request For Report
Sec. 4214 Plan For Transformation Of National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons Complex. The plan shall accomplish the following objectives:
(a)
1) To maintain the safety, reliability, and security of the US weapons stockpile.
2) To continue Stockpile Life Extension Programs that the Nuclear Weapons Council considers necessary.
3) To prepare to produce replacement warheads commencing in 2012 and achieving steady-state production using modern manufacturing processes by 2025.
4) To elminate duplication of production capability except to the extent required to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile.
5) To maintain the current philosophy within the national security laboratories of peer review of nuclear weapons designs to ensure safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile.
6) To maintain the national security mission, and in particular the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. To support other national security objectives in fields such as intelligence and homeland security.
7) To consolidate to the maximum extent practicable, with the ultimate goal of elminating Category 1 and 2 special nuclear material from the national security labs no later than March 1, 2012.

Page 10: 8) To employ a risk-based approach to ensure compliance with Design Basis Threat security requirements.
9) To expeditiously dismantle inactive nuclear weapons to reduce the size of the stockpile to the lowest level required by the council.
10) To operate the nuclear weapons complex in a more cost-effective manner.
(b)
Report- Not later than Feb 1, 2007, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the transformation plan required by subsection (a). The report shall address each of the objectives required by subsection (c) and also include:

1) A comprehensive list of the capabilities, facilities, and project staffing that the NNSA will need to have in place at the complex as of 2030.
2) A comprehensive list of the capabilities and facilities that the NNSA currently has in place at the complex that will not be needed as of 2030.
3) A plan for implementing the transformation plan, including a schedule with incremental milestones.
(c)
Consultation- The Secretary of Energy shall develop the transformation plan required by subsection (a) in consultation with the National Nuclear Security Administration Act.
(d)
Defintion- Defining 'national security lab' per NNSA Act.
(b)
Inclusion in Future-Years Nuclear Security Program. A Budget amendment to the NNSA Act.

Page 11: Complex 2030 Vision
The DOE, through NNSA and in partnership with the DoD, ensures the United States has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. Make changes to reflect reality that the Cold War is over, achieving a deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear warheads. Transfrom the NNSA nuclear weapons complex into a responsive infrastructure that supports the specific stockpile requirements and maintains the essential capabilities needed for an uncertain global future. Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW) concepts with less stringent warhead design constraints than those imosed on Cold War systems would be more easily and efficiently manufactured at fewer, more modernized facilities within the Complex, with safer and more environmentally benign materials. Although the stockpile would be smaller in 2030, deterrence would be enhacned because the transformed complex would be fully capable, sufficiently flexiable to fix technical problems in the stockpile, and respond to adverse geopolitical change.
The nuclear weapons complex of the future would include an integrated set of labs and plants that apply leading edge science and technology to nuclear weapon design and production and provide the capability to respoind to technological surprise.

Page 12: As the transition progresses, the NNSA national laboratories would become part of a broader fabric of scientific and engineering capabilities that support the nation's national security and economic competitiveness. The national labs would serve as the gateway for the nation's best scientists to apply their talents to leading edge national security science and technology problems.
This report addresses elements of a transformation plan would seek to transition to an all-RRW stockpile, subject to necessary appropiations, appropiate review, the development of successful technologies and other contingencies. Three contingencies that we must consider:
1) RRW is successfully fielded in the 2012-2014 timeframe and the stockpile begins a transition over the coming decades to an all-RRW stockpile.
2) RRW is successfully fielded but a determination is made that it would be better to maintain diversity in the stockpile by fielding a mixed stockpile consisting of both Cold War legacy warheads and RRW warheads.
3) NNSA/DOD are not successful in fielding RRW and must sustain a Cold War legacy stockpile for foreseeable future.

Page 13: Transformation Plan To Achieve Complex 2030
NNSA leadership, in consultation with the DoD, develop a strategry to achieve a responsive infrastructure for the Complex of the future. This strategry is articulated in Complex 2030: An Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons Complex Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century. The plan is cost-effective and addresses the objectives outlined in Sec 3111 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007.

Transformation to Complex 2030 relies on implementation of four strategies:
1) Transform the Stockpile: In partnership with the DoD, transform the nuclear stockpile through development of RRWs, refurbishment of limited numbers of legacy designs, and accelerated dismantlement of the Cold War stockpile;
2) Transform the Complex: Transform to a modernized, cost-effective nuclear weapons complex;
3) Transform the Operation of the Complex: Create a fully integrated and interdependent nuclear weapons complex; and,
4) Drive the Science and Technology Base: Drive the science and technology base essential for long-term national security.

By Jan 2007, the following commitments were complete:
1)delivering first production unites,
2) delivering the full capability of the Advanced Simulation and Computing Purple Machine,
3)updating pit lifetime estimates, and
4)supporting the Nuclear Weapons Council decision in November 2006 to proceed with the RRW.
By FY 2008, the following commitments will be met:
1)continuing to deliver NNSA's products to DoD,
2)eliminating the backlog of surveillance units
3)accelerating the dismantlement of retired weapons,
4)delivering the W76-1 first production unit,
5)certifying the W88 with a new pit and manufacturing 10 W88 pits in 2007,
6)extracting tritium for use in the stockpile at the new Tritium Extraction Facility.

Complex 2030 is neither the Cold War Complex, nor today's Complex. In the 1980s, the Complex contained fourteen sites; it contains eight today. By 2030, these sites would be integrated and interdependent, and the portion of the Complex required to perform nuclear deterrence would be smaller. Modern research, development, engineering and production facilities would be working together to support the Complex as a whole in a smaller footprint.

Page 14:Table 3.1: Comparison of the Complex Today and the Proposed Complex in 2030.
This is table essentially highlighting all the infrastructure and function of the Complex Today and how those specifics listed will change by 2030 in the Proposed Complex.

Page 15:More jargon of Complex 2030 being a strategic nuclear deterrent.
DOE completed the orginal Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (SSM-PEIS) in 1996. DOE and NNSA have implemented a number of major programmatic decisions regarding the Complex over the past 10 years that were based on the SSM-PEIS as well as othe assessments. These have decisions to pursue the following activities:
- Constructing the National Ignition Facility (NIF)
- Constructing the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing (DARHT) facility
- Consolidating uranim production at Y-12
- Establishing a small interim plutonium pit fabrication capability at Los Alamos, while continuing to evaluate the need for future production capacity
- Down-sizing assembly and disassembly capacity at Pantex
- Down-sizing non-nuclear component production at the Pinellas and Mound Plants
- Transferring neutron generator production to Sandia National Labs (SNL)
- Storing strategic reserves of highly enriched uranium at Y-12
- Storing strategic reserves of plutonium at Pantex

On Oct 19, 2006, NNSA issued a notice stating it would prepare a supplement to the SSM-PEIS to analyze the environmental impacts of the continued transfromation of the Complex. NNSA pushes to continue modernization of the Complex; selecting sites for a plutonium center and pit manufacturing.

Page 16: Discusses the different Lab and Plant sites associated with the Complex 2030 vision.

Page 17: Again, discusses the different Plant sites, there roles, the transformation they will undergo and any construction of new facilities of the specific sites.

Page 18: Talks of the NNSA evaluating the Complex 2030 proposal and 2 other alternatives: (1) no action and (2) a reduced capability alternative.
The second alternative would not have sufficient production capability to meet predicted national security requirements. There was a 90-day scoping period from Oct 2006 - Jan 2007, where the NNSA received many comments on its proposed action.

Page 19: Comparison of Complex 2030 Plan with Section 3111 of Public Law 109-364
1) Maintain the safety, reliability, and security of the US nuclear weaons stockpile.
2) To continue Stockpile Life Extension Programs that the Nuclear Weapons Council considers necessary.
3) To prepare to produce replacement warheads under the RRW program.

Page 20: 4) To eliminate, within the nuclear weapons complex, duplication of production to the extent required.
5) To maintain philosophy of peer review of nuclear weapons design.
6) To maintain the national security mission, and in particular the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program.
7) To consolidate the maximum extent practicable.

Page 21: 8) To employ a risk-based approach to ensure compliance with Design Basis Threat security requirements.
9) To dismantle inactive nuclear weapons to reduce the size of the stockpile to the lowest level required.
10) To operate the nuclear weapons complex in a more cost effective manner.

Page 22: Table 4.1: Complex 2030 Planning Scenario Comparison with Objectives
Consists of a table with left side outlining objectives in FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364) and the right half analyzing the consistency of Complex 2030 Planning Scenario with P.L. 109-364 Objectives

Page 23: Capabilities, Facilities, and Staffing for Complex 2030

Page 24: Table 5.1: Functional Capabilities Required in 2030
3 column table highlighting Function, Capabilities, and Reduced Need or Excess in 2030.

Page 25: Figure 5.1: Shows bar charts for Construction History for Existing Facilities.

Page 26: Figure 5.2: Bar chart representing Potential Reductions in Comlex Footprint Supported by Weapons Activities Account Funding- 2006 compared with 2030.

Figure 5.3: Bar chart representing Estimated Staffing Funded by the Weapons Activities Account- 2006 compared with 2030.

Page 27: Table 5.2: Facility Plan
Table with the left side listing Facilities Considered for Excess, Consolidation, or other Action. Right half of table are the Proposed Actions.

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Page 29: 6.0 The Plan to Implement Complex 2030
Includes figure 6.1: Complex 2030 Planning and Execution

Page 30: Figure 6.2: Is a flowchart for Complex 2030 Near-Term Schedule and Milestones

Figure 6.3: Is a flowchart for Complex 2030 Long-Term Schedule and Milestones

Page 31: Features another table about Budget Preparation Approach.

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Page 33: Conclusion of the Complex 2030 plan.

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Page 35: Appendix A: Historical Perspective of the Nuclear Weapons Complex
Includes a figure showing the historical Cost and Staffing for the Nuclear Weapons Complex.

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Page 37: Appendix B: SEAB Task Force Recommendations Incorporated Into Planning
Includes a table looking at the comparison of Major SEAB Recommendations and the Complex 2030 Proposal regarding various topics.

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Page 39: List of Acronyms

Page 40: Not much here

*note*
Phew that took awhile to cover... I don't see anything suspicious here, although, there is certainly room for speculation. The title of this proposal does sound alluring: "Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons Complex Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century."
What are those threats? Terrorists, Nations, Aliens? Considering the mistrust and instability within the geopolitical world, I don't think it's necessary to invoke "aliens" to find just cause for updating the US nuclear deterrent.