This document is a briefing document pertaining to a suspected atmospheric nuclear detonation in the Indian Ocean, south of Africa, on September 22,
1979, known as the Vela Incident, named after the satellite Vela that picked up the detonation.
Without having any other corroborating evidence that a detonation took place and with no one taking responsibility for it, the leading suspected
country is South Africa, which the US was pursing negotiations with in an attempt to stop them from obtaining nuclear weapons.
The document written one month after the incident begins with a situation report explaining how attempts to get additional evidence has been a problem
in that part of the world.
The next section on page 2 explains the effects on U.S. Policies particularly the nonproliferation policy and the negotiations to get South Africa to
adhere to the IAEA safeguards for it’s enrichment plant. The worry is that if South Africa is able to get nuclear weapons, then they may support
other programs in Israel and Taiwan and other countries like India and Pakistan will follow. What I find interesting is that both India and Pakistan
have successfully tested nuclear weapons and it is suspected that Israel also has them, and that the US nonproliferation policy was not very
effective.
List of states with nuclear weapons
The report goes on to say that if the news of the detonation was leaked that other countries of Africa would want a strong response and UN plans that
are in place would be seriously diminished.
The tactical issues on page 4 describe how members of Congress are to be told of the incident ahead of time and how they should have a contingency
plan if the news were to be leaked. Other international leaders were also to be informed and asked to help gain more evidence of the detonation. The
report continues to describe possible reactions if they confronted the South African Government (SAG) with allegations that they exploded a nuclear
device.
The report goes further into public reaction and that many countries would raise the issue at the UN and demand sanctions and the effect they will
have including the reaction from the SAG.
On page 10, the report describes problems with admitting to not having enough evidence that a detonation took place, will raise questions of the US
capability of verifying adherence to the Test Ban Treaty. Several explanations are listed to prepare to respond in the event critics raise this
issue.
The last section covers the approach to take when talking to the Prime Minister of SA and gives responses to questions that may be raised.
Related FOIA Documents:
FOIA: Security Council discussion paper for Jan 7, 1980 meeting
FOIA: DCIA memo on the Sep 22, 1979 Vela Satellite event recording a suspected nuclear
test
FOIA: Sandia Laboratories report on the Sep 22, 1979 Vela satellite event - Alert
747
FOIA: A report by a panel of non-government scientists on the Sep 22, 1979 Vela satellite
event
Related Links:
Wikipedia article on the Vela Incident