If not hushmail, then whom do you recommend?

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Originally posted by dr_strangecraft

If not hushmail, then whom do you recommend?

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Good question. I was a Hushmail user but am seeking alternatives now. Still the underlying question here is how did they get the e-mail content. If this style of encryption is not the protective umbrella we think it is then it becomes increasingly difficult to find options.

brill

Most hackers would laugh at the idea of unbreakable encryption, or 'secret' emails. You could probably get the passphrase just by social engineering if the interest was strong enough. Next step would be keylogging using a Tempest truck out on the street.

Some people suggest, at least a few years ago they did, that the certain US agencies was ten steps above the rest of the world wrt encryption/decryption abilities. They could probably break most encryption by brute force over the weekend if the need was great enough.

Finally, who's to know if there hasn't been a backdoor built into something, making decryption a trivial matter.

For casual use, one might use a double encryption method. Or include something like the Navajo language plus the normal encryption. That way even if the code were broken, the message would not be interpreted. (The British tried to use Welsh like this in WWII)

2 centi-quatloos...

[edit on 8-11-2007 by Badge01]

Comrad everything coming in and out of the USA via phone and e-mails is checked by your countries super computers. Everytime you write or speak a tagged word, your phone call or e-mail jumps to high priority. Say, "Hello" to Big Brother and you Uncle Sam; their listening and reading.

So... jump in there and grab your share of attention... hahahaha.

I remember hearing back about the millennium or so, that PGP had a built in key for the US intel and law enforcement.

My understanding was that PGP uses a system of "public key/private key," where you can give the other key to your confederate. But I thought the NSA had delayed the release of PGP until they had inserted a second "private key" just for them, rendering decrypt a trivial exercise.

I figure its only a matter of time until organized crime penetrates the govt and gets the USG key. Then PGP will quickly become old hat.


Here's the strategies I'd recommend:

1. Conlang.
Invent a new, authentic language, and use that to communicate. In that case, you can use ANY email you want. Constructing a language is not as hard as it sounds, and you can make a "model" language of just a few hundred words. The trick is to use an alien grammar system. My experience working with US feds is that they are extremely short on linguistics and liberal arts in general. They seek the technical solution over the human, which is why we weren't expecting the 1979 Iran revolution. But that's another thread. Making your own language is called "conlang," for constructed language. Wikipedia article has links to good sites, including the "language construction kit."


2. Download a computer model of the enigma machines, or purple code from WWII. There are dozens of downloadable enigmas online for free. A number of amateur cryptologists actuall re-decrypt the famous messages from the Abwehr from WWII. While they are obviously dated, local law enforcement wont have a chance. And even the Feds will have to spend a weekend or so figuring out exactly which one you used, and then a bit trying to suss out your settings. Enigma-type machines are not true encryption, but they will take resources to break, and buy you time. I suggest putting false information in PGP and enigma-ed emails, that could confuse them with your conlang or number 4 below.

3. A one time pad
This is the only truly unbreakable cypher. A random (not computer generated and thus pseudo-random) series of numbers on a pad. your correspondent has a copy. You use each page of the pad only once. each number tells you to shift the answer x number of spaces forward in the alphabet. This really IS unbreakable, until the man gets a copy of your pad.

4. Handwritten cyphers
I believe that the governments have become extremely dependent upon digital evidence; so much so that they are ill-prepared for handwritten cyphers. Just look at the trouble the online community has, trying to quantify the "letters" in the voynich manuscript. They can't even agree on how many letters there are in the text!