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Barksdale Missile Number Six: The Stolen Nuclear Weapon

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posted on Sep, 14 2007 @ 10:33 PM
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I've been reading this thread for several days now along with several others and a ton of googleing. I've had many theories come and go since the story broke, but things seem to be coming into focus now. I finally decided it is time to put in my two cents. Here's my hypothesis. Everyone now understands what a hypothesis is - right? So, let's test it with our collective knowledge.

1) Whitehouse knows ACM’s are scheduled for decommissioning.

2) Whitehouse needs, for various reasons, unaccounted for nukes.

3) Orders go out from the Air Force to Minot to move 12 ACM's for decommissioning to Barksdale. Barksdale is informed to receive ACM's and to hold for transport to Texas.

4) Under Whitehouse orders, six (or five) are to be mated with nuclear warheads for a super top secret mission. Minot is told Barksdale knows what to do with them and they don't need to know.

5) Minot complies using all normal procedures. (few good officers are suspicious though)

6) From the original set of orders Barksdale believes that unarmed ACM’s are coming to be moved to Texas for decommissioning.

7) B-52 leaves Minot with 12 ACM’s (full load) as ordered and arrives 3.5 hours later at Barksdale.

8) The B-52 is parked in a secure area awaiting pickup of the 12 ACM’s.

9a) (This is the part that was not supposed to happen). Someone notices or is informed by a leak from Minot that there are nuclear warheads in the ACM’s.

10a) Air Force goes in cover-your-ass mode and starts a disinformation campaign to create as much plausible deniability as possible while they try to figure out WTF happened. They leak 5 missing nukes then 6 missing nukes to create confusion and buy time.

11a) Dick Cheney is arrested for treason. (let's hope)

9b) (This is what was supposed to happen) A transport truck shows up and the ACM’s are off loaded to the truck.

10b) The truck leaves the base with a special ops crew.

11b) The warheads are removed from the ACM’s during transport and arrive in Texas exactly as they should for decommissioning.

12b) Six nuclear warheads are available for whatever Dick Cheney might want to do.

13b) The whole World is Dicked.

Sounds a little too Tom Clancy, but who knows?




posted on Sep, 14 2007 @ 10:36 PM
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reply to post by scrapple
 



Continuing:

Now, with the story out, flight crew members should expect to be questioned. In a very hard manner. Which leads to the issue of the risk of one or more of them breaking under pressure and what to do about that before it happens.

Yes, I know. This all sounds crazy.

So Google for the story of the suicide of B-52 Captain John Frueh on the west coast sometime around August 30, the day of this flight. John flew from Florida to Portland for a vacation and a friend's wedding, drove to a secluded spot in a forest and shot himself to death.

Although listed as a Captain, Frueh was reported to actually be a Major with the Air Force Special Operations Command.

I suggest that additional deaths of B-52 pilots or crew members will provide an independent if tentative confirmation of sorts of my hypothesis.

No matter their base. If I am correct, we should anticipate that insider crew members will quickly be separated by transfer.

Probably very quickly. Which opens another possible window of information. Anyone at Minot following this blog, and I'm sure there are a few out of over 123,000 hits to this thread as I write this, should watch for unanticipated transfers of personnel away from Minot.

I mention all this because there have reportedly been six deaths of healthy, young Airmen at Minot since October of last year.

Three recently. One on July 2 and one on July 17, by motorcycle accident in Tennessee while on leave and one found dead in his home near base. On September 10 the third committed suicide in Virginia while on leave. I find this string of deaths troubling.

The July and Frueh deaths obviously do not directly relate to the August 30 flight. But as I posted late last night, I now see the possibility that the August 30 flight was only the latest in a series. The one that got caught. Which in turn implies the Airmen who died in July could have been involved in prior flights.

Yes, I know. I'm fear-mongering again.

azchuck



posted on Sep, 14 2007 @ 10:53 PM
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Mattification - re your post that a nuclear blast could be easily traced to the country of origin. Not true! At least not yet.

I've done some research on that subject. Here's one good link. There are many more - search "nuclear attribution"

204.71.60.36...

Here's a really scary quote from the link:

"The American Association for the Advancement of Science is in the very early stages of a study on nuclear forensics, and the Homeland Security Department has plans for a White House exercise exploring forensic capabilities after a domestic nuclear explosion.

With robust forensics and attribution capabilities — paired with a declared retaliatory policy — the United States could, in effect, hold nuclear states around the world accountable for a nuclear transfer."

I think the outcome of the Homeland Security exercise has already been determined before the bomb goes off in the US. It will be North Korean material tracked through Syria.

The technology if it exists at all, is so immature and untested that any results will be accepted by Bush's 28% and dismissed as inconclusive by the rest of the world. But that won't make any difference - remember the anthax was tracked to Fort Detrick.



posted on Sep, 14 2007 @ 10:56 PM
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reply to post by Bhadhidar
 



Hi Bhadhidar;

You start with:


There was no Specially Trained and Authorized crew at Minot to load the nukes because what they were loading weren't supposed to be nukes!


Good, and I appreciate your trying. Your suggestion adds to the thread.

But I get to keep the cigar. The AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile was specifically designed to deliver nukes. No conventional explosive warhead is available for this missile.

So your two choices are nuke warheads and practice "dummy" warheads.

And the weight difference between the live nuke warhead and the practice dummy warhead is significant, according to several sources.

I should have included that fact in the original article but did not.


But suppose you could "steal" a warhead before it got "locked-down", before anyone was even aware of the fact that is was a nuclear warhead?


Always possible. Although there is an equally stringent chain-of-custody protocol for nukes rolling out the door of the Pantex assembly plant near Amarillo.

On the other hand, I can see how that could be possible. But not as to the nuclear warheads loaded on the plane at Minot.

azchuck



posted on Sep, 14 2007 @ 11:04 PM
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reply to post by doubleded
 


Creepy. It was stated several times by others in this thread that the radiation signature could be traced, maybe I should have scrutinized those claims as strictly as I have azchuck's.



posted on Sep, 14 2007 @ 11:21 PM
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reply to post by doubleded
 


Hi Doubleded;

On behalf of Bill and all, welcome to ATS! As an old-timer here (as compared to you anyway) I feel qualified to say that.

To all, I thoroughly enjoy the mental games here but I have been writing posts for 15 hours now. I'm no longer young, I'm losing my edge, and I have to quit for tonight.

Especially when I see six new posts for each one I respond to. I'll be back tomorrow morning. Early, Mountain time.

But I have to say, upon first reading:

BINGO !

YOU GET IT TOO !


You see how this really could be done.

To me, the secret is in the decommissioning part. The missiles are scheduled for decommissioning - the scrap heap, as I mentioned in the original article. So no one at either Barksdale or Minot would really be concerned. The B-52 flight was really nothing more than a fancy airborne trash truck run.

As I said, I need to study your post carefully. And I think it merits close study, because I think you are very close. My only possible (preliminary) disagreement at this point is that I think the missiles never were intended to be unloaded at Barksdale. Remember, missiles and planes are decommissioned at Davis-Monthan in Tucson. So the plane was merely parked temporarily, just like any commercial flight. The missiles never were to be unloaded.

I'll give your post a serious look-see tomorrow. In the meantime, I'm shipping you the cigar.

azchuck



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 12:17 AM
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don't need codes to trigger an explosive device. the codes tell a micro processor to trigger the explosive in the same way a control panel for an alarm system triggers the system.

you can bypass all of that. it might take a set of manual switches, and you'll need to know what signals need to be applied to what wires but if this all did go down this way I am sure the people who have number 6 know how to trigger it with or without the codes.



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 07:01 AM
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reply to post by azchuck
 


Hello,
I agree az, doubleded gets the cigar. In the article he posted on the forensics there was this bit of info

Despite the sensitive nature of the issue, however, the topic has been migrating closer to the spotlight. An upcoming report from the Preventive Defense Project, a joint research initiative between Stanford and Harvard led by former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Assistant Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, is expected to touch on post-explosion forensics and attribution.

now wouldn't you know, all coincidence I am sure, just speculation mind you perry and carter were involved in 9/11

www.whodidit.org...

I personally could not say, although I think Stalin might agree, mass murder gets easier after you done popped your cherry.
f3



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 09:46 AM
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reply to post by azchuck
 


I thought about why they might fly to Barksdale rather than to the decommissioning site. I thought it was in Texas which is very close to Barksdale, but Tuscon is not too far either (1005 miles). One possibility is that Tuscon may not be set up to service B-52's. I'm sure they could if necessary but it was probably more effort than it was worth, so SOP was to fly to Barksdale and truck to Tuscon. Another reason might be Tuscon may not have the necessary equipment to demount the ACM's from the B-52.

And of course the plan would not work at Tuscon since the swaperoo in the truck could not take place, so the planners would have found any plausible excuse not to fly the ACM's directly to decommissioning.



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 09:57 AM
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Originally posted by doubleded
Mattification - re your post that a nuclear blast could be easily traced to the country of origin. Not true! At least not yet.

I've done some research on that subject. Here's one good link. There are many more - search "nuclear attribution"




That month, Stanford’s May, Jay Davis, founding head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Raymond Jeanloz, a professor of planetary science at the University of California, Berkeley and nuclear expert, jointly published an article in Nature.

They wrote that an isotopic signature would be available within hours after a terrorist nuclear detonation, but determining where that material came from hinges on already having a database of existing nuclear signatures. It is that database that some experts suggest remains incomplete.
.
.
.
.
The United States has developed its own database based on its nuclear weapons test programs and monitoring of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted during the Cold War.


We know what OURS look like, and we know what our friends' look like from their aboveground tests.

It's the untested ones not in the database that take longer and are far more difficult to determine - thus the article's rambling about being able to determine where the uranium was mined etc. If you've got to backtrail where it was mined at and how long it's been since the rods were reprocessed, I could see it being a bit sticky trying to pin it down.



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 11:16 AM
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reply to post by doubleded
 


Good morning and Aaaah, the missiles vs. warheads issue again. Nuke warheads are assembled, disassembled etc. at the Pantex facility near Amarillo, TX.

Missiles and military aircraft are scrapped or mothballed at the military graveyard adjacent to D-M AFB in southeast Tucson, AZ.


One possibility is that Tucson may not be set up to service B-52's. I'm sure they could if necessary but it was probably more effort than it was worth, so SOP was to fly to Barksdale and truck to Tuscon.


D-M is a pretty big place. I know they do training and proficiency testing for A-10s and either F-15s or F-16s. They have about 14,000 feet of concrete. I'm sure they could handle a B-52. After all, all that would be necessary is unloading the missiles, refueling and normal pre-flight.

I don't mean to be argumentative, but... As to ease, trucking from Barksdale to Tucson may or may not be easier, but remember, we're dealing with the Air Force here. Which means Air force mentality.

The Air Force does not drive trucks.

Period.

The Air force flies airplanes.

Period.

Example: In the 60s, an AF Colonel friend of mine told of flying from one of the little countries south of Saudi Arabia to Italy every time the base commander needed another case of Scotch. Bud got his flying hours in that way, at a cost of several thousand dollars a bottle.


And of course the plan would not work at Tucson since the swaperoo in the truck could not take place, so the planners would have found any plausible excuse not to fly the ACM's directly to de-commissioning


About the graveyard: As of a year or two ago, the price of scrapped equipment was $37.1 billion. That's inflated retail prices, of course. A short description is here:

www.thepepper.com...

Google photo and map are here:

www.satellite-sightseer.com...

More coming after more caffeine intake.

azchuck



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 11:30 AM
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reply to post by azchuck
 


The Air Force does not drive trucks.

Period.

The Air force flies airplanes.

Period.

LOL. Good point!



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 11:35 AM
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Originally posted by azchuck
The Air Force does not drive trucks.

Period.

The Air force flies airplanes.

Period.


Whilst I take the point, this is overly simplistic. Of course the Air Force drive trucks. There are many many occassions when transport via road is preferable to transport via air.



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 11:42 AM
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reply to post by doubleded
 



I still haven't done justice to your post. But here's what I think:

Nukes were loaded into the missiles at Minot, per orders from high authority.

This would make sense to Airmen at Minot IF the B-52 was headed to Barksdale, because Barksdale has been publicly declared to be and is well-known to be a jumping-off point for shipments to the Middle East.

And all Airmen surely have heard of Washington threats to nuke Iran. So Minot Airmen could accept their orders to ship their nukes to Barksdale. The orders make sense.

But the orders wouldn't make sense if the nukes were going to Tucson. So at least one of the Minot Airmen might question the orders or complain to higher-ups.

As to unloading nukes at Tucson or Barksdale:

At Tucson, the nukes conceivably could be unloaded from the missiles and stored somewhere in the process of scrapping the missiles. Remember, paperwork would be a lot less for trash than for usable items.

But the weight factor might be a problem: The risk of Airmen asking why the empty missiles were so heavy.

But at Barksdale, the B-52 is in, parked on a back apron for a while and then off again, to Tucson. Refueled at Barksdale probably, and the missiles under the wings would be obvious, but paperwork shows the plane destined to the Tucson scrap-yard. So that explanation would satisfy people who asked questions about the missiles under the wings. Again, it's logical.

And the warheads are only visible via two windows in the missile skin. Both windows are about the size of a dime. So nobody on the ground at Barksdale would know the missiles bound for the Tucson scrap-yard had nukes inside.

But somewhere on a back apron of Barksdale, the missile hatch doors could be opened and the nukes removed and trucked away. Most likely at night. The truck could be explained as taking out conventional bombs for storage.

On the other hand, as I think about this, retrieving them in Tucson might be easier and make more sense. And weight might not be a problem. I don't know the weight of the nuke warhead as compared to the weight of the missile.

azchuck



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 11:55 AM
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reply to post by franzbeckenbauer
 



With all due respect, I do not see the sense in unloading missiles from a plane, crating them securely and trucking them to Tucson. Particularly given that equipment destined for the scrap-yard routinely flies in to Tucson.

For one thing, because a heavily armed convoy would be required for security purposes. Scrap or no, these missiles are high-tech.

Security is one of the reasons why, as to nuke warheads as contrasted to advanced cruise missiles, by air is the much-preferred method of transportation, per Air Force policy manuals.

This also might explain why the missiles were not trucked from North Dakota to Louisiana.

Alternatively, you might try reading my comment as intended Sat-morning humor.

azchuck



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 11:56 AM
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Just a side point to begin with this time: re the decom location for "special" weaponry (read "nukes")... I thought they were taken to Kirtland AFB in NM and that Sandia in Albuquerque has some involvement in the process as well. Of course, that could be disinformation but I found it on a few sites that are also discussing this "mistake".

There has been quite some discussion about whether the aircrew of the bomber involved did not know what they were carrying under the wings. It would be pretty worrying if they didn't. Consider the scenario of the aircraft developing trouble...losing power or having serious probs with hydraulics that operate various control surfaces, stuff like that. If the ACM's were only carrying dummy warheads (or no warheads at all), the pilot might make the decision to drop them (over a empty field, say), to reduce payload in an attempt to save the aircraft from going down. With a "mixed load" would it not be advisable that the pilot knows which ACM's can be dropped/jettisoned and which must not be except as an absolute last resort?

Further to this, if the plane either went down or had to jettison a nuclear-armed ACM, personnel along the chain of command would have to know exactly what the aircraft was carrying in order to inform those responsible for instigating appropriate measures under NARP (Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures). Otherwise, in any scenario where an ACM could impact, without or without the aircraft, the local populace would be placed at risk of exposure to highly toxic plutonium. After all, in such a secnario the impact velocity could well be in excess of 500mph and though the chance of an actual nuclear detonation is virtually zero, the conventional explosives could detonate lead to radiation spread.

By the way, if anyone wants to take a look at the NARP manual (which is not classified and available to the public) you can find it [here]

Actually, considering some of the scenarios that have been proposed it might not be a bad idea to glance through it. In usual DOD fashion you have to wade through a ton of definitions and so on but it's worth a look.



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 12:34 PM
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Thought I'd best post this separate from my previous one.

Mention has been made of Putin and the current relationship between Russia and the US as well as other nations. If I may give you a perspective as a person who is at this moment sitting about 60 km (40 miles) from where the US wishes to build a new anti-missile-defence radar base in the Czech Republic, I can tell you that the majority of Czech citizens do not want this base here. (By majority I mean in the order of 70% of those surveyed by the usual "Gallup" poll methods.) The Poles have the same feelings about the anti-missile missile base proposed for their country. Of course, the popular press both here and as far as I can see in the US continue to state that "the Czech Republic supports this radar base", but this only means that the current Czech government does. By a slim majority that could well turn the other way after the next elections. (Difficult to say when they will be.)

The "people" don't want it. The reasons are simple. First, they had enough of foreign soldiers and bases on their soil under the USSR's control and prior to that under Hitler's regime. So there is the emotional-level reason and you can't really blame them. Secondly, these are not stupid people and they know that in the event of a conflict, radar bases (especially those designed to track missiles) are a prime, first-strike target and would be hit hard, and many thousands of people living in the towns and villages in the area near where the base is proposed to be are scared and some have already sold up. (Market values in the area have plummeted.) Third, they don't buy the story that this radar base is only to track incoming threats from potential "rouge" states like Iran; they know darned well that the US and NATO allies have the ability to track ICBM's already and their assets in the med. and nearby places (guess where) are working quite well already thanks. They also are concerned because it's not a NATO-only initiative but "gWb" has stated that this base is to "protect US interests in the region" and as far as we know the nearest ones are in Germany.

The Germans obviously don't want this base in their country (see point two above) so the Czechs are going to get stuck with it.

How does this relate to the thread? Well the Russians (read Putin) have stated that they see these two new bases as a threat to their own security and that both the radar and the anti-missile base will have an offensive as well as a defensive role -- and they are not happy about it. The Czechs get very worried when the Russians start saying things like that. After all, they have a history...

There is pressure mounting for the govt here to call a referendum, which they won't do unless they have to because they'd lose and so there'd be no base. I say "unless they have to" because under the Czech constitution if citizens can gather a minimum of 200,000 signatures calling for a petition on a specific issue then the govt is obliged to accept it and call one. This country has only ten million inhabitants in total so 200k signatures is a fair number.

This number has now been gathered and presented, but the Premier (named Mr Topolanek) has said in so many words that "the people don't understand the issues involved so we will make the decision, not the people". He (or his party, better said,) argues that we need to defend ourselves and the US is only trying to help us. We could be attacked by Iran etc at any time and so we need this radar base with its US soldiers to operate it. (The Czechs have a very good radar system of their own, btw.)

On Thurs 13/9/07 there was a meeting between mayors of district towns near the proposed base site and the minister of defence, Vlasta Parkanova. However, here the plot thickens so because this post is getting long I'll start a new one and you will see the possible tie-in between what is happening here to some hypotheses that have been proposed on this thread.






posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 01:11 PM
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So, to continue from my previous post if you're not bored to tears yet, our minister of defence here had a meeting with district mayors to discuss their objections and provide information that intended to reassure inhabitants that the base posed no risk to them. (By the way, the government has also been voting through extra funds lately for towns in that region for things like upgrading road and drainage infrastructure, but they have expressly denied that this is in any way an attempt to sweeten up the populace vis-vis the radar base. Sure.) However, in spite of the fact that this was supposed to be a public meeting and journalists therefore could attend, only two journalists were present as the rest were prohibited access. (The two who got in were personally invited and under the "care" of one of the mayors.) The minister's spokesperson denied that the minister had barred news media but one of several of the mayors who shortly left the meeting in protest had a different version: "Starosta Strašic uvedl, že zákaz vydalo ministerstvo obrany." The Mayor of Strasice stated that this prohibition was issued by the ministry of defence. (Quoted from news reports here in Prague on 15/9/07)

Interestingly, the Mayor of Strasice is one of few in the region totally in favour of the base. But that didn't stop him walking out in disgust when journos were barred.

This little side-line is to show you that things are not all squeaky-clean and above-board here in respect of the proposed US radar base. There is mounting opposition; even people who previously couldn't have cared less about this matter are now becoming interested and concerned, more because of the increasingly threatening attitude they see from the Russians (read Putin, again,) than anything else.

The problem is that unless the citizenry can be convinced of the necessity for such a base here, opposition will continue to grow. Concerned about this and also no doubt worried that as the Premier refuses to allow a petition in spite of the law, and that petition question may be eventually resolved by the supreme court and the govt might lose, our govt here will soon let a contract of some 12 to 15 million crowns to a PR agency to assist them in swaying public opinion in favour of the base! (Tenders for the job are being examined now.)

So, to bring this right back into the thread at hand, there has been a lot of speculation about which US city would be a likely target for a false-flag nuke and so on, but very little about how one could set up a false-flag op to gain certain objectives, such as getting a couple of new bases built with no public opposition -- and even have other countries asking you to build one in their back yard as well. That's without considering the other spin-offs as well...

Just imagine if a nuke went off somewhere in Central Europe! OMG, a rouge state has got their secret ICBM and WMD programs further along than we even realized -- and now "they" have done the unthinkable!

You can write the rest of the script I guess...

Okay, I am giving you an "outside the US" perspective, but I hope it is at least some food for thought. In my (admittedly rather insignificant) opinion I feel there would be no need to use a nuke within the US. After all, "an attack on any NATO country is an attack on us all." And the Czech Republic is a NATO member. So is Poland.

Leave it with you,

Mike



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 02:08 PM
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Thought you might like to read this direct quote from page 65 of that NARP manual I mentioned a bit earlier, as it has some bearing on what the AF said in regards to their "mistake". As I stated, this manual is not classified, it is available to the public.
So here’s the quote:

Table C2. T1. Nuclear Weapon Confirmation Guidelines

Confirmation Guidelines for the CRTF

It is DoD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular installation or location. There are two exceptions to this policy.

1. The CRTF is required to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in the interest of public safety if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon. The OASD(PA) shall be advised of this confirmation as soon as possible.

2. The CRTF may confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. The OASD(PA) shall be advised before or, as soon as possible, after such notification.


Notes: The CRTF is the Commander, Response Task Force. The OASD(PA) is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

Anyways, so by confirming where these nukes were (namely where they weren't supposed to be), the DoD was just following policy to (ahem) "prevent widespread public alarm". I mean, obviously, once they announced their "mistake" everyone felt safe and cosy, right? Even though we ...ummm... wouldn't have officially known about it if they hadn't "admitted" to it...

Oh, just another thing...(Sorry about this.) Does anyone see any conflict between points one and two? I mean, I was just thinking that if (for example) a bomber went down over US soil with a nuke or six attached and was now in a million bits all over the place, the DoD would be required to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons at the crash site because of danger/s posed by them. That's what exception (1) says. But if they inform the public, then that would could widespread public alarm, would it not? And that's not good under exception (2).

Is my line of reasoning off the wall here?

I'm asking all this because that darned bomber could have crashed for heaven's sakes -- and apparently no-one on the ground who had to deal with its effects would have known it had nukes on board! But if the high-ups actually knew, would they inform the public or just quietly seal the area off for Reasons of National Security and pretend to know nothing when radiation (and cancer) rates downwind/downstream etc started going through the roof?



posted on Sep, 15 2007 @ 02:35 PM
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Originally posted by doubleded


X2D

Your ground crew would have no problem loading (empty) ACM's under a wing, as they would HAVE to be duds headed for training/decommissioning.

Or

The ground crew knows the missiles are hot during a underwing training exercise. This scenario ‘in my imagination’ ends with them saluting to the covert flight crew taxiing off to runway hold. On pilot’s sign-off, the load and security crew are told to stand down or move to next plane (it’s a bigger exercise in my world)

If you really want to get Clancy with it, I then drive a ‘second’ B52 back at the same ground crew a few minutes later with ‘fake’ nuke warheads inside (switch-a-roo scenario) – so a legit ground crew can unwind the whole process , but now with 5-6 fake warheads back in the tank.

Heck, if you don’t like the idea that your pilots are bad eggs, I tell the B52 drivers to return from taxi to a different hanger location where my Covert ground and security crews (In my exercise there is more than one team of them) unloads the live rounds for cross country delivery to your favorite Sunday sporting event in an ice-cream truck.

Seriously, The intricacies of plan are only as limited as the complexity of the procedure, and I am the king of Halliburton.

On a simpler note I ask if the war heads are stored separate from the missile body on base?

If interchangeable then the USAF probably transports/decommissions them without mating them to a stinking missile - as the full assembly would be less efficient and prone to illegal transport??

– As a result of my messy screen play logic I say nobody in the USAF believes or allows underwing decommissioning stories- without POTUS or VPOTUS special order!



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