reply to post by azchuck
As someone who has preformed "site guard" whilst serving in the British Army I can confirm this is the case. Whenever someone enters one of these
bunkers, there are at least 3 people; one officer and two enlisted men. Not only that, but (at least in Europe) there are 2 armed guards stationed at
the door of the bunker itself. This is without taking into consideration the massive amount of security around the site itself. Usually site security
is provided by a nation other than the owner of the site - I'm not 100% sure why this is but I'd guess it is a security measure to minimise the
chances of one nation attempting to suborn its own armed forces into helping stage false flag attacks or similar. Of the two armed door guards (I
performed this function many times) one is from the "host" nation and the other from the nation which provides site security; again I imagine so
that there is an armed "neutral observer" to keep an eye on things.
This is all just to ENTER a warhead storage bunker. To MOVE a warhead, the whole site is mobilised. This happens sporadically for exercise purposes,
and would usually be unannounced and in the early hours of the morning to test reactions and procedures with at least a little realism - after all, if
them damned Russkies were going to kick off they'd hardly have the decency to do it when we're all awake. There is a veritable plethora of checks
and balances involved in the moving of a warhead. Firstly there is a complete accounting of ALL the warheads in the site. Then, a number of different
people verify the warhead to be moved - and they don't just have a cursory glance, but actively read from a script, out loud, for the benefit of
"I certify that this warhead is serial number blah blah and is to be moved to the toilet down the corridor", etc etc.
Then there will be a receiving team in the warhead's new location who will follow similar accounting procedures. Finally, when the new warhead is in
its new location there will another FULL accounting of ALL the warheads on the site, with every single one checked physically by a minimum of three
people (again, usually two fairly senior enlisted men, sergeants and above and an officer), again reading their script out loud for the benefit of
Once the second full accounting is completed, the site commander will confirm the job is done to his superiors, at which time security will be stood
down to normal levels - which would make concentration camps look like public thoroughfares. Nobody goes ANYWHERE within the secure compound of a
weapons site without a very good reason - and NEVER alone.
There will NEVER come a time when these procedures are relaxed. As has been observed, atomic weapon security is THE highest priority for armed forces.
To think for one second that these weapons could have been "accidentally" put aboard a bomber is, quite simply, laughable.
PLUS. As I tried to argue a couple of days ago, it is NOT policy to transport nuclear weapons (or for that matter ANY weapons) on the actual delivery
system. If these warheads were being sent for decommissioning then without any doubt whatsoever they would be crated up and sent either by road, rail
or by transport plane - but NEVER by bomber! The chance of an accidental launch or radioactive leak, whilst remote, still exists; that possibility
does not exist when the warhead is crated up in specially made containers and transported with full security.
[edit on 14-9-2007 by franzbeckenbauer]