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Originally posted by ShatteredSkies
Now, apart from all the other obvious falacies, how exactly is the S-300 expected to intercept an ICBM moving at Mach 25 in an almost perpendicular path to the ground?
Shattered OUT...
Originally posted by Daedalus3
Read up on the S-300PMU..
Supposed to be able to shoot down projectiles at speeds upto 4800m/s
(Mach 14), and this is suitable for terminal velocity phase interception(
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Reentry is anywhere from 4 to 7 KM/s though. While the S-300PMU can hit between 4-5km/s some ICBMs will be going 40% faster than that or more.
Originally posted by ShatteredSkies
Now, apart from all the other obvious falacies, how exactly is the S-300 expected to intercept an ICBM moving at Mach 25 in an almost perpendicular path to the ground?
Shattered OUT...
In March 4, 1961, in the area of the A testing ground the V-1000 ABM with a fragmentation-high-explosive warhead successfully intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 25 kilometers the R-12 BM launched from the State Central Testing Ground with a dummy warhead weighing 500 kilograms. The Dunai-2 radar of the A system detected the BM at a distance of 1,500 kilometers when it appeared over the radio horizon, then the M-40 central computer found parameters of the R-12 trajectory, and prepared target designation for precision homing radars and the launchers. The ABM was launched and its warhead was actuated by the signal from the command post. The warhead of the ABM consisted of 16,000 balls with a carbide-tungsten core, TNT filling, and a steel hull. The warhead had a fragments field shaped as a disk perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the ABM. The warhead was actuated by the signal from the ground with a deflection necessary for formation of the fragments field. The warheads of this type were designed under the supervision of Chief Designer A. Voronov. The M-40 central computer was designed by the Precise Mechanics and Computer Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences under the supervision of Academician S. Lebedev. The computer could make 40,000 operations per second.
The V-1000 had two stages. The first stage was a solid-propellant booster, and the second stage was a sustainer stage with a warhead which was equipped with a liquid-propellant engine developed by the Design Bureau of Chief Designer A. Isaev. In addition to the fragmentation warhead a nuclear warhead was also designed for the missile. The flight tests of the missile, which could intercept targets at altitudes of up to 25 kilometers, started in 1958. The parallel approach to the target at a strictly counter course was chosen as the method of the ABM's homing. The V-1000 was delivered to the trajectory calculated according to the homing method along the regular curve, parameters of which were defined by the predicted target trajectory. P. Kirillov was the Chief Designer of the missile's automatic pilot. On March 26, 1961, the ABM destroyed the warhead of the R-5 BM with 500 kilograms of TNT. Overall, during the trial of the A system 11 launches of ABMs were performed which destroyed warheads of BMs, and experimental ABMs with heat seeking self-homing warhead, radio-controlled fuses, and optical fuses were also launched. The S2TA version of the V-1000 ABM with a heat seeking self-homing warhead was tested at the A testing ground between 1961 and 1963. The flight tests of the V-1000 with the nuclear warhead (without the fissible material) designed in Chelyabinsk-70 were conducted in 1961. For this warhead two types of proximity fuses were designed and tested: the optical fuse (designed by the GOI under the supervision of Chief Designer Emdin) a and radio-electronic fuse (Chief Designer Bondarenko) for the R2TA and G2TA versions of the missile.
Systems for surmounting of air defenses intended for domestic BM were also tested during the trial of the A system. The launched target ballistic missiles were equipped with inflatable false targets Verba, unfolding false targets Kaktus, and Krot active jammers. Overall, the field tests of the A system showed a principle possibility of BM warheads interception. Experiments under the coded name Operation K were conducted (K1, K2, K3, K4, and K5) to check a possibility of the A system functioning under the influence of nuclear explosions at altitudes of 80 to 300 kilometers between 1961 and 1962 at the Sary-Shagan testing ground. The A system showed its capability to function even when a conventional enemy used nuclear weapons.
www.fas.org...
On 29 November 1960 the first attempted intercept of an R-5 IRBM by the V-1000 was fully successful. (1) The anti-ballistic missile passed within the kill radius of the high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the V-1000. But the warhead itself had not completed development and was not installed. The five following intercept attempts were unsuccessful - five R-5's and two V-1000's were expended (three times the system failed to launch the anti-ballistic missile in time):
1961 began with another string of failures (5 further launches were planned in the first test series). A variety of warheads were wasted in attempting to destroy the incoming missiles. (3)Once, manually, and twice, automatically, the missile made a more-or-less successful intercept. But this was followed by three failures, indicating a great amount of time and effort were needed to develop the intercept method.
(2)On 4 March 1961 the V-1000 achieved a world first - the destruction of the re-entry vehicle of an R-12 IRBM. This was followed by the destruction of an R-5 re-entry vehicle. In all, there were 11 launches with military warheads, plus launches of developmental warheads. The S2TA variant used an infrared-homing self-guiding high-explosive warhead and was designed by Storozhenko at the GOI State Optical Institute in Lengingrad. It was capable not only of determining the moment for warhead detonation, but also was capable of guiding the anti-ballistic missile independently using an on-board computer. The R2TA version used a radio-guided explosive warhead, with two types of proximity fuses used to determine the correct moment for warhead detonation. These were the G2TA, a radio ranging system, developed by Bondarenko and an optical system, developed by Emdin at GOI. Flight tests of the V-1000 with a nuclear warhead designed at Chelyabinsk-70 were also carried out.
Manufacturer: Vympel/Grushin. Launches: 37. Failures: 5. Success Rate: 86.49%. First Launch Date: 1958-10-16. Last Launch Date: 1962-11-01. Launch data is: incomplete. Apogee: 100 km (60 mi). Total Mass: 8,800 kg (19,400 lb). Core Diameter: 1.00 m (3.20 ft). Total Length: 14.50 m (47.50 ft). Maximum range: 300 km (180 mi). Boost Propulsion: Solid rocket. Cruise Propulsion: Storable liquid rocket, AK-20I/TG-02. Cruise engine: S2.726. Cruise Thrust: 102.900 kN (23,133 lbf). Guidance: Radio command. Maximum speed: 3,600 kph (2,200 mph). Ceiling: 25,000 m (82,000 ft).
www.astronautix.com...
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Reentry is anywhere from 4 to 7 KM/s though. While the S-300PMU can hit between 4-5km/s some ICBMs will be going 40% faster than that or more.
However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.
Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.
In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).
www.jinsa.org...
Mr. Lee's analysis is complex. To vastly simplify, he says he has evidence that Russia's surface-to-air interceptor missiles carry nuclear warheads and therefore are capable of bringing down long-range ballistic missiles, not just aircraft and shorter-range missiles, which is their stated purpose. Russia has 8,000 of these missiles scattered around the country, and Mr. Lee says he has found numerous Russian sources that describe how successive generations of SAMs were in fact designed with the express intention of shooting down ballistic missiles, which is illegal under the treaty.
www.opinionjournal.com...
It is not my purpose here to deal at length with the technicalities of SAM upgrade, but these analytical results shed light on some important considerations. Any ABM capability that might be ascribed to the SA-2 system was highly qualified and conditional. But those who took the possibility seriously noted that some capability could indeed be shown to exist. Those who denigrated the possibility emphasized that such capabilities were "technical" or "theoretical" and not "real," though no means for giving meaning to those characterizations ever emerged. It was also pointed out that no country would rely upon a defense which depended upon the attacker's behaving in a certain way which made him peculiarly vulnerable; on the other hand, it was noted that the approaching strategic arms limitations negotiations might freeze the offense so that
precisely such a situation might occur. Discussions about the possibilities of changing reentry angles or burst heights quickly showed that it could be accomplished only with great difficulty.
The report we prepared was not enthusiastically received. In several parts of the Agency and elsewhere in the community, we were charged with having added fuel to a destructive fire by not rejecting out of hand a palpably ridiculous suggestion. Within the defense technology community, we were ridiculed as delicate flowers unwilling to go the whole way in addressing the possibilities of upgrading SAMs. Throughout the rest of the debate-through the SALT considerations and the preparation of NIE 11-3-71-CIA's defensive weapons systems analysts alternately defended the possibilities of SAM upgrade or argued against its likelihood depending upon the particular protagonist being encountered.
www.cia.gov...
Correspondent] The upgraded S-300 can hit a warhead even in space. This is exactly what the Americans are dreaming of when they speak about the ABM system. As soon as it is known about the launch of a combat missile, its trajectory is calculated immediately and air defence experts begin acting. There are just 7-10 seconds to locate a target, acquire it and launch an interception missile. They have done it.
www.missilethreat.com...
Originally posted by Daedalus3
In the ABM role..
And that twist on launch is an exageration..
You can't havea a missile of that length doing such things..
In the ABM role..
And that twist on launch is an exageration..
You can't havea a missile of that length doing such things..
The Soviets have developed a surface to air missile -- SA-12. This missile is mobile. They are about to deploy it. In a few years they will have hundreds of them -- maybe 1000 or 2000 -- maybe more. The Soviets claim these missiles are there to defend against incoming airplanes.
What counts in such a defense is acceleration -- how quickly the missile can turn. That acceleration, published in reliable British sources, is "at least 10 times the acceleration that any pilot can stand." I estimate that with appropriate available equipment, these surface to air missiles could stop any incoming ballistic missile --particularly ours.
www.commonwealthclub.org...
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Reentry is anywhere from 4 to 7 KM/s though. While the S-300PMU can hit between 4-5km/s some ICBMs will be going 40% faster than that or more.
Originally posted by ShatteredSkies
Now, apart from all the other obvious falacies, how exactly is the S-300 expected to intercept an ICBM moving at Mach 25 in an almost perpendicular path to the ground?
Shattered OUT...
Originally posted by vK_man
that twist right after cold launch from missile tube is not exageration , check s-300v 's video , s-300v makes such twists (right after launch)
www.youtube.com...
though speed of the twist is slower ,than what is shown in this animated video , but after the twist the misssile acceraltes rapidly to mach 8 - mach 11
s-300v and S-300VM(and also samoderzhats missile) is designed for such things though i am not sure about s-300PMU ,
and here's what mr.teller has to say on s-300v on its manuverablitiy and accerlation:
[edit on 26-4-2007 by vK_man]