SLINEY, LEIDIG, MYERS: THREE DEFENSE LINKS SWAPPED AT THE LAST MINUTE
Original link:
they-let-it-happen.blogspot.com...
9/11 was just such a weird day, who could think it relevant that among the other oddities of that morning The FAA was being run by a first-day rookie?
Benedict Sliney was just getting his feet wet as the National Operations Manager when four civilian airliners were hijacked amid confused reports of
about a dozen possible hijacks. USA Today, which described Sliney as the nation’s “air traffic chess master,” reported that in his job interview
he was told by the man promoting him he had “unlimited” authority. Indeed, while Sliney had superiors like FAA administrator Jane Garvey, he was
called on to make major decisions that morning. He told the 9/11 Commission: “NORAD […] asked
me if I were requesting military
intervention. And I indicated to NORAD that I’m advising you of the facts of this particular incident – I’m not requesting anything. I wasn’t
sure I even had the authority to request such a thing.” Perhaps he hadn’t watched the training video closely enough the day before.
But was the Chain of Command he and the others at FAA informing any better organized? The National Military Command Center (NMCC), beneath the
Pentagon, is the command and control “nerve center” for the military leadership if America comes under attack. While this usually does not happen,
the NMCC sits ready, watched over and coordinated by the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) and is used for other activities requiring centralized
coordination – like
passing on requests for fighter assistance in case of a hijacking
and, I’d guess, coordinating air-based War games, of which there were
at least five on 9/11.
Army Brigadier General Montague Winfield was originally slated to be in charge of the NMCC that morning, but the previous day he had decided to take
some time off, asking a recently qualified but inexperienced rookie, Navy Captain Charles Leidig, to stand in as DDO in the morning. This is confirmed
by Leidig’s own testimony to the 9/11 Commission. His written statement was the shortest they received at just over one page, large font, double
spaced. It stated blandly “on 10 September 2001, Brigadier General Winfield, US Army, asked that I stand a portion of his duty […] on the
following day. I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 0830 on 11 September 2001.” At that very minute, the first plane was right
between its hijacking (about 8:15) and its impact with the WTC (8:46).
The remarkable request was presumably for some other, lesser, reason. But Leidig’s rookie status (only qualified to be DDO a few weeks earlier) and
the emerging crisis did not interrupt the transfer and Winfield left. I can’t say whether this had any operational role in 9/11 or the lack of
defense against it, or was related to the air-based war games that have been acknowledged, but both seem probable. And while certainly the timing of
this admitted September 10 request is beyond coincidence, none of the involved parties have offered any explanation - it has remained both curiously
open and unexplained.
But war games or no, Leidig’s job there wound up more than a drill. As the 9/11 Commission’s final report explained “the job of the NMCC in such
an emergency is to gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between the national command authority […] and those who need to
carry out their orders.” This includes, among others, the Defense Secretary and JCS Chairman. Acting Joint Chiefs Chairman, Air Force General
Richard Myers – like Leidig,
filling in as of the morning
of 9/11 - claims total ignorance of the attack until about 9:40, and the 9/11 Commission confirmed that he arrived at the NMCC and joined the
conference in session just before 10:00, over an hour after the attack began and just as it was ending.
By the time Myers arrived at 10:00, regular DDO Montague Winfield had taken the center over again from Leidig, but Rumsfeld, the middle link in the
“national command authority” chain Leidig was tasked with “gathering,” was still MIA. Winfield would later state “for 30 minutes we
couldn't find him. And just as we began to worry, he walked into the door” at 10:30 – nearly a half hour after the attack was over. While he’d
been at the building all morning, officially he’d been too busy loading injured into ambulances for the TV cameras to take his part in the defense,
though
accounts of his whereabouts vary greatly.
So here is the graphic representation of Leidig’s unorthodox stand-in shift and the results of his work to “gather the relevant parties” during
the 111 minutes that hijacked attack craft were attacking the heart of America’s financial and military might. By whatever confluence of factors,
the room was kept vacant of upper leadership until Leidig relenquished control and the attack ended. We should be left wondering why the parties
weren’t gathered, what was so special about Leidig that he had to be there to fail to gather them, and who knew the day before just how badly he
would fail when inserted in the morning?
Since that day, Leidig has been promoted – first to Commandant of Midshipmen in September 2003, then to U.S. Defense Representative to the Pacific
micro-states. Later he assumed command of U.S. Naval Forces Marianas and Navy Region Marianas and advanced to Rear Admiral status. Leidig is recipient
of numerous service medals over his distinguished career, none specifically for his service on 9/11, of which his official Navy bio makes no mention
whatsoever.