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Russian version of the Trophy.

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posted on Feb, 12 2007 @ 01:33 PM
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armor.kiev.ua...

Not much to say, just decided to include what the Russian's have that is similar to the Trophy.




posted on Feb, 12 2007 @ 01:36 PM
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Originally posted by deltaboy

armor.kiev.ua...

Not much to say, just decided to include what the Russian's have that is similar to the Trophy.


the new russian military suits and caps are soo ugly!!

man, i love the USSR ones, those were so nice.



posted on Feb, 14 2007 @ 12:32 AM
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'And under the pretty but pointless category...'

My understanding of this is that they loft a rocket and then fire a counterblast diagonally down at a sharp angle to 'minimize collateral/unintendeds' while maximizing the fragment shower densities are relatively low impingement velocities (hence the shaped charges are able to go off without/before complete vaporization of the weapon before terminal fuzing approach).

To which the obvious answer is simply to increase the index height and/or the standoff range as a function of firing EFPs from beyond the effective coverage arc.

I would specifically like to see one of these APS' try to stop a 5,000fps EFP that forms upwards of 100m away from the target if necessary.

Of course 'then you go' to active armor systems like Cactus and the like but even this is not a guarantee because you can stage EFPs or 'overstretch them' so that the shotgun effect destroys the protective facing and the high mass slug behind goes right on through.

Since the entire design of the tank is completely dorked from the perspection of contemporary engineering understanding of how to design mission volumes on vehicles and particularly the importance of the heavy gun over rockets, this kind of hackneyed 'incremental' defense is to be expected.

But it isn't really effective.

Something that should be obvious from the fact that a bunch of barbarians with 2nd grade educations are now using sophisticated ORMs which employ EFP technology in Iraq.

If you want to survive sophisticated antiarmor threats do the following:

1. Deny their targeting.
Jamming, Smoke, Size, Maneuver Off Road. Typical stuff.
2. Evade their fires arcs.
Speed, Size, Saturation, Maneuver and Terrain Effects.
3. Trade acceptable attrition for deployment portability.
If I can drive five ATVs off the back of a V-22 but only sling one
Hummer, I have just scaled my 'new tank' to a strategy of winning by
numbers. Alternatively, look at the CH-53/CH-X and the Wiesel.
4. Exceed their ranged or rate of fire.
In many ways, this has more to do with netcentrics and offboard
targeting than anything but there is also a valid argument for
deceptive maneuver and saturation to bring lighter, faster firing,
weapons into the distance at which advanced rounds can defeat heavy
armor.
5. Yank the dumbass morons opening up the internal volume.
Humans breathe air and they wriggle around too much, that's a terrible
design compromise for engineers to be stuck with. Thus the fewer
gomers under armor the better, especially in turret design and -
optimally- as a staged evolutionary process leading to complete
Bolorization.

With the above as a design baseline, you quickly realize that maybe the M4 Sherman approach and certainly the T34 one (small, fast, easy to build) gives you superior tradeable options in a 21st century universal weapons carrier followon platform.

And _NO_ I'm /not/ talking about Stryker or the moneypit FCS.

The only thing remaining (once we retire the current generation of codger from the 5-walled asylum) is the abandonment of the 'my gun is bigger' phallic obsession with absolute fires dominance. Instead, we need to make detailed design studies on _how good is good enough_ in terms of specific target classes serviced before these vehicles are considered paid off relative not only to it's own platform values but those of the mission being supported. In this, you will likely find some surprisingly inverse logic assumptions.

'High Threat' platforms like MBTs are encountered in relatively small numbers as relatively open-field discrete target sets. Thus a MULE UGV (not to be confused with the 1960s utility cart) with 4 or 8 CKEM and a 25-35mm Bushmaster upgrade with 100 rounds may well be a 'winner' if it fires off no more than half it's short TOF weapons before being counter killed, even as a completely unarmored target. Why? Because it can rapid-fire it's HVAT weapons with shorter intervals than any autoloader can match. And, by definition, it MUST be able to support those weapons, in flight, against multiple tracked targets (i.e. intelligent optics).

OTOH, you take that same buggy into a city and start doing block by block clearance work, and things change. Because the LOS is much shorter. And the intimidation effect much less. And the ability to bulldoze through unexpected maneuver lanes less. While in turn it is _the enemy_ who sees YOU as the large, discrete, target force. And one which is defeatable with LAW and Mine/IED/Satchel attacks from inside the distance at which the single gun system can react. Here you need to be able to rapidly engage multiple targets with heavy, all-sector, armor and indeed potentially act as an independent maneuver as much as fire support asset /without troops/ so that you can force the geometry of the fight to your advantage (i.e. If the threat is too high to go around the block and cut off reinforcment or flight from a given bulding under assault).

The resulting value trades that must be assumed start to drive you towards individual configurations that are highly dissimilar with the high-intensity warfighter needing all his technology investment in independent ops capability (automotive reliability and intelligence of untethered ops) as well as weaponization/sensorization dominance to take the fight beyond the enemy ability to WEZ challenge. OTOH, simple multi-tire drive can probably provide sufficient mobility for what is a relatively lightweight combat platform, simply because the kinds of threats out there make surviving even a single platform-weapon attack unlikely.

OTOH, the LIC/SSC platform must concentrate on survivability and large round count/multi-axis fires options (at a minimum: 4,000+500+1,000+4rds of rifle, cannon and smart grenade caliber fires with backing thermobaric heavy LAW) relative to sustained fires endurance on SMALL targets. If it has even an emergency evac/assault bus role you also need residual internal volume and/or 'running board' troop rails. All of which means weight which means tracks.

CONCLUSION:
Firing ATGW or LAW of any kind should reward the threat with the dropping of the cover behind which he is standing. No questions asked. When you try and trade up on defenses against a cheap (potentially salvoable) threat you imply a 'continuous exposure @ high value' unwillingness to maintain an operational pace sufficient to overrun the enemy and deny him the ability to /sustain/ a desultory campaign. i.e. You give him an Iraqi bled-white-by-inches scenario where conventional forces are meatgrindered at little resident population loss.


KPl.


LINK-
GSO: EFPs and Shaped Charges
www.globalsecurity.org...



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