POINT FIVE
The final point consists of two elements that arise from the same fundamental philosophy – the determination of the US to eliminate the influence of
the Soviets in Europe and, if possible, to precipitate the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Operation Gladio and The Strategy of Tension.
Operation Gladio was originally conceived by Allen Dulles, who went on to become the first civilian Director of the CIA. It was the Italian code name
given to NATO’s clandestine stay-behind armies, which were left across Europe after the war to better train partisan groups to counter the threat of
Communist expansion. Initially, these armies were coordinated solely by the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) until, upon the orders of NATO’s
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), a second command centre was formed in the shape of the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC).
These stay-behind armies later became key backers in what was known in Italy as the Strategy of Tension. This right wing, anti-Communist programme was
aimed at preventing the increasingly popular Italian Communist Party from participating in a governing coalition. It lasted for over a decade.
Throughout the campaign, Gladio members employed both violent and non-violent methods to manipulate public opinion against the Party, often committing
false flag attacks and then blaming them on Communist insurgents. These were conducted indiscriminately against both civilian and non-civilian
targets, and included the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, the 1972 Peteano car bombing, the attempted assassination of former Interior Minister Mariano
Rumor and the 1980 Bologna massacre.
Gladio first came to light in August 1990, when then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti gave testimony to a Senate subcommittee investigation into
terrorism in Italy. Andreotti revealed that the secret army had been hidden within the Defence Ministry as a sub-section of the SISMI and its
predecessor, the SOIS, Italy’s military secret service. This revelation infuriated the former Director of SIOS, Vito Miceli, who had “gone to
prison because I did not want to reveal the existence of this super secret organization.” An organisation, which according to Vincenzo Vinciguerra,
one of the 1972 Peteano car bombers, was required to “attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent people, unknown people far removed
from any political game [in order to force] the public to turn to the state to ask for greater security.” Subsequent investigations have since
revealed that Gladio-style armies also operated in Belgium (SDRA8), Denmark (Absalon), Germany (TD BJD), Greece (LOK), Luxembourg (Stay-Behind), the
Netherlands (I&O), Norway (ROC), Portugal (Aginter), Switzerland (P26), Turkey (Counter-Guerrilla), Sweden (AGAG), and Austria (OWSGV).
Following these disclosures, the European Parliament issued a Joint resolution condemning Gladio.
Operation Cyclone.
In 1978, Nur Muhammad Taraki, the Secretary General of the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), became the first Communist
leader of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
Taraki’s government immediately began the process of reform. It laid out a Marxist agenda, which included land and education reforms, as well as
more liberal attitudes towards women. These were seen as an affront to the traditional rural and feudal Afghan way of life; they were also seen as an
attack on Islam. By mid-1978, mujahideen insurgents had already established a base in Pakistan and had turned to the West, in particular the United
States, for support.
In September 1979, Taraki was killed and Deputy Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, took control. Soviet leaders soon began to question his loyalty to
Moscow following reports that he was purging the opposition of Soviet sympathisers and that he was a CIA agent. Indeed, the Soviets strongly suspected
that the CIA had, for some time, been active within Afghanistan. On 27th December 1979, they intervened militarily in support of the Communist
revolution.
The Soviet’s suspicion was later confirmed by the then US National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in an interview with Le Nouvel Observateur
in January 1998.
Q: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan
6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the National Security Adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in
this affair. Is that correct?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army
invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise. Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President
Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the
president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked to provoke
it?
Brzezinski: It isn’t quite that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
The CIA’s support of the Islamic mujahideen (Operation Cyclone) relied heavily on the intermediation of Pakistani secret service agency, the Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI). Much of that support, whether in the form of recruits, finance or equipment, was distributed by the ISI to the mujahideen
via Maktab al Khidamar (MAK), which was founded by Dr Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden.
Between 1979 and 1992, the CIA is said to have helped train over 100,000 Islamic insurgents at a cost of up to $20 billion. In his book, ‘Unholy
Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism’, John Cooley reveals that some insurgents were recruited in the US and sent to the CIA’s
spy training camp in Camp Peary, where they received paramilitary training.
[edit on 28-5-2007 by coughymachine]