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9. It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested:
A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.
10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.
[t]o show accurately the crucial role of the United States, it is not enough to point out that the American quota in the IMF, by far the biggest, prevented any decision from being taken without Washington’s consent or even to stress that the new monetary arrangement was in fact a gold-dollar exchange standard, since all currencies were linked to the dollar valued at $35 per ounce of gold. To do it full justice, one must describe the arrangement itself as an instrument of American domination.
…[t]he decline of oil, the principal driver of economic growth, undermines the validity of that collateral which in turn erodes the valuation of most entities quoted on Stock Exchanges. The investment community however faces a dilemma. It desires to protect its own fortunes and those of its privileged clients while at the same time is reluctant to take action that might itself trigger the meltdown.
Securing the flow of affordable oil is a cornerstone of U.S. Middle East policy. The U.S. strategy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, designed to ensure that neiher [sic] Iraq nor Iran is capable of threatening neighboring Gulf countries, is inextricably linked to Washington’s oil policy. Currently, U.S. domestic oil production supplies about 50% of total U.S. consumption. Foreign sources provide the rest, primarily Canada, Venezuela, Mexico, and several African countries.
By 2020, Gulf oil producers are expected to supply between 54% and 67% of the world’s oil. Thus the global economy will almost certainly continue to depend upon the supply of oil from Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members, particularly in the Gulf.
…fostering the independence of the States and their ties to the West; breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes; promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers; encouraging the construction of east-west pipelines that do not transit Iran; and denying Iran dangerous leverage over the Central Asian economies.
Q: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the National Security Adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in this affair. Is that correct?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise. Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked to provoke it?
Brzezinski: It isn’t quite that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Originally posted by NGC2736I grant that it does not exactly fulfill the basic idea, as I understood it to showcase 9/11 itself, but the fact that it lays the basis for understanding the hidden need and past actions of the role players in this drama, it does fulfill the spirit of the contest, IMO.
Originally posted by NGC2736
I grant that it does not exactly fulfill the basic idea, as I understood it to showcase 9/11 itself, but the fact that it lays the basis for understanding the hidden need and past actions of the role players in this drama, it does fulfill the spirit of the contest,