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Paratroop Forces

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posted on Feb, 11 2007 @ 04:51 AM
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please no personal attacks


why then does the SRR and the SFSG have different selection processes, have different insignia and are based separately. Not to mention they fact they have different roles.

Fritz you have still not answered the question (and dont give this its too secret BS) what is SRS?. One more question: you quoted "I still don't know why we need the paras. We have SAS/SBS, Pathfinder, SRS and SFSG. They could be deployed by parachute. " why did you add the pathfinders when you said we dont need paras i was under the impression that the pathfinders are paras? Still seems very strange why you seem to have forgotten about the SRR.




posted on Feb, 11 2007 @ 05:44 AM
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Everyone please drop the attitude and insults or keep away from the thread...



posted on Feb, 11 2007 @ 07:50 AM
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Can you know please tell me the point of your links?

All these facts are well known, infact i have been looking at these same sites to try and find anything on this SRS (apart from the ww2 special raiding squadron). We know the SFSG exist we know we know the SRR exist,contrary of what you say the SRR are not part of SFSG they are all parts of the UKSF but it would not make sense for the to be part of SFSG, when SRR main role is gathering intel for SAS, SBS and the secuirty services.

Not once in your links does it say anything about your SRS and it wont because they havent existed for over 60yrs. If they do exist please please give us info, but i for one know you wont because you cannot. This is the reason you have put these links up to hid the fact of your error. This link actually contradicts your claim that the SRR is part of SFSG quote:"2. The creation of two new Special Forces units to enhance the overall capabilities of the Special Forces and to improve the UK's ability to fight terrorism was announced by the then Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon on 16 Dec 2004. The first unit, the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, became operational on Apr 2005. The SFSG is the second unit, which became operational on 3 Apr 2006." clearly showing that these two groups are clearly separate. I think what you mean is that they are part of UKSF.

Anyway i look forward to reading your post in which you clear up your confusion about SRS

mojo


[edit on 11-2-2007 by mojoberg]

[edit on 11-2-2007 by mojoberg]



posted on Feb, 11 2007 @ 10:38 AM
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I only ask because, in the very first link it lists all the units.

If you take the trouble to search further and I'm not too sure that you know what you're looking for, you may eventually find, a list of all the units that may be part of and support the 16 Air Assault Brigade.

So go dig.

Shot Out!

[edit on 11-2-2007 by fritz]



posted on Feb, 11 2007 @ 11:30 AM
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Can you fritz or anyone please tell me in this link www.timesonline.co.uk... it says anything about SRS or that SRR are a part of SFSG. All it does is explain the role of SFSG and then lists the SF units : SAS SBS SRR SFSG and 18signal regiment. What am i supposed to have missed Fritz? and what has the 16th air assualt brigade got to do with anything. And i like the way you Quote"you may eventually find, a list of all the units" why dond you just put the link on the forum so we can all see?

All it requires Fritz is for you for once and for all to gave a definitive name for this SRS and to what their role is in the UKSF. It really is that simple.

[edit on 11-2-2007 by mojoberg]



posted on Feb, 14 2007 @ 07:37 AM
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Nothing heard from my protagonist....silence is golden, as they say. Guess my 2 U2Us worked.

So how about it mojo......................did you find the answer? U2U me if and when you do.



posted on Feb, 14 2007 @ 02:36 PM
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Was the question about whether Paratroop forces in general were a good/bad idea, or just for the Brits? The US has had Airborne insertions as recently as 2003 into Iraq and Afghanistan(SF, 75th Ranger Regiment, PSYOP, 82nd Airborne).



posted on Feb, 14 2007 @ 04:18 PM
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Originally posted by BlueRaja
Was the question about whether Paratroop forces in general were a good/bad idea, or just for the Brits? The US has had Airborne insertions as recently as 2003 into Iraq and Afghanistan(SF, 75th Ranger Regiment, PSYOP, 82nd Airborne).


Cheers BlueRaja.

I was talking about paratroops in general but Brit paras in particular. I was trying to make the point, that operational combat missions such as Arnhem, Suez and Dien Bien Phu, were all things of the past. I always understood that paratroops like snipers and SF, were a strategic weapon.

In modern combat operations, you'd never get away with deployments of the size that took place at Arnhem or Dien Bien Phu, without at least
50-75% casualties, given the advances in ground to air AAA and missile systems protecting vital assets.

I was also trying to explain to certain people that once on the ground, paratroops reverted to light infantry and were incapable to capturing and holding ground without heavy support from the ground and the air.

With regard to more recent conflicts, am I correct in thinking that the SOCOM in Afghanistan were clandestinely 'inserted' as part of the SOF tasking?

I have not heard of ANY US SF or Paratroops jumping in to Iraq on combat missions since GW1 and even then, I understood they were inserted by rotary wing assets or, as was the case with SAS/SBS, by vehicles.



posted on Feb, 15 2007 @ 06:59 PM
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Fritz,

According to a book I read (_Shadow Wars_ or maybe _The Mission_) we suffered a major SOF crisis in the mid-late 90's simply because the elitism effect required too many prior tours in a 'volunteer' force for which increasingly the existing hardships (endless deployments etc.), lack of pay and college education were the major drivers in preventing commitment to a career track which 'eventually' lead to the various Teams training pipes.

Literally the old hands were all aging out without 1:1 replacement.

Then 9/11 happened and for the first time, SOF candidates were taken straight out of Basic. Kind've miffed some 'on the list for how long now?' people off but the shortfalls were truly that bad.

Now assuming you have a similar Airborne/Ranger type qualification prenup to your SWO courses, exactly how many people do you need to induct per year to get the prerequisites for each? Can I assume a 50% dropout factor at each level?

IMO, given the performance displayed in 1991 and since, and particularly the reversion to mobile warfare (horse, bike, ATV, Gator, Pickup), there may be something to be said for getting new blood into the units faster so that they can have some immediate satisfaction factor before the realization sets in as to exactly how miserable a military career can be.

It may also help to keep the total washout factor lower if you tier the performance thresholds and then split the inductees up into Commando and SOF training pipes from early on. The training will still be hard, but the test-to-failure performance thresholds will be tailored to an existing expectation level rather than ramping up to Hell Week from the start.

Myself, the utility of para forces all comes down to 'how many tons, how many miles', you expect to deploy them. Vs. how many miles and how many weapons/sensor/comms options you expect them to be able to lug about on their own, once grounded.

During the Falklands, I remember the photos of lines of British troops during their 'long walk' South and how tired and unready they were when they got there. Given what they brought to the fight, I have to wonder if the option to move a dozen heavy weapons (say twenty specialists divided into three sections and a command group) on ATV wouldn't be better, especially now that we have high leverage enablers like SPR/AMR, GPS cued mortars, light ATGW, FLIR on every CSW and even handlaunched UAV overhead cue so readily available.

Again, if you can bring a heavy fight to a light environment, with fewer total forces, fine, design a para force around them. If you lack the airlift to insert the more conventional style of air assault force, I don't think trying to justify them as a force generation capability for the SOF which -can- undertake that high teeth:tail mission.

Quite simply: At the human level, Physical Capabilities don't match Mental Endurance + Heavy Weapons + Powered Mobility. Training men to jump is a damned expensive way to get an occupation force or deployment rotation fill as backup boot which is basically all that units like the Rangers and 82nd are good for once they are on the ground anyway.

In the end, what will be the death of Airborne forces will be a rough-field reliable, 400-500 knot, VTOL platform with at least 500nm worth of range and the ability to deploy 20-50 men. Since I don't think we are that far away anymore (once the SDLF concept migrates from the F-35) it may indeed be time to consider tailoring the force to the kinds of deployment platform that lets them effectively _drive_ off and ride to the sound of gunfire.


KPl.



posted on Feb, 16 2007 @ 01:38 AM
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I'm not too sure from which viewpoint you are coming from CH1466. Are you talking from an American or Brit standpoint?



posted on Feb, 16 2007 @ 02:38 PM
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Originally posted by fritz

Originally posted by BlueRaja
Was the question about whether Paratroop forces in general were a good/bad idea, or just for the Brits? The US has had Airborne insertions as recently as 2003 into Iraq and Afghanistan(SF, 75th Ranger Regiment, PSYOP, 82nd Airborne).


Cheers BlueRaja.

I was talking about paratroops in general but Brit paras in particular. I was trying to make the point, that operational combat missions such as Arnhem, Suez and Dien Bien Phu, were all things of the past. I always understood that paratroops like snipers and SF, were a strategic weapon.

In modern combat operations, you'd never get away with deployments of the size that took place at Arnhem or Dien Bien Phu, without at least
50-75% casualties, given the advances in ground to air AAA and missile systems protecting vital assets.

I was also trying to explain to certain people that once on the ground, paratroops reverted to light infantry and were incapable to capturing and holding ground without heavy support from the ground and the air.

With regard to more recent conflicts, am I correct in thinking that the SOCOM in Afghanistan were clandestinely 'inserted' as part of the SOF tasking?

I have not heard of ANY US SF or Paratroops jumping in to Iraq on combat missions since GW1 and even then, I understood they were inserted by rotary wing assets or, as was the case with SAS/SBS, by vehicles.


Well typically, the mission of US paratroopers(not SF, but 82nd Airborne or Ranger), is to act as a forced entry unit. They capture airfields, etc.. so follow on(heavier) forces have a means to arrive. Additionally they can capture and hold strategic points where there is a time sensitive nature involved. They can also keep an enemy off balance as you can get forces behind their lines to disrupt their rear echelon/logistical chains. The US Marine Corps has a similar mission, but theirs would be to capture ports of entry. As for AAA/SAMs, there would have to be some sanitizing of the battle space before they could operate, which is why they typically would have a support package flying ahead if there was a significant threat. The air assault forces(i.e. the 101st Airborne), have similar roles, but more of a tactical nature than strategic due to their reliance on heliborne insertion, so they'd have to already be in theater to operate. I agree that once these light infantry forces are on the ground, their missions are similar to the conventional infantry. There is a huge psychological effect of having paratroops suddenly show up though, which can be exploited to gain initiative.

[edit on 16-2-2007 by GT100FV]



posted on Feb, 16 2007 @ 11:57 PM
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GT100FV,

>>
Well typically, the mission of US paratroopers(not SF, but 82nd Airborne or Ranger), is to act as a forced entry unit.
>>

I think of Ranger and Airborne as more akin to Grenada type 'light rescue' units in that they land where there is the largest flat space available to keep their clustering ratios high enough to be self defending against _other infantry_. They then _temporarily_ pass thru as much as sieze an objective and are themselves evacuated before real threats show up. If that flat spot should happen to be something so predictable as an airfield, too bad for the soldiers because it's a straight shot killing zone that can 'lose' men across the very linear terrain matrixes that they have come to set up for allied use. Indeed, in Grenada, half the men landed in rocks on the south side, and ALL of them took up to 12-15hrs to get it in one sock, get the desultory fire from the tree'd ridgelines cleared with company mortars and an AC-130. And then clear off row after row of concertina, spikes and assorted other FOD.

Try doing this under /serious/ fire and well...I think Crete says a lot here.

>>
They capture airfields, etc.. so follow on(heavier) forces have a means to arrive. Additionally they can capture and hold strategic points where there is a time sensitive nature involved.
>>

Snicker. Which means that -after- X-many C-17 sorties have been dedicated to 'first wave' converting winged boot badges to rifled ones, the Barneys get to go **back around the planet** to reconfigure and pick up the '1 M1 apiece' by which they plan to deploy heavy forces into theater.

To support the new-minted infantry of course.

Riiiight.

Indeed, didn't we do this out West, just to prove we could? Drop 82nd at H3 or 4 and then start to bring in heavy stuff to the airhead even though what little resistance was being encounted was still Feyadin/Technical oriented on the main southern AAs? I know CAS tasking on the left was more or less dead.

Anyway, the important thing to realize is the difference between a 'militarized DZ' and a true APOD/SPOD relative to ton-hours and months if not YEARS of build up necessary to field an ARMOR force capable of independent ops from yon hostile airfield. Where, thanks to systems like Netfires and Viperstrike, you don't need to cross horizons let alone swords with any threat unit, let the bloody AF spend some of those tanker frequent flier miles to bring in some of the 1,000 or so tacjets rather than plan spit-in-a-gallon-jug with airlanded whatever.

The only thing muzzle mutts are good for is attracting enemy fire so that heavier platforms can kill it. That and screaming on the radio where to put what arrives and you sure as hell don't want that to be 15-20hrs later... i.e. Ground Enables Air. Not the other bloody way about.

>>
They can also keep an enemy off balance as you can get forces behind their lines to disrupt their rear echelon/logistical chains.
>>

Snort. To the extent that either side knows where each other are at. My recollection of 'the great northern front campaign of OIF' was...oh wait, there wasn't one, was there?

Jump in the mud like a Dirty Jobs pig wrestler and then Hurry Up And Sit 'guarding a ridgeline' while the Iraqis on them don't engage with available mech or RT based fires because they are scared shirtless of fixed wing airpower. Rather, they simply look at you digging your fighting positions as Saddam is too busy looking at his southern reaches to bother with boots in Khurdland (where we've defacto been for ages anyway).

What the northern 'airborne' offensive amounted to was a buffer zone as much to the Turks as the Iraqis, acting as a speedbump to the SOF _driving_ out of the DMZ and tying up with the Khurds to secure 'our half' of the oil bounty at Kirkuk and surrounds. Thus creating a natural regional 'ethnic power shift' whose resulting slaughter we only partially control rodded so as to encourage the Iraqi Army to 'just start walking south'.

Which is fine. Except that the airpower and RT to secure the dumbass paragrunts where they sit in their mudbaths is being wasted holding hands with an unthreatened force when it could be hunting Feyadin in the South. Para_military_ 'amateurs' who ended up doing the majority of the ass biting on our CS/CSS columns.

So bad that twice the Cavalry had to turn 'round and head back south to cleanup nasty little pockets of death and destruction as the Iraqis played leavebehind just like a Russian Partisan waving at Kraut armor passing by.

>>
The US Marine Corps has a similar mission, but theirs would be to capture ports of entry.
>>

Not without a Carrier. Which is essentially why the **lie** of the LHA/LHD as a self defending force is so laughable. If you hit the beach with conventional seaborne assault, you beg the enemy to kill you with preemplaced and preregistered fires that can go all the was out over a short horizon to your primary amphib group.

If you try it by air alone, you're down to RAP style attacks with mobile groups of no more than 4-5 vehicles and desultory mounted attacks at best.

Because these Jeep Carrier wannabes are too damn tight to be both an LCVP/LCAC well deck carrier and an effective airborne intervention force with all the jarhead ton-miles jammed in as well.

To do the airmobile-from-sea mission /properly/ you need to do what Boyd suggested which is think past the surfzone with ENOUGH ASSETS to effectively roll up the enemy from landwards. This comes down to 20 Osprey and 10 CHX plus 20 A-whatevers and that is pressing the envelope on even an SOF converted Nimitz class, let alone the KHawk.

More...



posted on Feb, 17 2007 @ 12:01 AM
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>>
As for AAA/SAMs, there would have to be some sanitizing of the battle space before they could operate, which is why they typically would have a support package flying ahead if there was a significant threat.
>>

Pffft. Short of coming in with a pair of glide wings and a GPS 'compass' from over a border, you are ALWAYS gonna have tight formations of slow, low, lumbering C-Jets dropping sticks of 'perfectly good airplane' idiots in densities sufficient to assure they all break ankles in the same county. That means that anything 14.5 and up is gonna be in envelope and MANPADS will give you /fits/. Make it a real IADS and/or hunting/DEW systems you had better ready for some serious BOHICAn duck bleepin'.

OTOH, if you skip the runway and land ONE jet (as a SOLL converted C-17) with 15-20 ruggedized trucks onboard, now you have something closer to a Quantrill's Raiders scenario with which to /hunt/ Feyadin.

Which is the same as saying that now it's the /bad guys/ who have to clap both hands over their genitals.

Given that, in-theater airlift or no, you can be in small dispersed units (impossible to ambush or overrun simultaneously) and still provide detached support to each other while DRIVING AWAY FROM the sound of gunfire.

Targeting can come from VTOL systems, ERMP/Predator or even Shadow type divisional UAV if you can lay down a rolled heavy-mat someplace.

While firepower can either be organic and thus _persistent_ to your teams. Or come from overhead via whomever is on station as you fire up whatever has the brazen gall to think they can safely move on YOUR roadway system.

One plane. One riskable unit. All the airpower in theater available to sort them out if they really catch the schnitzel.

>>
The air assault forces(i.e. the 101st Airborne), have similar roles, but more of a tactical nature than strategic due to their reliance on heliborne insertion, so they'd have to already be in theater to operate. I agree that once these light infantry forces are on the ground, their missions are similar to the conventional infantry. There is a huge psychological effect of having paratroops suddenly show up though, which can be exploited to gain initiative.
>>

Not really. Anybody who can read a high density terrain map can basically guess what they're about for objectives, how far they can go as a 'mixed' foot and command vehicle unit and what they can or cannot do in the given numbers likely to be encountered.

As such, conventional paras don't drop ala Normandy on purpose and U.S. doctrine in particular forbids the risking of assets under conditions where they could potentially be rolled up by a heavier unit. Which means they and their pretty berets get to sit out the fight in the backwaters of any real war. Or be fed piecemeal into a COIN type grinder that is the aftermath of many.

The one immediate exception I can think of was 1991 and then it was only because the 82nd was secured by both Saudi and U.S. nukes had Saddam decided to get stick his toe in the shark tank.

CONCLUSION:
The difference between 1940-when and now in what amounts to yet another legacy 'tradition' force structure is that, with modern day /sport/ equipment, it may well be possible for even an idiot to achieve the kinds of tricks that were previously reserved solely for the HEHO/HALO 'elite'.

But no matter what, once you stop being a airbone, if you can't drive, you can't _dictate_ the tempo of battle. Everbody has to bring the war to you. And you can't get out of the way if they bring more spunk than you can chunk on a death in detail basis.

That's why I say that a real 'para' force has to be one which is either capable of delivering useful quantities of lightweight (ATV or endurance Gator) roll-around vehicles from high altitudes and some precision. Or able to in fact _air land_ a medium vehicle (Pickup to Hummer class) forced entry team which can survive for 2-3 weeks, just on what they bring with them the first time.

Anything else, in a real warzone, is a dice toss that ends up be marginalized for political reasons as much as anything.


KPl.



posted on Feb, 18 2007 @ 04:46 PM
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It would appear that we wasted a lot of time training for those missions then, when I was in the Airplane Gang. The idea was to go in fast, and be able to fight for 72hrs till follow on airland forces arrived. Wild weasels, jammers, CAS, and interdiction would be flying ahead to clear a pathway, and the birds would come in around 450' AGL to minimize exposure to AAA. It certainly had a psychological affect in '95 w/ Haiti. When they heard that 120 planeloads of paratroopers were inbound, they capitulated.
Of course you would have Air Force CCTs, Pathfinders, SF, etc.. already on the ground communicating with the inbound birds, and giving them the most up to date sitreps on the DZ. They were also effective in Grenada and Panama. The 173 Airborne Brigade out of Vicenza, Italy along with augmentees from 10th SFG, conducted an airborne insertion into nothern Iraq due to Turkey's unwillingness to allow forces to stage from there. The 75th Ranger Regiment conducted several other airborne missions as well in Iraq and Afghanistan. While I'll agree that a massive airborne insertion into N. korea, Russia, China, etc.. wouldn't be a likely scenario, but that certainly doesn't preclude the airborne forces from having significant roles in regional type conflicts, or in NEO(non combatant evacuation operations) type operations. As for the 101st's utility- that was validated in Desert Storm when they conducted the largest air assault mission in history, moving a 4,000 man combined arms task force over 150km into enemy terrain in one lift, with the capability to move as far as 300km. They had 281 helicopters including 3 battalions of Apache Attack helicopters. The 82nd Airborne has the capability to from the time of the alert, have the DRB or ready brigade wheels up within 18 hours to deploy anywhere in the world.

www.globalsecurity.org...

"The 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, provides the ability to begin executing a strategic airborne forcible entry into any area of the world within 18 hours of notification. Their primary mission is airfield and seaport seizure."



posted on Feb, 26 2007 @ 05:23 PM
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Unfortunately, I was referring to the UK paratroop brigades.

I fully accept that the US has both the tactical ability and the military muscle necessary to deliver paratroops such as the 82nd to the battlefield.

However, as previously stated, the 82nd and other US paratroops have a particular role.

We Brits on the other hand, can barely clothe and feed our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and I believe that our parachute brigades are a very expensive luxuary we can ill afford - excepting SF units.

We currently have the main parachute brigades, para commandos, para commando gunners, para gunners, and I think, a para unit from the Royal Armoured Corps.

I believe there is also a small unit in the brigade of Guards that also undertakes para training, but I'm not too sure about that.

Our forces are almost stretched to breaking point and whilst surprisingly, our recruiting is up, training does take a minimum of 16 weeks.

I seriously do not think we can afford or need the paras.



posted on Mar, 5 2007 @ 03:35 AM
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We would end up using 'Skip Tanks' if we keep cutting down on defence.



posted on Mar, 22 2007 @ 06:06 AM
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While the reduction of paratroop forces seems like a good idea, I would suggest that this is ill-advised. The requirement for lightly-equiped aggressive troops who can deploy at short notice behind an enemy forward area is a huge asset.

These troops are able to take and hold strategic points of importance for a period suggiciently long enough to allow heavy forces to move in and creat an in-deapth position. This is often preferable to frotal assault, as rear areas tend to have weaker defensive capabilities and are manned by less aggressive troops.


BTW, good to be back from the land of the burka and back on ATS!



posted on Mar, 22 2007 @ 03:50 PM
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Paddy, so glad you made it back mate! Hope you and yours had a good tour. Good job, well done!

The tasking you suggest, was part of the II Sqn RAF Regiment roles but, as they have been amalgamated with 1 Para and others, into this SFSG thingy, I seriously doubt whether they are still able to undertake that type of mission.

Incidentally, 2 and 3 Para seem to be involved more and more in the Heavy Infantry and Support roles in Afghanistan and Iraq and I think I can see a shift in roles coming quite soon.



posted on Oct, 19 2008 @ 09:59 AM
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fritz you obviously have no idea whatsoever what you're talking about. Your post was very ill-thought out, you obviously didn't bother to think about what you were writing. You say there is no real point to 2 3 & 4 Para, simply because we have UKSF, SFSG and the rest.

That means NOTHING. Not only are we some of the toughest soldiers around, but without us then half the SAS would diminish. You say that we have the Pathfinder Platoon, SFSG, UKSF. Where do most of them come from? How can we have a Pathfinder Platoon if we have no soldiers to go for selection?

If you really have to, then at least look at us from a mercenary point of view, we provide a stepping-stone to Special Forces. Just because we don't jump off a C-130 in our hundreds, it doesn't mean there's no need for the Parachute Regiment. We're used in so many more ways.

Pvt. James Roberts - 2PARA.



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