Originally posted by WestPoint23
Personally I find this to be quite interesting, sending the F-22 abroad so soon to train with a foreign nation. Not to mention the North Korea
situation (they may test a second nuke), I feel this and the F-117 deployment can't be a coincidence. Both are aimed at being a show of force and
reassurance for our Allies.
Oh yes, its quite obvious now; with these pincer deployment strategies at Kadena and Kunsan. The Kunsan was a little old and so the deployment could
have been conceived to be 'normal', but this is a definite 'play of cards'.
Also it could possibly serve the dual purpose of marketing th F-22 the JASDF(I remember them being potential customers if Congress allowed it..)
Hope it doesn't pressurise the Norkians(I like that and mean no offence
) into doing something aggressive in a direct response to these
Another thing to keep in mind is the reaction, or lack thereof, of China. They know what the F-22 brings to the table but we're trying to show that
we can rapidly deploy in theater and sustain such operations.
They're(chinese) studying the situation you can be assured.
And the JASDF/USAF better have top-notch security at Kadena AFB for the very same reasons I've stated in F-117 Kunsan thread. I can bet that
they(chinese/Norkians/even Russians maybe..) will be tempted to get the best out of this backyard treasure trove.
Norkian and Russian agent activity in Japan has always been very very high and one can presume the Chinese aren't sleeping either.
It also highlights our close and mutual relationship with Japan, in time of war I have no doubt that all of its facilities and support systems
would be availabe to the US.
On a different note if you remember, this is EXACTLY what I was trying to explain to Chinawhite in one heated thread(I think Westpoint interjected
once there). There is the equivalent of approx. ~500-1000 strong 4th gen fighter force(estimates vary due to variables like a/c gen ranging between
3rd-5th,political alignments and geographical logistical deployability) of the Chinese east coast just meant to contain China(reassure Taiwan) and
This is preceisely why China counts on Pakistan to serve as a deterrent for India, and thus it(China)does not explicitly commit high-end fighter
resources specifically to the Indian theater.
And while we're on the topic of the F-22 Raptor, I cannot pass up this opportunity to post a highly informative article from Aviation Week regarding
the F-22 at Operation Northern Edge (Alaska). It's a follow up to the previous article I posted about this exercise. Read it, you will be surprised
and in awe...
Yep a good article.. Some thoughts on it:
1)In all WVR kills (I'm sure it obviously implies the same for the BVR realm) the F-22 was never 'seen' until it executed the kill. So stealth is
the key here.. I mean its definitely more pivotal than the WVR manueverability offered by the Raptor.
Maybe the USAF should try some Red Flag Exs where the Raptor has an intentional location transmitter so that it is aggressively engaged by 3rd/4th gen
red forces and a proper furrball dogfight ensues. Here you will get what the Raptor can do in terms of manueverability when its foe has parity in
terms of situational awareness. Maybe this can be tried out for Raptor vs Raptor or something or whatever.. bottomline is offer the foe equal footing
on situational awareness(by equal footing I mean don't mean give it the avionics capabilities of the Raptor but remove the stealth advantage) and
then see what the Raptor can do.
See its simple: You(Air combat tactician/fighter pilot/QFI) only depend so much on what your intel tells you about radar capabilities/advancements of
the Chinese and Russians(or anybody else for that matter). You need to prepare your pilots to deal with situations where they may NOT be at a complete
technological advantage so that they can give their best even when faced with such situations.
Maybe they already did this at Northen Edge.. who knows!
2) The bit about the F-22 acting as a mini-AWACS and relaying verbal feed to actual AWACS and lesser gen a/c:
This is great and it definitely acts as a force multiplier in terms of overall general situational awareness. Have the others(around the world) been
I'm not going to take names of a/c and events because thats irrelevant but the fact is other AFs are developing flight combat tactics around
scenarios where in a formation the 'super-fighter(s)' acts as a mini-AWACS and relays radar data-feed(note NOT verbal information) to lesser capable
In the case of the F-22 with stealth/supercruise et all, the pilot is able to hover 'above' the battle theatre,perform CnC roles at that altitude,
and then zip in for any targets it deems fit to engage.
In the case of a/c lacking stealth/supercruise, this role is executed in lesser capability(though sufficient) from a horizontal distance away from the
battle theatre in order to avoid enemy detection.
And here I'd like to make another point to guys who posted in the Su-27 thread:
'Soviet-era(and so presumably tactics today) combat tactics for soviet/Russian aircraft were/are highly dependant on GCI and C4ISR'
guys are right but this was for a reason.. The VVS(Soviet AF) doctrine was initially(until fighters like the MiG29 and Su27+ came into play) to
provide CAS for advancing Soviet ground forces and home fleet defense against NATO/USAF bombers. In these scenarios(esp homeland air defense) Soviet
GCI would have 90% situational awareness 100% of the time. So this was never a 'drawback' as such. Deep interdiction missions(where GCI support
would be minimal)were never a part of the soviet air combat training regime . Also here's another thing: The VVS was essentially made up of two types
of fighter roles : the FA and the PVO.
The PVO was designated for home air defense and these were the guys that flew completely within the framework offered by GCI.
Now the FA(Frontal Aviation) were the guys based in forward areas and these were the top-brass of the VVS. These guys I believe had a separate
training regime and operated in a more autonomous fashion as compared to the PVO. The 120 IAP was one such FA sqn and was deployed in East Germany I
think: obviously they were the best their country had to offer and were tasked with roles that probably ranged from CAS/CAP to deep interdiction
strikes to support advacing armored columns(minimal GCI support). These guys were feared and revered by NATO and for good reason. The FA in concert
with the Soviet ground forces would have been an awesome invasion force.
Now with the introduction of the MiG-29 and the Su-27 and the advancements included like radar,missiles,avionics etc.; deep interdiction became much
easier and much more autonomous.
Infact though many criticise the MiG-29 for the Soviet-short-legs syndrome
(i.e. ridiculously inferior range),
IMHO(and that of the authors of certain articles I've been reading) it is not so much worse than the Su 27 in that aspect when you consider various
points like positioning of fueltanks,radar and of course manueverability.
So the MiG-29 was/is good for deep interdiction as well if configured properly.
Moreover with the advent of Su-27 upgrades like the Su-30(MKI is the best of the lot of course!
.. no really!
) the dependancy on GCI has
With powerful radars like the N011M/ZhukM interwoven into AWACS like the Phalcon(InAF) and KJ-2000(PLAAF) the GCI dependancies of the remainder of the
aerial interdiction force (J-8s,J-10,J7E/F/P,MiG-21Bison,MiG-21Bis,MiG-27ML,MiG23BN,Mirage 2000,Jaguar etc) have greatly been reduced.
The Su27 variants flying in these AFs(and presumably the Russian AF) themselves serve as mini-relay AWACS.
Note: Since this 'data-feed sharing' happens in the InAF I presume it most definitely happens in the Russian AF(only doctrines may again be
different here) and there's no doubt that the Chinese are working towards such a capability if they don't have it already. The only thing is that
the Chinese currently don't have a fighter radar of N011M pedigree. I believe the best they have is the ZhukM. Maybe the J10 has something
The Soviet dependancy on GCI may have been more than average but it wasn't necessarily a disadvantage esp because they flew to doctrines designed
specifically for their goals.
Today there is very little dependancy on GCI and C4ISR for any Russian a/c for the reasons mentioned above.
This is exactly what I meant when I said that one should look beyond soviet GCI depedancy when analysing soviet/Russian a/c like the Su 27.
Look beyond geographically and in terms of time as well.
The Raptor in conjunction with UCAVs bit: Where's ch1466?!!
Good read westpt..
[edit on 11-1-2007 by Daedalus3]