Shelters don't seem to be hardened
Standard TAB-V 'quonset' design. They are good for 1,000lb near misses but the reality remains that they are intended to be single-unit
sacrificial. You blow a hole in one side and the other (plus the internal volume with airframe and crews) contains it so the rest of the dense pack
Pics 4 and 5 presumably indicate soft shelters for the F-117s.Infact in the background of Pic 5, one can see how close the fenced wall is to these
shelters. One would presume safer measures for a/c of such caliber in esp in sensitive areas like the Koreas.
If it's an ex-Victor installation, what you are seeing is the 'inner wire' around the HAS farm and hardstands. I agree that it puts a lot of
emphasis on point defense of shelters that look like they are vulnerable to heavy mortar or certainly ATGW standoff attack but then again, I never
really agreed with our airbase security system anyway. As is, airfields by their very nature have HUGE area of open-LOS inherent to the ramps and
runway/taxiway system and this is probably intended to be a literal long-shot killing ground long before the HAS themselves are 'Sykes Dagger Betwixt
Teeth' threatened by Norkian commandos.
The nighthawk not N-capable aye? interesting..
Well, it's one of those 'six of one' deals... WAJ #19 has Robert F. Dorr making some contradictory statements and quotations based on comments by
The F-117 is fully capable of level, loft, dive, dive toss and LADD (Low Altitude Drogue Delivery)...
Although warfighters wanted the aircraft to 'decapitate' an enemy's C3I assets no-one ever expected the F-117 to carry nuclear weapons, making it
perhaps the only tactical warplane designed to without this capability. Without nuclear capability, the F-117 was never part of the SIOP (singe
integrated operational plan) for the intial phase of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union...
1. LADD implies level and downlook capable views of the aircraft 'hotside' from radars that might find a feature they can exploit through dynamic
maneuver especially. It also a heart-of-trashfire option whose very exploitation of the radar horizon effect implies detection vulnerability as a
given. I also doubt /seriouslly/ if the 117 over-shoulder lofts well.
2. Between the Composites and the Delivery Profile (most still quote 12-15,000ft for the first night of ODS) I doubt if I would want to be dropping
anything which could cook my subsonic jet. Particularly early on when initial IRADS resolution was not as good as it is currently and given the jet
has no radar offset bomb options.
3. SIOP and indeed all other 'official' opplans require a declaration unto applicable command that makes the asset visible through a papertrail as
well as tactics integration. When the plane was still SAR across the board, this would have been a no-no, especially with the various INF/CFE and
START talks still ongoing.
4. They had to redesign the bay, /twice/ to get the kinds of release and munitions performance they were looking for with the trapeze fixed and the
doors only opening for a few instants. One of the aforementioned quotes by one Richard Silzer I think it was states to the effect: 'Always, always,
test to the configuration you will be dropping with in combat.' As a primary driver on fuzes, mass balancing, shapes, lanyards and all the rest.
With nukes _requiring_ superb ballistics-as-CEP predictors to control fallout and proximal friendly/civillian targeting and given the primitive
then-state of CFD, I doubt if anyone wanted to risk designing a profile which could not be multiply testflown to confirm the aerodynamics. i.e. With
only a few flyable shapes and a bunch of BLU bombs in inventory, the combination of relatively slow speed and medium altitude necessary to use the
IRADS as an angle rate bombing system just didn't make sense for all the other associated vulnerability and employment issues involved in the
NATO-met environment especially.
If we do defang Korea and I am not necessarily agin' it; I think we should be very open about what it is and how we will get there from here. Rather
than use assets as 'actors' whose symbolic presence means more than their actual capabilities can deliver on. The DPRK is not a stable country,
politically. You only have to watch their television and see one of Dear Leader's speeches to understand the mental state they operate under.
Furthermore, they don't have enough mass-as-gravitasse to be countervalue hostaged to their good behavior compared to what even indirect-sale terror
nukes could do in our lands. Finally, on June 25th 1950, they invaded the South without cause. In the 57 years since, neither the cult of
personality nor the obvious dogma-as-doctrine (tunnels, tunnels everywhere...) on that offensive act have changed and so their bleeting comes across
On those three elements alone, their 'self-evident right' to possession of a national nuclear arsenal has long since been determined, IMO.
Just DO NOT, make it a function of diplomatic brinksmanship in a continuing aggression-for-politics-and-profits-sake. Give a warning, give a schedule
and then simply _do it_ as a fully acknowledged action with sufficient leadup to make the translocation of forces apparent for the stated intent and
not a surprise activity to either side.
Be very deliberate as to what you will do and push through to the end until you get what you need. If the UN gives you s**t, remind them that none of
the nations which are or have previously SOLD nuclear technology to these pissant states need to fear U.S. as they already /have/ substantial arsenals
of their own. Then challenge those sellers to justify their own actions on more than a commercial sales basis.
If there is indeed a 'peace dividend' inherent to the end of the Cold War, it is that we can safely separate the philosophies of Communism and
Capitalism from the simple Moralities of what is best-for-the-globe.
North Korea being in possession of nuclear weapons, whether as a means to prop up the current regime indefinitely or to 'leverage reunification'
(they have nothing else) with the South before total internal collapse is NOT a good idea. The F-117 alone, in the Peninsula environment, is
incapable of ending that capability. It is a rattled saber whose noise is both needlessly alarmist and ultimately pointless. And the Norkians, being
paranoid militarist gits, will know it at least as well as anyone whose studies of the proper employment of airpower as a unified force model argues
against the Cockroach being anything but an empty political gesture.